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ABSTRACT
An Eco-Political Theory of Territory
by
Jonathan Kwan

Advisor: Carol Gould
In this dissertation, I advance a novel eco-political theory of territory that grounds a
people’s territorial rights in its right to political self-determination understood as inextricably and
normatively bound up with its right to ecological integrity and duty of ecological sustainability. I
develop a social ontology of the people as the holder of territorial rights based on its members’
place-based common activities that aim at their own independent governance rather than in terms
of state institutions, cultural nationhood, ethnogeography, political identity, or shared conceptions
of justice. The common activities of a people generate a group right to democratic selfdetermination since no one has more of a right than any other to determine the nature and course
of their common activities and otherwise domination ensues. Because a people’s common
activities are fundamentally attached to a place, its self-determination must be realized through
recognizing its territorial rights to jurisdictional authority and to (some) control over resources and
borders.
A people also has the right to ecological integrity and a duty of ecological sustainability
since the ecosystems of its territory must be protected otherwise the material preconditions for
human life and political society would be undercut. A people ecologically sustaining its own
territory is not only an internal constraint on its right to self-determination but is also party
constituted by its self-determination. For a people to sustain its own existence within the
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ecosystems of its territory will just involve the people setting the terms of the common activities
that are a very part of those ecosystems. Likewise, a people’s right to ecological integrity is a
constituent part and an enabling condition of a people’s external self-determination. Because a
people’s right to political self-determination is intertwined with its duty of ecological sustainability
and its right to ecological integrity, I characterize the principle at the basis of justifying a people’s
territorial rights as one of eco-political self-determination.
In addition to developing a general account of territorial rights, I consider how my ecopolitical theory addresses the issues of Indigenous territorial rights, structural racism, and
immigration controls. I argue that an eco-political theory fares better than alternative accounts
(such as neo-Lockean property theories, legitimate state theories, and cultural nationalist theories)
in comprehensively grounding the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples in the face of colonialist
violations of their self-determination and ecological integrity. Next, since legitimacy is a necessary
condition for the exercise of territorial rights, I develop the concept of “transitional legitimacy” as
analogous to but distinct from the framework of transitional justice to theorize how to realize
legitimate political institutions from within an ill-ordered society structured by racial oppression.
Finally, I consider the territorial right to control immigration and argue that the principle of selfdetermination both grounds and constrains a people’s qualified right to exclude potential
immigrants, which provides an answer to the boundary problem in democratic theory of how to
determine the scope of the people in a non-question-begging way.
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INTRODUCTION
Territory is in many ways at the very heart of political philosophy but is not always placed
in the foreground for normative theorizing. Traditional theories of core political values such as
legitimacy, political authority, democracy, and justice usually interrogate a binary relation between
the state, on the one hand, and individual citizens, on the other (or a triadic relation between the
state, in one place of the relation, and individual citizens with one another, in the other two places).
But of course individuals, political societies, and their institutions take place on territories. And
prima facie, it is hard to imagine that the land and geographical context upon which political
relations happen would have no role to play in how those relations should be structured. To indulge
in metaphor then, territory is the stage upon which much of political philosophy occurs, but
philosophers do not always break the fourth wall, as it were, to consider the very connections their
philosophical theories have with the background against which these theories take place and by
which these theories ought to be informed.
Aside from its relevance to various traditional core political values, territory also raises
important theoretical and practical questions on its own. To begin with, what even is territory? Is
it just the physical land or something else? What constitutes rights over a territory and what
justifies them? Who holds territorial rights? Is it states, nations, or peoples? What makes a group
entitled to determine for itself the shape and trajectory of its collective life rooted in or attached to
a particular place? Is the sovereignty of modern nation-states such as the United States or South
Sudan (the newest country) and their territorial boundaries—as they are currently configured in
the international arena—legitimate or justified? If not, how could they be? How does a state need
to respond to past injustices of racial oppression and colonialism along with their ongoing legacies
in order to have the right to rule over its territory? How should we understand and justify the
territorial rights of Indigenous peoples, many of whom have been unjustly dispossessed of their
1

territories in the past and now live within the jurisdictions of host colonial states? Or, consider
whether a group that holds territorial rights should have the right to control its borders and exclude
potential immigrants? Do undocumented immigrants have claims to membership in the country
where they reside? Do refugees, both political and ecological refugees escaping environmental
disaster and threats to their basic needs and rights, have claims to enter? And last but by no means
least, given climate change and the dawn of what some geographers dub the Anthropocene, what
responsibilities do territorial rights-holders have to ecologically sustain their territories for future
generations and to respect the ecological integrity of other peoples?
The goal of this dissertation, then, is to develop a theory of territory that will provide some
answers to these questions and that will, in the process, (re-)interrogate how values such as selfdetermination, democracy, justice, legitimacy, and ecological sustainability are informed by their
connections to territory. I begin in §0.1 by analyzing the concepts of territory and territorial rights.
In §0.2, I then briefly canvas the existing theories of territorial rights in the literature, my criticisms
of them, and where to find my criticisms in the dissertation. I end in §0.3 by providing a synopsis
of the main arguments in the six chapters of the dissertation, which ultimately set out and justify,
what I call, an eco-political theory of territory.

§0.1 TERRITORY AND TERRITORIAL RIGHTS
Etymologically, “territory” derives from the Latin territorium, which combines the noun
terra (land) and the suffix -torium (indicating a place). It first emerged in late Medieval Europe
and was used to designate particular jurisdictional areas (Khan 2012, 231). Territory, then, does
not simply refer to land or a geographical place, but is also inherently a political concept and
indicates the geographical domain controlled by a political entity generally through the exercise
of its jurisdictional authority (Moore 2015, 15, 26–28; Catala 2016). It is useful, too, to think of
2

territory as involving a triangular relationship between first, a geographical place; second, a group
of individuals inhabiting that place; and third, the political institutions that govern those
individuals in that place (D. Miller 2012, 253). As I will argue, in order to account for these many
different sorts of relationships between individuals, places, and institutions, a theory of territorial
rights will have to appeal to a diverse range of values, including self-determination, ecological
sustainability, and justice, and explain how these values are interconnected.
While theorists generally emphasize the political dimensions of territory, the debate on
territorial rights on the whole has, what Omar Dahbour (2019) calls, an “ecological blindspot”
because it ignores the material and ecological elements of territory, especially the importance of
territory in securing the environmental goods and services necessary for human life and political
society (2). A territory does not merely denote a domain or locus of political control or
jurisdictional authority but rather is also constituted by ecosystems of interacting and
interdependent organisms, abiotic entities, landscapes, and other environmental features and
processes. Moreover, the ecological and political dimensions of territory are not independent but
interact with and impact one another. In addition to providing the material prerequisites for human
life, a territory’s ecosystems influence, condition, and even set certain constraints on the political
society that exists and develops there. On the other hand, a group’s political control of a
geographical place involves in significant parts determining how the group should relate to,
manage, or steward the ecosystems of the territory it inhabits. Avery Kolers (2009) has emphasized
the “bi-directional character of human-environmental interactions” in which “people and land
interact in mutually formative ways: the people are as they are partly because of where they are
(were), and the land is as it is partly because of who is (was) there” (130). So, territory should be
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conceived neither as a political nor an ecological notion alone but fundamentally as an eco-political
concept.
What then constitutes rights to territory? Theorists generally follow A. J. Simmons (2001,
305–6) and David Miller (2012, 253) in disaggregating territorial rights into the following three
components: (1) the right to jurisdictional authority (also referred to as the right to rule), that is,
the right to make and enforce the laws governing a territory, (2) the right to control or use the
resources available within a territory, and (3) the right to control the movement of individuals or
goods across the borders of a territory.1 The right to jurisdictional authority also entails certain
rights to be free from interference (within certain constraints, e.g. of basic human rights) from both
outsiders and insiders. If an entity has the right to rule, then outsiders have a duty not to intervene
in that entity’s jurisdiction or to try to change its regime just as its subjects have a duty not to
interfere with the activities of that entity (or perhaps more strongly, a duty to obey its laws). 2 An
entity with the right to jurisdictional authority has the right to be the preferred ruler with respect
to some kind of independent domain of political control over some geographical area. The right to
jurisdictional authority is the more fundamental right of the three since the rights to control
resources and borders are in some sense parasitic on the prior right to jurisdictional authority. After
all, the right to make and enforce laws governing a territory may include the right to make and
enforce laws concerning resource use and border crossings.

1

Simmons adds to these three rights the right to tax and regulate private property and the right to limit or prohibit the
“dismemberment” of territory, which are particularly pertinent to his concerns because, as a neo-Lockean, Simmons
thinks individuals have natural pre-political rights to property.
2
I cannot address here the philosophical debates as to what exact sorts of duties legitimate authority conceptually
entails and whether the duty to obey is stronger than the duty not to interfere with the activities of an authority. Some
theorists take the duty to obey to be the stronger duty because it involves conforming one’s actions to the specific
directives issued by an authority (Christiano 2013, sec. 1.1). I think that the duty of subjects to obey an entity’s laws
is not conceptually entailed by the right to jurisdictional authority even if the duty to not interfere with an entity’s
activities is so entailed (Applbaum 2010; Buchanan 2002). However, if democracy grounds both the right to
jurisdictional authority and the duty to obey, then within a democracy the two will co-exist even if the one does not
conceptually entail the latter (Christiano 2004; 2008).
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Nonetheless, there are good reasons not to collapse the three rights into one. The right to
jurisdictional authority is primarily exercised over persons residing within a territory (even if it
entails duties of non-interference on the part of outsiders), whereas the right to control resources
is primarily exercised over material objects. Additionally, the rights to control resources and
borders involve preventing outsiders from controlling certain resources or moving into the
territory—outsiders over whom the territorial rights-holder is not claiming jurisdiction—and so
may be subject to certain external legitimacy constraints to which the right to jurisdictional
authority is not subject (D. Miller 2012, 253–54; Stilz 2011, 573–74). I will deal with the external
legitimacy constraints of the right to control resources in Chapter 2 and the external legitimacy
constraints of the right to control borders in Chapter 6.
It will be useful here to consider what makes territory similar to but ultimately distinct from
property, especially since some theorists inspired by John Locke take territorial rights to be derived
from or importantly analogous to property rights (Steiner 1996; Simmons 2001; Nine 2008; 2012).
Property generally refers to a bundle of claim rights and powers held by individuals to access,
control, and use certain objects, which entail corresponding duties and liabilities on the part of
others. Territorial rights are similar to property rights, then, in that both are irreducible to a single
right but instead can be disaggregated into various incidents or component rights. Moreover, the
territorial rights to control resources and borders seem very close to the incidents of property since
they too involve rights to access, control, and use material objects and to exclude others from them.
The territorial right to jurisdictional authority, however, is more difficult to reduce to or
derive from property rights because rights to govern—to make and enforce laws over a
geographical domain—do not seem to be understandable in terms of rights of ownership (D. Miller
2011, 93; Holder 2011, 574). Rather, territory is conceptually prior to property since jurisdictional

5

authorities create the systems of rules for acquisition, transfer, bequest, etc. that instantiate and
govern property rights.3 Additionally, territorial rights seem to be internally connected to certain
obligations of justice and ecological sustainability in ways that property rights are not. Since
territorial rights involve exercising jurisdictional authority over the inhabitants of a geographical
place, territorial rights-holders must meet certain standards of justice or legitimacy in terms of how
they treat those inhabitants. But property owners are not ordinarily subject to normative standards
in the treatment of their property as an internal requirement of ownership (Nine 2012, 12; Moore
2015, 15–16). Territorial rights also seem to entail certain responsibilities of ecological
sustainability that are not straightforwardly generated by property rights. In the limit case, one is
free to destroy one’s property. It may even been very important to one’s freedom of expression
that one is allowed to destroy one’s property, such as if one decides to burn a national flag that one
owns out of protest. In contrast, as Kolers (2009) explains, “territory is held in trust for a
population, including future generations and future immigrants; thus territorial rights have at their
core a stewardship element that is typically absent from or peripheral to property rights” (27).4

§0.2 PREVAILING THEORIES OF TERRITORY
After now having analyzed the concepts of territory and territorial rights, the tasks of a
theory of territory become clear. Any such theory must first and foremost answer the questions of
who holds territorial rights and what justifies territorial rights, which will constitute the core of the
theory, before seeking to address other territorial issues. I refer to these respectively as the rightsholder question and the rights-justification question. My answer to the rights-holder question is in

3

Of course, Lockeans who reject conventionalist understandings of property and instead take property rights to be
natural and pre-political will disagree.
4
See also Buchanan (1991, 134) whom Kolers cites.
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Chapter 1. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 complete my answer to the rights-justification question.
Chapter 4 demonstrates how an eco-political theory, when compared to some of the other
prevailing theories of territory, more comprehensively accounts for and grounds the territorial
rights of Indigenous peoples. Chapter 5 develops the concept of “transitional legitimacy” to answer
the question of how to realize legitimate political institutions from within ill-ordered societies
structured by racial oppression, which is a necessary condition to justify the territorial rights of
those political institutions (who hold them derivatively on behalf of their peoples). Chapter 6
considers the territorial right to control borders and argues that a people has the qualified right to
exclude potential immigrants insofar as it respects the self-determination claims of all those it
constitutes as outsiders.
Before providing a fuller synopsis of the various chapters of the dissertation, it will be
useful here to briefly canvass the prevailing theories of territorial rights in the literature, each of
which answers the rights-holder and the rights-justification question in varying ways. My
criticisms of the existing theories are interspersed throughout the six chapters as parts of my larger
constructive arguments in defense of my own theory, rather than separated out into purely negative
or deconstructive chapters. So, as a guide for the reader, I will indicate here what the prevailing
theories are, my main charges against each of them, and in which chapters my criticisms can be
found. The existing theories of territorial rights can be divided into the following five types:
property theories, legitimate state theories, cultural nationalist theories, political theories, and
ecological theories.
1) Property Theories: According to property theories, territorial rights are either derived from
or analogous to individual property rights (Steiner 1996; Simmons 2001; Nine 2008; 2012).
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I argued in this Introduction that territorial rights are conceptually distinct from property
rights. In Chapter 4, I also criticize property theories, which are inspired by John Locke,
for re-inscribing the colonialist and anti-ecological underpinnings of Locke’s own views.
2) Legitimate State Theories: For these theories, legitimate states have territorial rights in
virtue of their legitimacy, which is generally taken to require the satisfaction of minimal
liberal standards such as the protection of basic rights, the rule of law, and opportunities
for political participation (Buchanan 2007; Altman and Wellman 2009; Stilz 2011).
I argue in Chapter 1 that states should not be understood as the primary holders of territorial
rights. Rather, states and other political entities only hold territorial rights derivatively on
behalf of their peoples. In Chapter 4, I consider various problems that legitimate state
theories face when accounting for the claims of Indigenous peoples, including applying
only to modern nation-states, justifying benevolent colonialism, and ignoring backwardlooking corrective justice measures needed to rectify colonialism. I argue that even if
suitably modified to respond to these problems in some ways, legitimate state theories are
still unable to account for the collective self-determination rights of Indigenous peoples.
Additionally, in Chapter 5, I criticize existing theories of legitimacy (based on consent,
public reason, basic human rights, and democracy) for operating in various ways from an
ideal theory approach that inadequately addresses the actual circumstances of oppression,
domination, and past injustices structuring most societies.
3) Cultural Nationalist Theories: For cultural nationalists, territorial rights should be
accorded to nations, understood as a distinctive sort of pre-political group marked by
certain shared cultural features (Margalit and Raz 1990; Tamir 1993; D. Miller 1995; 2000;
2012; Meisels 2009). Nations acquire territorial rights by transforming the land in ways
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that add both material and symbolic value—the former through cultivation and the creation
of buildings, roads, waterways, and so on, and the latter as a result of historical events
taking place on a specific site or rituals and practices marking out certain places as sacred
or holding special significance (D. Miller 2012, 259).
In Chapter 1, I argue that nations should not be seen as the holders of territorial
rights because nationhood is a slippery and controversial notion; candidate territorial
rights-holders do not always share a common culture; and promoting a national culture
devalues minority cultures and fails to fairly treat individual members as political equals.
In Chapter 4, I argue that cultural nationalist theories, by grounding self-determination and
territorial rights in a determinate pre-political cultural target, risk collapsing into ethnic or
racial nationalism and perpetuating a colonial logic of governmentality.
4) Political Theories: Margaret Moore (2015) defends a political theory of territory according
to which peoples, understood as collective agents meeting certain conditions of political
identity, political capacity, and political history, have territorial rights grounded in the
value of collective self-determination when the people legitimately occupies a
geographical area.
In Chapter 1, I argue in contrast to Moore that a people should not be conceptualized
(a) as a collective agent, (b) in terms of the subjective political identities of its members,
or (c) as already involving overly idealized conditions such as political relations among
coequals. Moore’s account of the value of collective self-determination is also ambiguous
as to what extent it inheres in the realization of relationship-dependent goods, i.e. goods
that can only be realized with “particular others—co-citizens, co-nationals, other
indigenous peoples—with whom I have an ongoing commitment and a shared collective
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identity, as a member of a particular people,” since her account also appeals to the value of
collective autonomy. See, for instance, the following list of considerations that Moore
appeals to when articulating the value of self-determination: “Institutions of political selfdetermination give expression to the communities in which people live; they express
people’s identities; and they are an important forum in which collective autonomy can be
expressed, and people can shape the context in which they live, and realize their political
aspirations, free of external domination” (64). So, I reject Moore’s account of the value of
self-determination to the extent that it is grounded in the expression of people’s subjective
political identities. And to the extent that self-determination is grounded in collective
autonomy, I think that self-determination requires democracy, whereas Moore (2015, 26–
28; 2016, 154–55; 2018, 6–7) thinks that it does not. I discuss why self-determination
requires democracy in Chapter 2.
Anna Stilz’s (2015; 2016; 2019) views, which she originally characterized as a kind
of legitimate state theory (2011), has evolved into its most current formulation as a hybrid
of legitimate state theories and political theories in order to more fully make room for the
value of self-determination. According to Stilz (2019), a state has legitimate territorial
jurisdiction if (a) the state’s inhabitants have a right to occupy the geographical space it
governs, (b) the state implements a system of law in the area that protects the basic rights
of its own subjects and respects the rights of outsiders, and (c) the state represents the
shared will of a significant majority of its rightful occupants (21, 117). My primary
disagreement with Stilz is with her account of the people and of the value of selfdetermination, which for her are conceptually linked in what she refers to as an endogenous
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theory of peoplehood. I criticize her account of the people in Chapter 1 and her account of
the value of self-determination in Chapter 2.
While I do not disagree with the many theorists including Moore and Stilz who
have defended occupancy rights by reference to their connections to individual well-being
and autonomy (Walzer 1983, 43; Waldron 1992, 17–18; Stilz 2013; 2019, chap 2; Moore
2015, 36–45), I think that for members of a people to not unjustly occupy a place will
require the people to fulfill certain duties of corrective justice. Although I do not offer a
comprehensive theory of corrective justice to explain all the responses that would be
needed to address the different kinds of injustices that may have taken place on a territory
in order for members of a people to not unjustly occupy that place, I consider in Chapter 4
how my eco-political theory of territory can help to ground corrective justice measures to
rectify colonialist (and territorial) injustices against Indigenous peoples. And in Chapter 5,
I evaluate how to realize legitimate political institutions from within ill-ordered societies
structured by racial oppression, which also entails past violations of occupancy rights.
Finally, I disagree with Moore, Stilz, and any other theorist who grounds the value
of a people’s self-determination in purely political considerations. The main thrust of my
eco-political theory of territory is that a people’s right to self-determination is inextricably
and normatively bound up with its duty of ecological sustainability and its right to
ecological integrity.
5) Ecological Theories: Avery Kolers (2009) defends an ecological theory of territory
according to which ethnogeographic communities (who are engaged in densely and
pervasively interacting land-use patterns and who have a shared ontology of the land) have
territorial rights if they demonstrate plenitude or fullness on the territories they inhabit.
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I argue in Chapter 1 that the notion of ethnogeographic communities is both overinclusive and under-inclusive and thus too thick ecologically to be the primary holder of
territorial rights. I argue in Chapter 3 that plenitude, abundance, or fullness, which is a
maximizing notion, is also too thick ecologically as a criterion for grounding territorial
rights and that only a threshold notion of sustainability is required.
My eco-political theory of territory bears most similarities with political theories,
ecological theories, and even legitimate state theories. However, an eco-political theory cannot be
understood as merely combining a political theory with an ecological theory in a simple additive
way. Rather, the principle of eco-political self-determination that I ultimately develop as the
primary basis for a people’s territorial rights fundamentally transforms political and ecological
considerations taken each on their own to show that they are always already bound up with one
another. A fuller synopsis of the six chapters of the dissertation follows.

§0.3 CHAPTER SYNOPSES
In Chapter 1 (“The Social Ontology of the People”), I provide my answer to the rightsholder question and argue that peoples, as opposed to states, nations, or ethnogeographic
communities, should be the appropriate type of entity to be eligible to hold territorial rights. I
provide a social ontology of the people as a group of individuals engaged in common activities
that are rooted in or attached to a place and that aim at various shared ends, the overarching end of
which is the exercise of some form of independent governance over all the inhabitants of a
geographical area. I also defend the social ontology of the people that I provide against other
accounts of the people in the territorial rights literature. I contend that a people need not (but may)
have formal political institutions and consequently may not be collective agents, which is in
contrast to most accounts in the literature that do take peoples to be collective agents. I explain
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how the common activities of the people should be predominantly understood in externalist terms
that do not rely on (but do not necessarily exclude) mental states or representations, which avoids
various problems that trouble internalist social ontologies of the people including scaling collective
intentions or joint commitments up to the level of large social groups such as peoples. I also
criticize existing accounts for presuming too much internal unity and overly idealized conditions
holding within peoples. I contend that by encompassing both ill-ordered and well-ordered
societies, the social ontology of the people that I defend enables the people to play the necessary
normative functions of serving as (a) the holder of territorial rights even in cases of failed or unjust
states and (b) the legitimizer of political institutions.
In Chapter 2 (“Democratic Self-Determination”), I begin my argument in answer to the
rights-justification question and demonstrate how a people’s right to self-determination serves as
the primary ground for justifying its territorial rights. Following Carol Gould (1988; 2004; 2006),
I defend self-determination as a democratic norm that involves the equal right of all those engaged
in common activities to participate in the decision-making concerning those activities. I argue
against two prominent conceptions of self-determination in the literature by Andrew Altman and
Christopher Wellman (2009, chap. 2) and Anna Stilz (2019) that both do not take selfdetermination to be a democratic norm. I refute arguments that self-determination only requires
the protection of certain basic and political rights and a constitutional channel to revoke a people’s
authorization of its government, which would puzzlingly characterize the people of a (suitably
structured) constitutional monarchy as self-determining. I end this chapter by considering what
implications would follow from the requirement of democracy and emphasize that coercive
interventions in non-democracies would not automatically be licensed by my view.
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In Chapter 3 (“The Principle of Eco-Political Self-Determination”), I argue that a people’s
right to self-determination, because it involves determining common activities that take place upon
and are a very part of the ecosystems of a people’s territory, is not simply a political and democratic
right but is also inextricably and normatively bound up with a duty of ecological sustainability and
a right to ecological integrity. The ecological sustainability of a people’s territory is a material
precondition for human life, political society, and a people’s capacity to exercise its own selfdetermination. So, a people has a duty to ecologically sustain its own territories, which is an
internal constraint on a people’s right to self-determination. Additionally, I demonstrate how a
people sustaining the ecosystems of its territory is partly constituted by the people’s selfdetermination. For a people to sustain its own existence within the ecosystems of its territory will
just involve the people setting the terms of the common activities that are a part of those
ecosystems. I also show that a people’s right to ecological integrity is a constituent part and an
enabling condition of a people’s external self-determination. Because a people’s right to political
self-determination is intertwined with its duty of ecological sustainability and its right to ecological
integrity, I characterize the principle at the basis of justifying a people’s territorial rights as one of
eco-political self-determination.
In Chapter 4 (“The Territorial Rights of Indigenous Peoples”), I argue that an eco-political
theory of territory, when compared to existing theories (property theories, legitimate state theories,
and cultural nationalist theories), more comprehensively explains and justifies the territorial rights
of Indigenous peoples. Property theories inspired by John Locke risk re-inscribing the colonialist
and anti-ecological underpinnings of Locke’s own views. Legitimate state theories are unable to
account for the self-determination claims of Indigenous peoples. And by grounding selfdetermination and territorial rights in a determinate pre-political cultural target, cultural nationalist
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theories risk collapsing into ethnic or racial nationalism and perpetuating a colonial logic of
governmentality. Instead then, I argue that the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples should be
primarily grounded in a principle of eco-political self-determination, which draws from some
Indigenous scholars’ own conceptions linking self-determination with sustainability, enables
Indigenous peoples to decide for themselves how to understand and protect their cultural integrity,
and justifies Indigenous territorial rights especially in response to some of the central eco-political
wrongs of colonialism. I end this chapter by outlining some ways in which Indigenous territorial
rights and Indigenous claims to corrective justice claims could be fulfilled and institutionalized in
practice.
In Chapter 5 (“Transitional Legitimacy”), I develop the concept of “transitional legitimacy”
as analogous to but distinct from the framework of transitional justice to theorize how to realize
legitimate political institutions from within an ill-ordered society. This is an important issue to
consider for a theory of territory because the legitimacy of a political entity is a necessary condition
for its territorial rights, which it exercises on behalf of its people. I criticize existing theories of
legitimacy (based on consent, public reason, basic human rights, and democracy) for operating in
various ways from an ideal theory approach that inadequately addresses the actual circumstances
of oppression, domination, and past injustices structuring most societies. By examining the case
of structural racism against African Americans in the United States, I argue that transitional
legitimacy requires the public affirmation of the equal political status of all (via truth commissions,
legitimate apologies, political symbols, and the like), the rule of law to guard against racial
discrimination, the dismantling of racialized mass incarceration, de facto protection of democratic
rights instead of voter suppression laws, and reparations for past and enduring injustices.
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In Chapter 6 (“Self-Determination as the Ground and Constraint for the Right to Exclude”),
I consider the territorial right to control immigration and argue that a people has a qualified right
to exclude potential immigrants, as grounded in its right to self-determination, but only insofar as
it respects the self-determination claims of all those it constitutes as outsiders. (I assume here that
a people with the qualified right to exclude potential immigrants has fulfilled the other conditions
needed to justify its territorial rights, and focus only on what is required by the external legitimacy
constraint on the right to exclude of respecting the self-determination of outsiders.) My argument
provides an answer to the “boundary problem” within democratic theory (of determining how to
decide the scope of the people in a non-question-begging way) by appealing to the very democratic
principle of self-determination to both ground and constrain the right to exclude. Respecting the
self-determination rights of others will require a people to enfranchise all residents including
undocumented immigrants, accept political and ecological refugees, and counteract the harms of
brain drain. I contend that sometimes the only way for a people to respect the self-determination
rights of outsiders will be by including, rather than excluding, them as members.
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CHAPTER 1: THE SOCIAL ONTOLOGY OF THE PEOPLE
When developing a theory of territory, one question in need of address is who holds
territorial rights? Not only must the appropriate type of entity be identified (whether states, nations,
ethnogeographic communities, or, as I shall defend, peoples) but our account of the nature of that
type of entity, its social ontology, must be systematically worked out. 5 A social ontology of a
candidate territorial rights-holder has two desiderata. (1) It is beholden to the world—it must
accurately characterize entities (and relations) as they are. And (2) it should enable our conception
of that candidate entity to play the functional roles needed for the holder of territorial rights in the
context of our wider theory of territory.
Many social ontologies of candidate territorial rights-holders (such as those of states,
nations, and ethnogeographic communities but also some accounts of peoples) fail because they
are unable to meet the second desideratum. Some fail because they are unable to meet the first
desideratum, (especially for instance, certain social ontologies of the people that characterize the
people as a collective agent with collective intentions and joint commitments but do not show how
these complex internalist states and properties can scale up to the level of large social groups such
as peoples). And some, of course, fail in regards to both desiderata since the two are related—
success or failure on one may impinge on success or failure on the other. (For instance, as I shall
argue, overly unified and idealized social ontologies of the people not only do not match up with
many actual peoples in the world but also preclude the notion of the people from serving as the
holder of territorial rights in cases of unjust or illegitimate states.) The goal of this chapter is to

5

As Carol Gould (1988, 91) has argued, every social and political theory presupposes a social ontology, whether
explicitly or implicitly, and so the adequacy of any normative sociopolitical theory depends in part on the coherency
and adequacy of the social ontology it assumes.
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defend a social ontology of the people as the holder of territorial rights that is able to successfully
meet both desiderata.
In §1.1, I begin by arguing why states, nations, and ethnogeographic communities should
not be identified as the (primary) holders of territorial rights. In §1.2, I distinguish between what I
call the rights-holder question, which concerns what is the appropriate type of entity to be eligible
to hold territorial rights, and the rights-justification question, which is about what normative
conditions must be satisfied to justify an entity having territorial rights, and argue that these two
questions must be clearly separated from one another even though many theories conflate them. I
then go on to provide a preliminary characterization of the people in §1.3 as a group of individuals
engaged in common activities that are rooted in or attached to a place and that aim at various shared
ends, the overarching end of which is the exercise of some form of independent governance over
all the inhabitants of a geographical area.
The next four sections clarify various facets of the social ontology of the people, which I
defend, and argue against other accounts of the people in the territorial rights literature. In §1.4, I
contend that a people need not (but may) have formal political institutions and consequently may
not be collective agents, which stands in contrast to most social ontologies of the people in the
literature that do take a people to be collective agents. In §1.5, I explain how the common activities
of the people should be predominantly understood in externalist terms that do not rely on (but do
not necessarily exclude) mental states or representations, which avoids various problems that
trouble internalist social ontologies of the people including scalability issues when trying to
demonstrate how large social groups such as peoples have collective intentions or joint
commitments. Next, I continue to argue against internalist social ontologies of the people in §1.6
by criticizing them for presuming too much agreement and internal unity within peoples. In §1.7,
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I argue that existing social ontologies of the people operate from an overly idealized context but
that peoples must encompass both ill-ordered and well-ordered societies if the notion of the people
is to play the necessary normative functions of serving as (a) the holder of territorial rights even in
cases of failed or unjust states and (b) the legitimizer of political institutions. With the social
ontology of the people fully in view, I conclude in §1.8 by comparing for a final time my account
of the people against other candidates for the holder of territorial rights, including states, nations,
and ethnogeographic communities.

§1.1 STATES, NATIONS, AND ETHNOGEOGRAPHIC COMMUNITIES
What is the appropriate type of entity then to hold territorial rights? States (Buchanan 2007;
Nine 2008; Altman and Wellman 2009; Stilz 2011; 2019), nations (D. Miller 1995; 2000; 2012;
Meisels 2009), peoples (Nine 2012; Moore 2015), and ethnogeographic communities (Kolers
2009) have all been put forth as candidate territorial rights-holders. I hold the view that peoples
are the primary holders of territorial rights and that their political institutions, which may include
but are not necessarily limited to modern states, only exercise these rights derivatively on behalf
of peoples (D. Miller 2012, 253; Moore 2015, 66). In this section, I will canvass the reasons why
states, nations, and ethnogeographic communities should not be understood as the (primary)
holders of territorial rights. In later sections, I will then articulate and argue for my own social
ontology of the people against alternative accounts in the literature.
Let us start with legitimate state theories that take states to be the primary holders of
territorial rights and grant states territorial rights so long as they meet certain legitimacy
conditions—conditions that differ from theory to theory but generally include minimal liberal
standards such as the protection of basic rights, the rule of law, and potentially even opportunities
for political participation, which may or may not require democracy (Buchanan 2007; Altman and
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Wellman 2009; Stilz 2011). By “states,” some theorists—whether explicitly or implicitly in their
use of examples and their intended domain of application—primarily mean modern nation-states
as they are currently configured in the international legal system or adopt a roughly Westphalian
model of statehood.6 “Modern states,” notes Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman (2009),
“are distinguished from other ways of organizing politics by their claim to sovereignty over a
demarcated territory, their unified system of law and governance within the territory, and their
extensive regulation of social life by means of legal institutions and an administrative bureaucracy”
(10n2).7 Other legitimate state theorists define states in broader terms as “a persisting structure of
institutions for wielding political power” (Buchanan 2007, 237) or “a public-law making authority
with the power of enforcement” (Stilz 2019, 14) that features “(i) binding collective rule setting
and (ii) the ability to enforce its determinations in case of disputes.”8 In her later work, Stilz makes
clear that traditional Indigenous decision-making procedures operating by compromise or
consensus and other localized self-organized schemes would still count as “states” on this broader
definition.
A major problem with these theories is that they seem to imply that failed or unjust states
can be annexed by other states so long as the conquering states establish the necessary levels of
legitimate governance afterward. Stilz (2011, 590) refers to this as the annexation objection.
However, this is a rather unintuitive consequence that licenses certain forms of aggressive
intervention and imperialism and runs contrary to international law. In the cases of failed or unjust

Ayelet Banai (2014) distinguishes between the Westphalian state model that requires a state to have “(1) a unified
system of law; (2) clear and fixed territorial borders; and (3) a central government that enforces the system of law in
the entire territory” and a softer Westphalian state model in which a legal-political entity qualifies as a state if it has
“(1) stable and complex system of law; (2) recognizable structures of legal and political authority; and (3) identifiable
procedures for attaining them” (147-48).
7
See also Morris (1998, 45–46) who Altman and Wellman cite.
8
See also Banai (2014) who defends a diversified account according to which “any system of law and government
that meet minimal conditions of stability and functionality may (i.e. subject to specified criteria of legitimacy) qualify
as a holder of territorial rights” (148).
6

20

states, rather than allowing their annexation by other states, we seem to want to say that the peoples
of those states still should serve as the holder of territorial rights (which according to statist
theories, they do not hold) and should have the opportunity to establish effective and just states
through which to exercise their own self-government (Stilz 2011, 590; Nine 2012, 53–56; Moore
2015, 103–6). More generally, a theory of state legitimacy seems to need an account of how a state
is authorized by the people it governs, regardless of whether this takes the form of democratic
authorization or not. But if this is the case, then the people is the ultimate source of territorial
rights, and its political institutions (which may be states but may also take other forms such as
intrastate autonomy arrangements) only exercise these rights derivatively as the agent of the people
(D. Miller 2012, 255). The concept of the people, then, should serve the normative functions within
a theory of territory as the holder of territorial rights and as the legitimizer of its political
institutions.
Instead of states, cultural nationalist theorists accord territorial rights to nations, understood
as a distinctive sort of pre-political group marked by certain shared cultural features (Margalit and
Raz 1990; Tamir 1993; D. Miller 1995; 2000; 2012; Meisels 2009). Different theories characterize
the relevant cultural features in different ways, which may include among other things, political,
historical, linguistic, or other identity markers. To give one of the more prominent definitions as
an example, David Miller (1995) describes a nation as “a community (1) constituted by shared
beliefs and a mutual commitment, (2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to
a particular territory, and (5) marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture”
(27). Later, Miller also allows language to count as an element of a common nationality (98). For
cultural nationalists, nations acquire territorial rights by transforming the land in ways that add
both material and symbolic value—the former through cultivation and the creation of buildings,
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roads, waterways, and so on, and the latter as a result of historical events taking place on a specific
site or rituals and practices marking out certain places as sacred or holding special significance (D.
Miller 2012, 259).
Taking nations to be the holders of territorial rights, however, encounters several
difficulties. First, cultural nationalists face the challenge of defining the slippery and controversial
notion of nationhood, particularly so that it does not collapse into problematic forms of ethnic or
racial nationalism (Dahbour 2003; Abizadeh 2012, 868–73). This difficulty may not seem entirely
insurmountable since any “essentially contested” concept (Gallie 1955) admits of some amount of
imprecision and controversy and we may still ultimately need some account of culture and
nationality in our political theories even if we do not ground territorial rights in cultural
nationhood. However, I will argue in Chapter 4 that the problem of defining cultural nationhood
to ground territorial rights is exacerbated in the case of Indigenous peoples given the diversity of
Indigenous identities and the colonialist history of Indigenous cultural dispossession.
A second and more serious problem is that groups ordinarily taken to be potential territorial
rights-holders do not always share a common culture. Canadian and American cultures, for
instance, do not seem to be sharply distinct from one another and the differences between the two
nations are not necessarily greater than cultural differences within Canada or within America
(Moore 2015, 80). 9 Additionally, many political societies are multi-national (including both
various modern states and many Indigenous peoples such as the Haudenosaunee, which comprises
the Six Nations of the Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, Mohawk, and Tuscarora nations), and
it is unclear why they should be broken up along nationalist lines especially if these multi-national

9

Even if you do not think that Canada or the United States constitute groups that should be considered potential
territorial rights-holders, the point remains that it should not be for the reason that they are not separate cultural nations
that they should not be considered the appropriate type of group to hold territorial rights.
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groups are stable or have chosen to be a part of the same political society (Moore 2001, 57–58;
Nine 2012, 62–63).
Finally, a third problem with cultural nationalism is that justifying territorial rights for a
nation to promote its own culture devalues minority cultures and fails to fairly treat all individual
members of a political society as equals (Barry 2001, 27–33; Nine 2012, 64–65; Patten 2014, 27;
Stilz 2019, 139–48). Under conditions of social and cultural pluralism, a political society should
remain neutral between different cultural groups and ways of life. Nonetheless, “a state that is
neutral toward culture,” as Alan Patten (2014) puts it, “is not one that takes no notice of culture,
or disentangles itself from culture” (27). Since political institutions cannot help but be culturally
formatted in various ways (e.g. operating in particular languages), neutrality does not imply a strict
separation between culture and political institutions but rather equal treatment of different cultures.
This might entail promoting shared values or a thinner public political culture in which different
component cultures find overlap, or establishing a fair framework in which to provide public
support and resources to different cultures (perhaps through a system of “prorating” that devotes
the same per capita level of goods and resources to different cultures) (Patten 2014, 162).
Instead of the political institutions of states and cultural nations, Avery Kolers (2009)
develops an exclusively ecological notion of “ethnogeographic communities” as the holder of
territorial rights. “An ethnogeographic community is a number of persons with 1) densely and
pervasively interacting land-use patterns, and 2) a shared ontology of land. Land-use patterns are
densely interacting when people’s uses of land are such as to rely on each other for their possibility
or viability; and these interactions are pervasive when they structure a whole way of life” (86).
Shared ontologies of land or ethnogeographies refer to “culturally specific conceptions of land…
what the land is, what about it is valuable, [and] how humans interact with it” (3). Examples of

23

ontologies of land include the dominant Anglo-American ethnogeography, which is constituted by
the beliefs that land can be owned and natural resources should be exploited efficiently and
profitably, and dissident views such as ecofeminism or agrarianism (86–87).
One benefit of Kolers’ notion of an ethnogeographic community is its emphasis on the
ecological dimensions of a territorial rights-holder and its relationship to the land. However, the
concept of an ethnogeographic community is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive of potential
territorial rights-holders. It is under-inclusive because, as Moore (2015, 75–77) points out,
territorial disputes can often occur between two groups who share a similar pattern of land-use and
a similar ontology of land but nonetheless disagree about which group should hold rights over a
given territory (e.g. the conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland from 1969
to 1998).10 Kolers (2009) is forced to arbitrarily characterize such conflicts as “mere boundary
disputes” and not as “territorial disputes proper” (14). Additionally, the notion of an
ethnogeographic community is over-inclusive because a group may contain within it a diversity of
various land-use patterns and ontologies of land, but if its members are politically organized in
such a way so as to aim at their own collective self-governance, then it is puzzling why the group
should not be seen as a single candidate territorial rights-holder. If the concept of a nation is too
thick culturally, then the notion of an ethnogeographic community is too thick ecologically.
How a group is politically organized matters to whether it should be considered a candidate
territorial rights-holder, but Kolers’ conception of the claimants of territory is totally apolitical and
explicitly so: “The members of an ethnogeographic community need not share a primordial

Moore (2015) also criticizes Kolers’ notion of an ethnogeographic community for being indeterminate since the
two criteria may come apart and even conflict. “To the extent that Kolers emphasizes the first criterion—the shared
social ontology—his account seems to be much closer to a cultural nationalist account… To the extent that Kolers
emphasizes the second criterion—the pervasiveness of the land-use pattern—his theory seems to track economic and
functional considerations” (74).
10
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identity, political opinions, or even any desire to live together” (88). While Kolers’ motivation
here seems to reflect certain worries about ascriptive nationalist identities, which I share, he fails
to consider how political considerations can be normatively significant for identifying territorial
rights-holders without taking on thicker cultural nationalist forms. In other words, Kolers throws
out the political baby with the cultural bathwater.

§1.2 THE RIGHTS-HOLDER QUESTION VERSUS
THE RIGHTS-JUSTIFICATION QUESTION
Instead of states, nations, or ethnogeographic communities, I contend that it is peoples that
should be the primary holders of territorial rights. Political institutions, such as states, intrastate
autonomy arrangements, and even regional or international bodies, may exercise territorial rights
derivatively on behalf of peoples, although such institutions must be authorized by or accountable
to the peoples they represent (D. Miller 2012, 253; Moore 2015, 66). It is important to note that to
say that peoples are the appropriate type of entity to be the primary holders of territorial rights is
not to say that peoples should have territorial rights by mere dint of their peoplehood. Instead,
whether territorial rights should be accorded to certain peoples will depend on the satisfaction of
additional normative conditions (concerning corrective justice, basic justice, self-determination,
and ecological sustainability, or so I shall argue in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3).
One problematic tendency in the literature, as I see it, is that the question of which is the
appropriate type of entity to be eligible to hold territorial rights or to be considered a candidate for
holding territorial rights (call this the rights-holder question) and the question of which normative
conditions must be satisfied to justify an entity having territorial rights (call this the rightsjustification question) are not always clearly separated from one another. Answering the rightsjustification question requires appealing to norms and values that would fully justify granting
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territorial rights to a particular entity. Of course, answering the rights-holder question may also
involve, in part, appealing to norms and values, as I do at times in the previous section to argue
that states, nations, and ethnogeographic communities should not be the (primary) holders of
territorial rights. But the rights-holder question is centrally a question about what type of entity
can play the functional role needed in a theory of territorial rights to be eligible to hold territorial
rights. And specifying this type of entity is insufficient for justifying territorial rights for all
instances of that type. Sometimes theorists invoke norms and values to specify the holder of
territorial rights in ways that build from the very beginning various normative conditions into what
it is to even count as a territorial rights-holder—normative conditions that I think are better left for
the rights-justification question. For example, as I will expand on later, Nine, Moore, and Stilz all
employ in various ways overly normative social ontologies of the people, as well-ordered and with
a common conception of justice (Nine 2012, 67), characterized by relations of equality and
reciprocity (Moore 2015, 53), or constituted by the willful participation of its members and thus
endogenous to a theory of self-determination (Stilz 2019, 123-27).
Another illustration of the tendency to conflate the rights-holder question with the rightsjustification question arises in discussions of the problem of attachment. Many theorists are
concerned with explaining how particular groups are attached or linked to particular territories as
opposed to simply explaining how a group should be granted some general amount of territory
(Simmons 2001, 304; D. Miller 2012; Kolers 2012b; Moore 2015, 9–10; Dahbour 2019). But
sometimes the problem of attachment is characterized in terms of the rights-holder question and
other times in terms of the rights-justification question. So sometimes theorists argue that some
type of group is of the appropriate sort to hold territorial rights because the group is attached in the
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relevant way to particular territories,11 whereas other times theorists justify territorial rights for a
group in virtue of the group developing the appropriate sorts of attachments to a particular
territory.12
Part of the cause of the confusion, I think, lies in the ambiguity of the notion of attachment,
which, as Kolers (2012) has pointed out, is variably understood as an ascriptive status belonging
to certain groups or an achievement that groups can succeed or fail at meeting. The more
attachment is characterized as a status, the more it is understood in terms of the rights-holder
question as a property of territorial rights-holders; and the more it is characterized as an
achievement, the more it is understood in terms of the rights-justification question as a condition
that must be realized to justify according territorial rights to a group. An additional ambiguity that
causes confusion lies in the use of the term territorial rights-holder, which can refer to an entity
that is of the appropriate kind that is eligible to hold territorial rights—that is, a candidate territorial
rights-holder who would have territorial rights were it to satisfy all the conditions necessary to
justifying it having territorial rights—or an entity that in fact holds territorial rights because it has
satisfied all the conditions necessary to justify it having territorial rights. I will primarily be using
“territorial rights-holder” in the first sense, though, of course, sometimes an entity that is a
candidate to hold territorial rights in fact has territorial rights.

Dahbour (2019), for instance, argues in favor of a conceptual connection between people and territory. “In order to
establish an attachment to territory that is more than an elective one, there must be something intrinsic to places that
peoples claim as their own… But how are we to characterize the nature of the specific connection of peoples to places?
Only by establishing a much closer identity between them: peoples are whom they are, in part, because of where they
are” (12). But Dahbour also conflates the rights-holder question with the rights-justification question. According to
Dahbour, “a specific relation to an ecosystem – one that consists of membership in a socioecological system – is what
justifies a claim to territory on the part of a people, as it defines what constitutes that people” (2).
12
Moore (2015) is a good example of someone who sometimes conflates the distinction between these issues. So for
instance, she contends that the moral rights to residency and occupancy are “necessary to address the problem, not of
justifying territory in general (as necessary to the good functioning of states), but of justifying particular pieces of
territory for particular groups” (the rights-justification question) (35). And on the other hand, Moore says, “One aim
of this chapter [three] has been to address the attachment problem, that is, to explain how particular states can
legitimately exercise territorial rights over a particular area of land. It did this by identifying the kind of group that
can be the ultimate source of territorial rights” (the rights-holder question) (66).
11
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§1.3 WHAT IS A PEOPLE?
My strategy then is to develop a social ontology of the people in a minimally normative
way so as to answer the rights-holder question without conflating it with the rights-justification
question. (I will save the defense of my answer to the rights-justification question for Chapter 2
and Chapter 3.) The main goal will be to specify the appropriate sort of entity to play the needed
functional role in a theory of territory to be eligible to hold territorial rights. To be sure, answering
the rights-holder question does not necessarily mean that no concepts with any normative content
can be employed when identifying and characterizing territorial rights-holders or that no normative
implications will follow from doing so. But it does mean that specifying the nature of territorial
rights-holders is insufficient to address the fully normative issue of justifying territorial rights for
particular entities. And as we shall see in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, developing a social ontology
of the people will give rise to and generate norms that will help to answer the rights-justification
question. So for instance, the place-based common activities of a people will generate interrelated
rights to self-determination and duties of ecological sustainability that help to ground a people’s
territorial rights.
How then should a people be understood? We can begin by characterizing a people as a
group of individuals engaged in common activities that are rooted in or attached to a place and that
aim at various shared ends, the overarching end of which is the exercise of some form of
independent governance over all the inhabitants of a geographical area (here, I draw on Carol
Gould’s (1988, 79, 2004, 175) notion of common activity). Independent governance is a
descriptive and not a normative notion here and refers to de facto authority—making and enforcing
laws or rules—over some domain without the interference of others. I use the term “governance”
rather than “authority” to more clearly convey the descriptive nature of the concept I am employing
here since “authority” is ambiguous between a descriptive (de facto authority) and a normative
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sense (legitimate authority), the latter of which refers to the right to make and enforce laws.13
Governance is independent when governance rules over some domain of common activities
without the interference of others. However, as Allen Buchanan (2007, 333) points out, this leaves
open (1) the nature of that domain and its activities, (2) the extent of control over the items in that
domain, and (3) the particular political institutions exercising control over that domain. So,
independent governance comes in degrees and is consistent with various institutional arrangements
of shared governance and disaggregated sovereignty, which I canvass more fully in §2.2.
Additionally, rule over some domain without the interference of others does not normatively entail
the right to be free from outside interference.
I deliberatively use the passive voice to describe the exercise of independent governance
to leave open who is the entity exercising independent governance. Even if a people is not the one
exercising independent governance, the members of the people can still be engaged in common
activities that are structured to realize someone else (e.g. a dictator) exercising independent
governance over them. Here, a dictator may be oppressing and forcing the people to engage in
common activities structured in this way to realize the dictator’s rule and not the people’s own
self-rule. Indeed, this is an essential way by which authoritarian or autocratic regimes generally
operate. So, according to my account of the people, we can speak of the people of a dictatorship
just as we can speak of the people of a democracy. Independent governance is thus distinct from
self-determination, which I do take to be normative and would indeed involve the people as a
group exercising independent governance. Ultimately, in my view and following Gould (1988;

13

For some theorists, de facto authority has an attitudinal component in which subjects obey the laws made by an
authority because they think of it as having legitimate authority in the normative sense. For such theorists, the notion
of governance that I am employing here is not de facto authority strictly speaking but only political power because it
lacks this attitudinal component (Christiano 2013, sec. 1). I continue to use de facto authority, in the sense that I
employ it without this attitudinal component, rather than political power because it seems to me that political power
need not be wielded through the issuing of laws or rules, but could be wielded completely capriciously or arbitrarily.
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2004; 2006), self-determination requires democracy where all those engaged in a common activity
have an equal right to participate in the decision-making regarding the nature and direction of those
common activities. The exercise of independent governance is the overarching end of a people’s
common activities since the members of a people may be engaged in a plethora of overlapping and
interconnected common activities taking place upon a geographical area, all of which is
encompassed by the single common activity aimed at the exercise of independent governance over
all inhabitants of that geographical area.
The second distinguishing feature of the common activities of a people, in addition to the
fact that they aim at the overarching end of independent governance, is that they are rooted in or
attached to a particular geographical place.14 The nature of the goods and ends that can be secured
by these sorts of place-based common activities is both universal and highly particular, as many
theorists have pointed out (Kolers 2009, 10; Miller 2012, 259–60; Moore 2015, 6; Stilz 2019, 167–
69). Ends are universal in nature if they are basic needs that nearly everyone has or are conditions
required to live a decent life (where the standard of decency is partly dependent on the prevailing
socioeconomic and cultural conditions). Universal ends that can be secured by place-based
common activities may reflect biological needs, such as food, water, clean air, shelter, health, and
a livable environment, or basic social needs, such as a basic level of education, access to a
permanent legal residence, or governance by minimally just institutions that protect basic human
rights. Many of the common activities of a people will likely aim to secure collective goods in a
given geographical location that are universal in this sense and that could not otherwise be
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I note here that the common activities of a people may be rooted in or attached to a particular place even if the
people are not currently inhabiting that place (such as Indigenous peoples who have been forcibly removed from their
homelands) or that place no longer exists (such as ecological refugee peoples whose island territories have sunk).
What sort of measures, including corrective justice measures, are needed to respond to these sorts of circumstances
will be discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.
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achieved by members individually, such as public education, a system of property and exchange,
mechanisms of environmental protection, and minimally just institutions (Gould 2004, 176; 1988,
79).
Ends are particular in nature if they are valuable only from within a specific world view
(so that others without that world view may not see them as valuable) or, less strongly, if they
represent a specific way of realizing certain universal ends, such that although not everyone may
value that specific mode of realizing those universal ends, others may understand why they are of
value to someone else (D. Miller 2012, 259–60; Stilz 2019, 167–68). So Kolers’ shared ontologies
of land can be understood as including particular ends in this sense. Nomadic ways of living (such
as those of Bedouin tribes) and industrial sedentary lifestyles both realize distinct particular ends
relating to a place, including some ends which can only be understood as valuable by one who
already has certain attachments and commitments and some ends which are specific modes of
realizing various biological and social needs.15
Although a people need not adopt any one mode of realizing universal ends in particular,
every people generally needs to adopt at least some specific mode or modes of realizing universal
ends through their place-based common activities. Partly as a result of this fact, many of a people’s
common activities will be fundamentally rooted in the territory it inhabits such that those common
activities along with their particular ends are given meaning and shape when pursued in that
specific location with its specific socioecological and geographical context and not elsewhere. The
place that a people inhabits forms the stable background context in which the shared ends of its
common activities can be concretely realized in locally determinate ways. (Part of the point behind
valuing a people’s self-determination, which primarily grounds a people’s territorial rights as I

15

I take this example from Kolers (2009, 93)
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will argue in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, is precisely to enable a people the freedom to decide for
themselves the nature of the particular ends they seek and how exactly to go about realizing them.)
Finally, although a people may end up developing a single shared national identity, political
identity, or ontology of land in the process of seeking to realize certain particular ends through its
common activities, none of these thicker cultural, political, or ecological features is necessary or
sufficient for constituting a people.

§1.4 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND COLLECTIVE AGENCY
The common activities of a people may but do not necessarily include formal political
institutions such as states. Although the line between formal and informal political institutions is
vague and the two exist along a continuum with the former referring (roughly) to the presence of
explicit rules or structures and the latter to unwritten codes, habits, or traditions,16 it is important
to note that peoples can exist prior to states (through informal political mobilizations), without
states (in cases of failed states or regime change), or as part of a larger state (for example, many
Indigenous peoples within host colonial states). Even without formal political institutions, a people
can still be engaged in common activities that aim at its own independent governance since a
people may be governing itself through less formal political arrangements or movements or may
simply be seeking to establish political institutions of governance that it does not yet have. If a
people does in fact have formal political institutions, then those institutions will be a proper part
of its common activities and may also help to delimit, demarcate, and stabilize those activities
(which gives a people a reason for developing more formalized political institutions of its own).
In general, peoples will need to exercise their territorial rights via political institutions since

16

And in reality, most if not all formal political institutions still rely in significant ways on the presence of informal
political mechanisms and arrangements.
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political institutions enable peoples to effectively take collective action. And so the normative
relationship that a people has to its political institutions (whether its political institutions are
legitimate and authorized by and accountable to the people) remains an important element in
justifying a people’s territorial rights.
Additionally, according to the social ontology that I defend a people can exist even under
oppressive conditions such as a dictatorship and can still technically be engaged in common
activities organized toward the end of independent governance as a result of top-down
imposition—just independent governance by the dictator, as it were. It is important to keep this
possibility live since, as I previously argued, even in an unjust state, it still makes sense to speak
of the people of that unjust state and to conceive of the people as the appropriate entity to be
eligible to hold territorial rights. And this possibility can be coherently explained, as I shall argue
later, under an externalist account of the people’s common activities that does not necessarily rely
on its members having certain mental states or representations of a special sort, such as collective
intentions or joint commitments. The property of being engaged in common activities aimed at
independent governance, as we shall see, is multiply realizable. In ideal cases, such a property may
come to exist at least in part through individuals desiring to engage in a common political project,
collectively intending or jointly committed to governing themselves, or sharing a common
conception of justice. But a people may also be engaged in common activities aimed at independent
governance because of dictatorial oppression and even if no individuals politically identify with
one another, no collective intention or joint commitment to self-governance exists, and no
conception of justice is shared.
A people’s common activities and shared ends serve to mark out its collective nature as not
simply reducible to a mere aggregate of individuals with their own individual activities and ends.
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On the other hand, a people does not necessarily constitute a collective agent, particularly because
a people is only contingently related to political institutions that can create and facilitate collective
agency (List and Koenig-Archibugi 2010, 89; Nine 2012, 67). As Christian List and Philip Pettit
(2013, 20, 24–25) argue, agency requires (1) representational states such as beliefs that depict how
the world is, (2) motivational states such as desires that specify how the agent requires things to
be in the world, (3) the capacity to process representational and motivational states and to act on
the basis of them, and (4) minimal standards of rationality (attitude-to-fact, attitude-to-action, and
attitude-to-attitude). However, a people does not necessarily form a single system of belief and
desire on the basis of which it can act in at least minimally rational ways just in virtue of engaging
in place-based common activities directed toward shared ends. For a people to incorporate into a
collective agent will require it to establish political institutions such as a state through which it can
form representational and motivational states on the basis of which it can act in at least minimally
rational ways. Indeed, part of the very point behind establishing and maintaining political
institutions, particularly of the democratic variety (deliberative, participatory, representative, and
the like), is so that a people can constitute sufficient agency to make collective decisions and take
collective action. (At the limit case, it is difficult to conceive of actions or decisions taken without
any broadly democratic or participatory procedure as collective in nature. A decision made for a
group by an autocrat, for instance, could not properly be considered collective or would be
collective in name only.) 17 In its collective nature then, a people stands midway, as it were,
between being a mere aggregate of individuals and a fully-fledged collective agent.18

17

Note, however, that the people of a dictatorship can still technically be engaged in common activities aimed at
independent governance as a result of top-down imposition even if the people cannot be said to be making collective
decisions or taking collective action.
18
Pettit (2005, 165–67) also maintains a conception of the people that is neither a mere aggregate of individuals nor
a group agent, which he terms a “civicity.” In a civicity, debates between members generate shared presumptions and
valuations, which then act as constraints on how the government that represents them justifies its decisions. This,
however, (a) limits the notion of a people to the context of a representative (or at least consultative) government, (b)
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Whether collective agency involves or constitutes a group mind, a corporate person, or a
supra-individual intentional subject in some more robust way over and above the conditions for
agency specified above (representational and motivational states on the basis of which action can
be taken in minimally rational ways) is a question that I aim to remain neutral on and do not address
here. Since I do not defend a conception of the people as a collective agent, the burden of proof is
not on me to substantively spell out all the metaphysical (and normative) implications of collective
agency. And political theorists such as Moore (2015) and Stilz (2011; 2016; 2019) who do defend
conceptions of the people as a collective agent are not themselves clear on whether collective
agency involves or constitutes a supra-individual intentional subject in some more robust sense. In
any case, taking collective agency as requiring representational and motivational states on the basis
of which action can be taken in at least minimally rationally ways need not settle the question as
to whether group minds exist since these conditions for collective agency could be understood as
realizable simply by individual human beings acting together in the requisite ways.
Compare then the social ontology of the people that I defend with that of Moore (2015)
and Stilz (2011; 2016; 2019) who both take a people to be a collective agent. On the one hand,
Moore assumes peoples are collective agents even though she takes them to be contingently related
to their political institutions (46–49). On the other hand, Stilz (2011; 2016; 2019) thinks political
institutions are required for peoplehood precisely because peoples are collective agents. Let us
consider Moore’s account first. Recall that distinguishing between peoples and their political
institutions such as states is important for the concept of the people to serve the function of a)
serving as the territorial rights-holder in cases of unjust and failed states and b) legitimizing

is an internalist conception of the people of the sort I go on to reject, and (c) is not a conception of the people that was
meant to function as the holder of territorial rights.
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political institutions.19 Indeed, Moore herself endorses this move and analyzes how certain types
of incapacities in establishing and maintaining institutions of self-government should not be seen
as a blocking condition that would exclude peoples from serving as territorial rights-holders.
Whereas insufficient size and territorial concentration may act as a blocking condition, a lack of
state infrastructure or dire poverty may indicate instead that third parties have duties of assistance
to provide a people with the means to exercise effective governance (50–52). But without
institutional structures for forming a system of beliefs and desires on the basis of which to make
collective decisions and take collective action in at least minimally rational ways (a possibility that
Moore admits), it is difficult to see how a people can constitute a collective agent (as Moore
insists).
In contrast to Moore, Stilz (2011; 2016; 2019) recognizes that political institutions are
needed for collective agency and as such conceives of peoples as requiring political institutions.
For Stilz (2016), “a people is born only when members engage in institutionalized political
cooperation, and come to value that cooperation. Some structure of representation is necessary to
create groups with sufficient corporate agency to act as peoples” (102).20 Peoples then are not prepolitical entities that can exist prior to political or state institutions. Stilz shores up the picture of
peoples as collective agents by requiring that they have political institutions, but as a consequence
risks giving up the normative functions that the concept of the people is supposed to play in terms
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Nine (2012, 67) also rejects conceiving of the people as an agent because peoples of failed states, peoples in the
midst of civil war, and oppressed minority groups may have collective rights justified by the interests of their
individual members even if they are not agents. Additionally, she thinks that rational agency is not needed to identify
the relevant groups to be peoples, which could be identified through shared political beliefs via a UN survey for
example. However, I disagree with Nine that peoples should be identified in internalist terms such as sharing certain
beliefs.
20
See also Stilz (2019, 124).
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of serving as the holder of territorial rights in cases of unjust and failed states and of legitimizing
political institutions.21
Indeed, in her earlier version of legitimate state theory,22 Stilz (2011, 590–98) recognizes
the need to respond to the annexation objection and to avoid the unintuitive consequence of
licensing the annexation of failed or unjust states by other states so long as they can establish
sufficient levels of legitimate governance after annexation. To overcome this objection, Stilz
simply makes room for the possibility that peoples have residual rights to territory. Even after a
state disappears, a people may still remain for a period afterwards due to the moral bonds that its
members share with one another as a result of their common history of political cooperation via
their state. 23 As a consequence of the relational value of this shared history (which cannot be
protected by a conquering albeit legitimate state that has not participated in this valuable political
relationship), a people has a claim to collective autonomy that justifies granting it territorial rights
so long as it is able to reconstitute and sustain a legitimate state. Stilz’s accommodation of the
territorial rights of peoples, however, seems to be a rather ad hoc move that does not sit well with
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However, as we shall see later, Stilz is sensitive to the normative function that a people should play in terms of
legitimizing political institutions, such as a state, and develops what she refers to an endogenous view of the people
that attempts to holds onto the idea of the people as a collective agent while preserving this normative function. This
is why I say that she “risks” giving up on these normative functions without saying she in fact does. My point here is
that there is a tension between conceiving of a people as a collective agent (which requires political institutions) and
allowing the people to play the normative function of legitimizing political institutions (which seems to require that a
people remain contingently related to political institutions).
22
According to Stilz (2011), a state has territorial rights if and only if: “(a) it effectively implements a
system of law regulating property there; (b) its subjects have claims to occupy the territory; (c) its system of law ‘rules
in the name of the people,’ by protecting basic rights and providing for political participation; and (d) the state is not
a usurper” (574).
23
Stilz (2011) insists that “only a history of sharing a state demonstrates that the existence of the moral bonds that
support political authority” (593) but I agree with Moore (2015, 104) that this rests on an implausible empirical claim.
If peoples can exist without states and hold territorial rights in virtue of their political cooperation, it is not hard to
think of cases of such political relationships existing that do not originate from state institutions, such as Indigenous
peoples whose existence date back to before the formation of the Westphalian nation-state system. In her later work,
Stilz (2019) tempers this thought—“peoples typically have an institutionalist genealogy: they emerge because groups
have shared a history of acting together in political institutions (or sometimes, reacted against that history)” (124;
emphasis mine)—and defines states broadly to include the political institutions of Indigenous peoples (14) but she
still maintains that “some structure of representation is necessary to create groups with the corporate agency to act as
peoples” (124).
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a theory that generally takes legitimate states to be the proper holder of territorial rights. Once you
make room for the relational value of a shared history of political cooperation to justify territorial
rights, the legitimacy of states is no longer the only normative source that grounds territorial
rights.24
In Stilz’s (2015; 2016; 2019) later work, she attempts to more coherently account for the
collective self-determination of peoples to avoid the annexation objection. She argues that
legitimacy requires a state to provide for both basic justice and collective self-determination and
thus expands beyond traditional liberal theories that ground legitimacy simply in justice. “A state
has a right to rule a territory and population if and only if it: (i) protects certain essential private
rights (including security, subsistence, core elements of personal autonomy, and deliberative
freedom) for all its subjects and respects these rights in outsiders [basic justice], and (ii) it reflects
the shared will of its population as to how (and by whom) they should be ruled [collective selfdetermination]” (Stilz 2019, 90). To further respond to the annexation objection, Stilz points out,
rightly I think, that the mere fact that a group does not meet the basic justice threshold is not
sufficient to license the military occupation by foreigners since for an invasion and occupation to
be just requires demonstrating a just cause (e.g. self-defense or in extremis humanitarian
intervention) and fulfilling other conditions of necessity and proportionality. And even in cases
where foreign occupation is permissible, occupiers only have a temporary enforcement permission
so long as they aim to facilitate the people’s future self-determination and not a fully legitimate
right to rule (a claim-right held against rivals to be the preferred ruler of the territory and
population) (131–32). Moreover, as part of her theory’s inclusion of the value of a people’s self-
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Indeed, Stilz (2011) admits as much, although she does not answer the charge that such an admittance undermines
the coherence of her theory: “Because of the value of shared political histories, the significance of state institutions
goes beyond the legitimating functions such institutions perform, such as protecting individuals’ basic rights and
providing essential public goods” (595).
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determination as a condition of legitimacy, Stilz develops what she refers to as an endogenous
account of peoplehood, according to which “a ‘people’ is constituted when a state is upheld
through the willing participation of its members.” “On the endogenous view, there is no
independent criterion for delineating ‘peoples’ beyond the fact that political institutions either
succeed or fail at eliciting willing participation from the populations they rule” (126).25
Although Stilz avoids the charge of accounting for the value of a people’s collective selfdetermination in an ad hoc way when she builds it in as a necessary condition for legitimacy from
the very beginning of her theory, this of course moves her newer theory away from the prototypical
legitimate state theory, as she herself recognizes, and more toward a theory like Moore’s (2015)
or mine, which likewise emphasizes the value of self-determination (though my account of selfdetermination also differs from Moore’s because I do not ground the value of self-determination
in a people’s political identity and I think, unlike Moore, that self-determination requires
democracy). However, the problem with Stilz’s theory is not so much the inclusion of the value of
self-determination as a condition of legitimacy but her account of what self-determination consists
in. Her theory depends on an implausible social ontology of a people’s collective intentions
constituting its shared will, which I will discuss in the next section of this chapter, and an overly
thin and inadequate view of what the value of self-determination and political autonomy requires,
which I will argue for in Chapter 2.
According to my terminology, Stilz’s endogenous account of peoplehood appears to blur
the rights-holder and the rights-justification question.26 But unlike other theorists who may be
mixing these two questions unintentionally, Stilz is self-consciously doing so, since for her, there
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See also Stilz (2016, 102).
Although Stilz takes it that states are the holders of territorial rights, she admits that peoples, such as Indigenous
peoples, and other persistently alienated internal minorities may have claims to self-determination and thus may also
hold certain territorial rights (Stilz 2015; 2016, 117–24; 2019, 133–39).
26
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just is no fact of the matter as to whether there is a people (for me, this concerns the rights-holder
question) aside from whether the value of self-determination is realized through the willful
participation of a people’s members (for me, this concerns the rights-justification question). As
Stilz (2019) notes, “If members willingly participate in their institutions, acting together to
implement their decisions, then a self-determining people is born. If members do not willingly
participate, while a state may exist, there is no ‘people’ that this institution could be said to
represent” (126). In taking an endogenous approach to peoplehood, Stilz is sensitive to the fact
that a people should play the normative function of legitimizing its political institutions, such as a
state (which at first glance, as I suggested earlier, seems to require that a people be conceived as
contingently related to its institutions), while also holding onto the idea that a people is a collective
agent requiring political institutions. She does this by making it a condition for a state to have
territorial rights that it creates (self-determining) peoples. So, in this way, although the state is the
holder of territorial rights (the rights-holder question), one of the conditions for its legitimacy is
whether peoples come into existence through those state institutions (the rights-justification
question), which both marks peoples as collective agents requiring political institutions and
enables the notion of the people to play the role of legitimizing states. Stilz also delineates a notion
of “proto-peoples” “not because we are recognizing something that already exists, but because we
have some reason to hope that a new institutional configuration will lessen alienation, facilitating
willing participation at reasonable cost.” A “proto-people” is typically “a group whose members
(i) desire to cooperate together politically, and (ii) seem capable of sustaining institutions that
could meet the conditions of basic justice, though (iii) they currently lack their own state or
substate political institutions and so do not have the corporate structure to act as peoples” (127).
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Ultimately, although I think both Stilz’s account of peoplehood and of self-determination
fail (which for her are one and the same account, per the endogenous view) because Stilz does not
plausibly explain a people’s collective agency and has an overly thin understanding of the value
of self-determination, nonetheless Stilz’s endogenous view of peoplehood is instructive because
the strategy it takes aims at the right theoretical goals. Stilz’s endogenous account correctly seeks
to balance between various desiderata in the social ontology of the people—accounting for its
collective nature and its relationship to political institutions while enabling it to play its normative
legitimizing function—and does so by establishing a nuanced theoretical architecture that mixes
(intentionally) the rights-holder question with the rights-justification question. The alternative (and
simpler) strategy, which I defend, is to just give up on the idea that a people is collective agent.
Why do Moore and Stilz both insist that a people must be a collective agent? Perhaps
because territorial rights are generally taken to be a group right held by a collective of a certain
sort and not simply by a mere aggregation of individuals, and a collective agent seems to be a
plausible candidate for such a collective. But to assume that a people must either be a collective
agent or a mere aggregation of individuals is a false dichotomy. 27 Instead, we can appeal to a
people’s place-based common activities and shared ends to make sense of its collective nature,
which may fall short of agency, while also accounting for a people’s contingent relationship to
political institutions and thereby the normative functions that a people is meant to play as the
territorial rights-holder (even in cases of failed or unjust states) and the legitimizer of political
institutions.
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One that Margaret Canovan (2005), for example, makes.
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§1.5 THE PEOPLE’S EXTERNALIST NATURE
A crucial feature of the social ontology of the people that I defend is that a people’s
common activities and shared ends, which constitute its collective nature, should be predominantly
understood in externalist terms that do not rely on (but do not necessarily exclude) mental states
or representations, such as collective intentions or joint commitments. As Kate Ritchie (2020) has
demonstrated, members of groups can be seen as minimally cooperating in virtue of playing their
roles within their common activities and having shared ends. Roles are defined in terms of the
rights, powers, and responsibilities that individuals occupying those roles have and the norms
governing how role players are to act and interact with one another.28 Roles are thus defined largely
interdependently in terms of their relations to other roles, where playing a role often depends on
or is part of a larger action involving other roles being played. For individuals to play their roles
does not require them to have complex mental representations of the mental states of others or
even to know the other members of their group. Instead, playing a role merely necessitates standing
in the right relations to other members playing their own roles, completing certain tasks, and
having certain rights and responsibilities. Likewise, for a group to have a common goal does not
necessitate that all or even most of its members aim at, intend, or even know about that goal.
Rather, what is centrally required is that the roles within the group’s organizational structure be
functionally integrated to achieve a certain end. Take Ritchie’s example of a spy network where
members may not know one another, what end they are helping to achieve, or how their roles
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I take it that the rights, responsibilities, and norms that constitute roles simply specify how role-players are to act
according to their roles and can be specified informally. So, role-players do not necessarily have obligations to act as
their roles dictate and are not necessarily justified in having the rights and responsibilities associated with their roles.
If an organized group is unjustly structured or is structured to realize certain unjust aims, it may very well be the case
that role-players in fact ought not to play their roles. Compare this to Gilbert’s (2008, 147–64) view that parties to a
joint commitment, in virtue of that commitment, have obligations toward each other, which have a certain normative
force even if they are not moral obligations or even if parties are not justified all things considered in fulfilling those
obligations.
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contribute to that end. Nonetheless, some sort of minimal cooperation is occurring so long as the
roles interact in such a way so as to achieve a particular end.29
One problem with internalist accounts of joint action or cooperation is that they often face
difficulty scaling up to analyze large social groups such as peoples (Ritchie 2020).30 Generally,
internalist accounts focus on analyzing the cooperation of small groups of individuals, such as two
people taking a walk. Michael Bratman (1992; 1999; 2014), for instance, offers a reductive account
of collective intentions in terms of individual intentions with consistent and jointly satisfiable (i.e.
“meshing”) subplans and common knowledge of each other’s intentions. The problem with
applying Bratman’s account to large groups is that Bratman requires that individuals participating
in a shared cooperative activity know that the other participating individuals have the relevant
intentions (of the form “I intend that we J”). However, large groups such as peoples are impersonal
(members do not know everyone personally) and anonymous (members do not know that some
other members even exist) and so members could not possibly know the mental states of all other
members.31 Additionally, even if members of large social groups did know the mental states of all
other members, it would still be implausibly costly for members to hold such complicated
representations (of the sort Bratman spells out with meshing subplans and common knowledge) of
all these mental states (Ritchie 2020).
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One might think that even if the functional integration of roles to achieve a certain end is what is centrally important
for cooperation with an organized, it is nonetheless implausible that such cooperation can occur if no one knows the
common goal that the group is seeking to achieve. If this is the case, one might impose requirements to the effect that
at least someone, or a sufficient number of members, or a relevant set of members (perhaps those with authority over
the group) know the common goal. Regardless, for the case of a people with the common goal of exercising its own
governance over a territory, it is likely that such (more minimal) internalist requirements, if they exist, for an otherwise
generally externalist account of cooperation would be easily met.
30
According to Ritchie’s (2020) terminology, which I follow here, “internalist views of the social are views that take
social phenomena or entities to be grounded, constituted, constructed… by mental representations, mental states, or
mental contents. On my usage externalist views of the social are those that take social phenomena or entities to be
grounded, constituted, constructed… by features that are external to mental states and mental contents, like documents,
laws, or material resources” (ellipses in original).
31
These understandings of impersonality and anonymity are drawn from Gilbert (2008, 99).
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Margaret Gilbert (2008) also defends an internalist theory of joint action, which involves
individuals forming plural subjects via a joint commitment to do something as a body. Gilbert
requires that all individuals bound by a joint commitment be involved in creating it and that prior
to forming a joint commitment, all individuals must express a readiness to commit which must be
common knowledge between them (138, 168). The problem with applying Gilbert’s analysis to
large social groups extended across time, especially intergenerational groups such as peoples, is
that many, if not all, current members of a group will not have been involved in forming any initial
joint commitments that the group has (Ritchie 2020).32 Peoples, then, are not plural subjects in
Gilbert’s sense. Lastly, John Searle (1997, 2010) offers an internalist account of collective
intentions that relies on the idea of primitive we-intentions in which members of a joint action
have intentions of the form “we intend that we Φ” that is irreducible to intentions in the I-mode.
Again, having such we-intentions may not be possible in large social groups since members may
not know who is included in the group that is picked out by the “we” (Ritchie 2020). And even if
a we-intention might not require of a member that she knows everyone who is included in the
group picked out by the “we”, the very primitive and irreducible nature of we-intentions makes it
mysterious what would be required for a group to be picked out by the “we’ in a we-intention,
which hurts the explanatory power of Searle’s view.
Political theorists draw on these internalist accounts when developing their own social
ontologies of the people as a collective agent, but they do not adequately show how their accounts
overcome these scalability problems. Moore (2015, 46–54), for instance, appeals to Gilbert (1992),

32

While Gilbert (2008) does consider how her account can be extended to large social groups that involve a high
degree of impersonality and anonymity, she still maintains that “all members of the population must have expressed
their readiness to participate in the relevant joint commitment with all other members of the population” and so is still
subject to Ritchie’s criticism that not all current members in a large social group are involved in forming any initial
joint commitments that the group has (175).
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Searle (1998), and Tuomela (2005) to describe the collective agency of peoples without addressing
any of these scalability issues. Stilz (2016; 2019) draws on Bratman (2007) to explain how a people
can share a will. For Stilz (2019), “A shared will, then, is nothing more than an interlocking
structure of cooperative intentions on the part of each participant, amid common knowledge on the
part of all that those intentions obtain” (108). Here again, we see how the image of the people as a
collective agent may have led political theorists astray since agency is generally an internalist
notion and collective agency seems conducive to being analyzed, at least in part, in terms of these
sorts of accounts of collective intention or joint commitment.33 However, if we give up on the idea
of the people as necessarily a collective agent, then we need not appeal to these sorts of internalist
accounts to make sense of a people’s collective nature.
Stilz (2016, 105; 2019, 120) herself addresses the worry that models of collective intentions
do not scale up to large groups such as peoples and argues that the political activity of everyday
citizens can be seen as jointly intentional on a grand scale. As evidence for this claim, she points
to the intentions of citizens to play their parts in a people’s shared venture by complying with the
law, paying taxes, respecting the legal rights of others, voicing their opinions, voting, etc.
However, Stilz moves too quickly here. Just because citizens behave in ways that contribute to a
people’s shared ends and activities does not mean that they have the relevant sort of interlocking
intentions in terms of which Bratman analyzes collective intentions. Citizens may have all sorts of
motivations for acting in ways that contribute to a people’s common activities. They may comply
with the law and pay taxes just because they want to avoid sanction or punishment. They may vote
or participate in their government’s political processes just because they want their voices to be
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Although political theorists tend to analyze collective agency at least in part through joint intentions, it is important
to note, as List and Pettit (2013, 34–35) have shown, that group agents can come about without the involvement of
any joint intentions and that even for a group agent formed by joint intentions, some or even many of the group
members may not participate in any of the group’s joint intentions at all.
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heard. Outward behavior that contributes to a cooperative activity is not evidence for any sort of
special internal intention (interlocking with the intentions of others) or the endorsement of an
intention to play one’s part and simply begs the question against externalist accounts of
cooperation that do not rely on mental states or representations.34 Indeed, I think what Stilz has in
fact demonstrated here is not how citizens play their intentional part within a people’s collective
intention, but how citizens play their roles within a people’s common activities and how these
roles can be functionally integrated to realize a people’s shared ends, along the lines that I have
suggested.
My point is not necessarily that it is impossible to provide an account of collective
intentions or collective agency that is able to overcome these scalability problems of applying to
peoples (though I have my doubts and such an account would likely not do the theoretical work
that political theorists would need it to do in their current characterization of the collective
intentions or collective agency of the people). Political theorists working on territorial rights,
however, have not offered such an account. Nonetheless, it may be that an account could be
provided (which I think is promising though I do not do so here) to explain the collective intentions
or the collective agency of a state or a formal political entity, since the scalability problems here
are less formidable.35 Formal political institutional structures could (and often do) mark out certain
members who occupy various roles and positions of authority (representatives, leaders, etc.) as
being the ones whose individual intentions, beliefs, desires, and other mental states count as

Stilz (2016, 105–8; 2019, 120–23) goes on further to explain how a people’s shared activity within a modern state
can be cooperative even though states are a) hierarchical, b) coercive, c) impersonal, and d) involuntary. I do not
necessarily disagree with Stilz here. However, again, Stilz only shows that political activity within modern state can
be cooperative but not that such cooperation should be analyzed using an internalist account of collective intention.
35
List and Pettit (2013, 40), for instance, mention that the state is a group agent by many accounts, citing McLean
(2003) in particular, but that whether the people is too is more controversial. But their concern here has more to do
with whether peoples can meet the requisite conditions of rationality and consistency for agency, and less about
scalability worries. See also Wendt (2004), Copp (2006), and List and Koenig-Archibugi (2010).
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relevant for forming the collective intentions or collective agency of a political entity or state. It is
precisely because of the difficulty of having the mental states of every single member of a people
be a part of forming the group’s collective intentions and collective agency that we a) have formal
institutional structures of decision-making in the first place and b) value these formal institutions
being responsive and accountable to each member of the people in some way (I think, equally and
democratically) so that they each can participate in the processes that form the group’s collective
intentions, beliefs, and desires even if their own individual intentions, beliefs, and desires are not
a constitutive part of those collective states.

§1.6 AGAINST OVERLY UNIFIED SOCIAL ONTOLOGIES OF THE PEOPLE
A second problem with existing and predominantly internalist social ontologies of the
people is that they often presume too much agreement and internal unity within peoples. Take Cara
Nine’s (2012) account of the people in which a people must:
1. demonstrate the capacity to meet minimal standards of justice (to provide secure access
to the objects of basic human needs for members and to respect the basic human rights
of all persons), and
2. have members who share a common conception of justice. (67)
She draws from Rawlsian notions to describe how a common conception of justice can arise from
an overlapping consensus between members of a people (either decent or liberal).
But just as members of a single people may identify with a diverse number of national
cultures, they may also endorse many different conceptions of justice and may disagree radically
and fundamentally about justice. There is no guarantee that a common conception of justice will
be achieved through an overlapping consensus (even if we might hope it can be) (Waldron 1999,
chap. 7). Moreover, a common conception of justice is also unnecessary for a people to qualify as
a candidate to hold territorial rights. A common conception of justice is often developed (and
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continuously revised) only after political institutions have become established and in the very
process of exercising the territorial right to jurisdictional authority—the making and enforcing of
laws. But if a people can exist independently and prior to political institutions (as Nine herself also
thinks), then our social ontology of the people as a territorial rights-holder should not have as a
feature something that is often realized only upon the creation of political institutions and the
exercise of those rights. Additionally, suppose, for instance, that a people who held territorial rights
and whose members initially shared a common conception of justice underwent a political crisis
that led to deep disagreements about justice. It would be strange and implausible to conclude that
all of a sudden the group is no longer a people and could no longer hold territorial rights rather
than to think that the people would continue to exist and could exercise its territorial rights in an
effort to bridge those disagreements (which it may very well want to for reasons of stability and
legitimacy, even separate from concerns about justice).
Let us turn next to Moore (2015) who defends a social ontology of the people, which
combines both internalist and externalist dimensions, as a collective agent that meets the three
conditions of political identity, capacity, and history (in addition to the condition of collective
agency). First, members of a people must subjectively identify with each other as exercising or
aspiring to exercise their collective self-determination (in particular, the sort of collective selfdetermination associated with a comprehensive set of territorial rights). Second, a people must
have the capacity to establish and maintain political institutions through which to exercise their
self-determination. And third, a people must have a history of political cooperation (50). I shall
focus here on the first internalist condition of political identity. 36 Although Moore recognizes,

The second and third condition of Moore’s conception of the people both, at least in part, address the rightsjustification question rather than simply the rights-holder question. As I mentioned previously, Moore (2015, 50–52)
argues that some kinds of institutional incapacities (insufficient size and territorial concentration) may act as a
blocking condition for a people to be accorded territorial rights but other kinds may not (poverty or lack of state
36
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following Young (1990, 46), the “thrownness” of identities and how identities have both objective
and subjective dimensions, Moore ultimately thinks that subjective identity is both a necessary and
sufficient condition for having an identity. 37 Subjective identity performs the individuating
function of distinguishing groups from one another but this does not necessarily entail that any
group that merely subjectively sees itself as a people is in fact a people. Rather, peoplehood also
requires that political identity be undergirded or supported by a network of shared political
relationships (which may be institutionally mediated or structured by political, religious, or other
formative institutions) (Moore 2015, 54–59).
The problem with requiring subjective political identity as a condition of peoplehood is
that not all members may incorporate into their own self-conceptions an understanding of being
engaged (or aspiring to engage) in a common political project of self-government with others
(Kolers 2018, 3–4). Indeed, members may be indifferent or even hostile to the more general
political identity of engaging in a common political project, especially if they feel like they are not
being fairly or justly included within that political project. Or the political identities of members
may be tied to more specific political identities such as belonging to a particular political party,
identifying with a particular political subunit (e.g. a city, province, or state), adherence to a specific

infrastructure) and may indicate instead that third parties have duties of assistance to provide a people with the means
to exercise effective governance. But this means that some peoples still count as peoples even if they do not meet the
second condition of having the capacity to establish and maintain political institutions of self-government.
Additionally, Moore’s third condition of having a history of political cooperation primarily seems to help to causally
explain other features that Moore takes to be important for according a group territorial rights, but it is less clear why
having a history of political cooperation must itself be a constitutive condition of peoplehood. So, Moore says that a
history of political cooperation helps to establish various elements such as moral bonds, evidence about the likelihood
of productive future cooperation, agreement, and political solidarity built on relations among coequals (52–53). But
then a history of political cooperation only seems to be contingently important for realizing these latter elements but
is not necessary as a constitutive condition of peoplehood. Additionally, these latter elements seem to be normatively
important as conditions that justify according a group territorial rights (the rights-justification question) and it is less
clear why they themselves must be constitutive of peoples (the rights-holder question).
37
Requiring identities to be recognized by others, according to Moore (2015, 55), would make identities hostage to
groups who have assimilationist tendencies or who refuse to recognize those identities (e.g. members of the Turkish
elite who do not see the Kurds in their country as a separate people).
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political ideology (liberalism, socialism, feminism, etc.), or commitment to certain ideals (justice,
democracy, equality, etc.). More generally, since people’s identities can be exceedingly
complicated and draw from a vast array of sources (political, religious, professional, familial,
cultural, sexual, etc.), it is not clear why any particular type of identity is of unique normative
significance in ways that do not also attach to other sorts of identities (Buchanan 2003, 250; Nine
2012, 58–63). After all, other sorts of identities may also be important in the ways that Moore
(2015, 50–54) values the distinct political identity of engaging in a common political project. Other
identities may likewise (a) create valuable moral bonds between members that intertwine their
lives and interests, (b) generate rights and duties for collectives whose member identify in a
particular way (e.g. a church), (c) be rooted in a place (e.g. some cultural national identities), and
(d) have political dimensions of being based on past cooperative relationships.
In response to the objection that her account ignores the rights and claims of individuals
who live on a people’s territory but do not share in its political identity and political aspirations
(Moore calls this the problem of the individual dissenter), Moore makes two points. First, she
reminds us that territorial rights are held by collectives and not individuals (who have other rights
such as basic human rights and residency rights) and so individual dissenters are not being denied
a right even though territorial rights are not extended to them. Second, she reinterprets this
criticism as an anarchist or libertarian objection to the justifiability of coercive political authority
and claims that this misunderstands her project, which seeks to account for how territorial rights
arise and not how political authority over individuals arises, and after all, she is on the side of those
who think that political authority can be justified (Moore 2015, 61–62).
However, I think both of these responses misses the point of the objection that her social
ontology of the people based on subjective identity presumes too much agreement and internal

50

unity within a people (which is more an ontological worry about what peoples are rather than
simply a normative worry that the claims or rights of certain individual dissenters will be violated).
First, even though territorial rights are collective rights, the question is how to account for the very
collective—the people—that should serve as the holder of those rights. Since Moore’s own
account of the people, as a collective, appeals to the subjective identity of its individual members,
she begs the question against the objection that appealing to this feature of a people’s individual
members inadequately explains the nature of the collective when she simply asserts that the
question under consideration is about collectives and not individuals.
Second, it seems to be a straw person to characterize the objection—that not all individuals
within a people may share the same political identity of the relevant sort that Moore picks out—in
terms of anarchist or libertarian skepticism about the justification of coercive political authority.
Rather, the objection is over Moore’s account of the entity that should hold territorial rights and
so the objection implicitly concedes that erecting political institutions to exercise territorial rights
and political authority can be justified. Finally, the question of legitimizing political authority and
the question of justifying territorial rights are not completely independent of one another since a
people generally exercises territorial rights through political institutions that have political
authority and so the legitimacy of those institutions are thus relevant for (even if derived from) the
justification for a people’s territorial rights.
What matters, then, when it comes to defining the people is not the subjective identities of
individual members but the externalist relationships that bind a people together, which I
characterize in terms of place-based common activities aimed at the overarching shared end of
independent governance. This is not to deny that a majority of members may share a desire to
engage in a common political project or come to subjectively identify in these political terms. Such
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a shared desire and subjective identification may even (but need not) explain why a people comes
to have a shared aim of independent governance. But whereas for Moore (2015), this subjective
political identity condition must be first met and only after do we “look backwards to see if the
identity is supported by relationships of the right kind” (56), my account of the people appeals
directly to common activities of the appropriate sort (place-based ones aimed at independent
governance) and is more capacious in terms of how those common activities may come about
(whether or not political identities or internalist desires play an explanatory role). Moore worries
that a purely relationship-based account is unable to individuate peoples from each other and faces
problems in explaining how many relationships are needed to distinguish a people and why these
relationships are important (57). But a subjective identity account fares even worse with respect to
these issues since, as I argued, it is not clear how many individuals need to subjectively identity
with a common political project in order to mark out a people or why this particular political source
of identity is of special normative importance over other kinds of identity. In contrast, the social
ontology of the people that I develop does not face the problems that Moore associates with
relationship-based accounts in general since, according to my account, it is not simply the number
of common activities that matter but common activities of a particular type (place-based ones
aimed at independent governance) and the importance of such activities will become clear in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 as contexts that generate rights to self-determination and ecological
integrity and duties of ecological sustainability.

§1.7 AGAINST OVERLY IDEALIZED SOCIAL ONTOLOGIES OF THE PEOPLE
A related problem with existing social ontologies of the people is that they operate from or
assume, at least implicitly, an overly idealized context. Nine (2012) takes for granted, for instance,
that a people represents a well-ordered society (66). It is no surprise then that within a well-ordered
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society, in which everyone accepts the same principles of justice and knows that everyone does so
and the basic structure is generally just and known to be so (Rawls 1999, 4), members will (almost
definitionally) share a common conception of justice.
Consider too Rawls’ (2001) own account of the people including liberal and decent
peoples, both of which are well-ordered. “Liberal peoples have three basic features: a reasonably
just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental interests; citizens united
by what Mill called ‘common sympathies’; and finally, a moral nature. The first is institutional,
the second is cultural, and the third requires a firm attachment to a political (moral) conception of
right and justice” (23-4).38 Decent peoples, while sharing in the second and third features of liberal
peoples, do not have a reasonably just constitutional democratic government. Instead,
A decent people must honor the laws of peace; its system of law must be such as to respect
human rights and to impose duties and obligations on all persons in its territory. Its system
of law must follow a common good idea of justice that takes into account what it sees as
the fundamental interests of everyone in society. And finally, there must be a sincere and
not unreasonable belief on the part of judges and other officials that the law is indeed
guided by a common good idea of justice. (Rawls 2001, 67)
So, the people, for Rawls, whether liberal or decent, is clearly a moralized notion and meant
to be so. Rawls (2001, 3–5) did not intend his conception of the people to function as the holder
of territorial rights within a fully-fledged theory of territory, but rather saw it as serving to develop
a Law of Peoples for the Society of well-ordered Peoples, which is supposed to be an exercise in
ideal theory. The moralized nature of peoples, both liberal and decent, is thus important for Rawls’
set-up of the (second) original position (at the international level) in which representatives of such
peoples are to select the principles that specify the Law of Peoples. Thus, the representatives of
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What distance there is exactly between Rawlsian peoples and nations is not so clear. Both Rawls and Mills, whom
Rawls (2001, 23n17) draws from, are ambiguous as to whether common sympathies should be understood in terms of
cultural or political ties. At one point, Rawls says that “if those sympathies were entirely dependent upon a common
language, history, and political culture, with a shared historical consciousness, this features would rarely, if ever, be
fully satisfied” (Rawls 2001, 24) and yet he also relies on Yale Tamir’s (1993) cultural nationalism to interpret
common sympathies (Rawls 2001, 25n20). Nine (2012, 63–64) also has made these observations about Rawls.
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these peoples must be modeled with the appropriate normative motivations for this thought
experiment of an initial choice situation to function. For Rawls, this is what distinguishes peoples
from states: not the fact that peoples are contingently related to political institutions (since
Rawlsian peoples are partly defined in terms of their institutions: liberal peoples by reasonably
just constitutional democratic governments and decent peoples by the decency of their systems of
law, judges, and officials, which is exemplified by a decent consultation hierarchy) but the fact
that the rationality of states excludes the reasonable. States for Rawls are essentially Thucydidean
and realist in nature; they are concerned about their own basic interests and power without seeking
to offer fair terms of cooperation to other peoples that respect and recognize them as equals (27–
30).
However, when it comes to a theory of territory, we need a social ontology of the people
applicable in conditions that range from not-so-well-ordered societies to ill-ordered societies, the
latter of which, as coined by Charles Mills (2017, 207–8), are not cooperative ventures for mutual
advantage (Rawls’ (1999, 4) conception of society) but are rather marked by coercion,
exploitation, and systematic disrespect for subordinated groups. In ill-ordered societies, dominantgroup ideologies will obfuscate and distort the senses of justice that members have (both
unconsciously and consciously and for both privileged and subordinated groups) such that it may
be unlikely and difficult for them to arrive at a shared conception of justice. At the extreme end,
an ill-ordered society could create conditions, perhaps in virtue of unjust, ill-ordered, and
segregationist structures, that would generate two or more peoples, each of which had a distinct
territorial base and were engaged in separate domains of place-based common activities aimed at
their own independent governance. Another possibility is of peoples within peoples such as
Indigenous peoples who have suffered colonialist injustices within and at the hands of a host
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colonialist state. However, whether such peoples in these and other sorts of cases should be
accorded territorial rights and what institutional forms these rights should take (which may or may
not generate a right to secede and to create one’s own state due to injustices suffered) is a separate
issue that is a matter of the rights-justification question and not the rights-holder question.
Moore (2015) too describes how “political relations are different from family and religious
relationships because they involve a relation of coequals subject to and creating a common
political power” in which individuals with different backgrounds and conceptions of the good are
prepared to cooperate and compromise to create and maintain rules to govern their lives (53;
emphasis mine). While this can help to explain why political identities are distinct from other
identities and have unique normative significance, it does so only at the cost of building in too
much normative content into the notion of politics from the very beginning. In relations of equality,
it is much more likely that members will subjectively identify as being engaged in a common
political project of self-government with each other. But (actual and not just idealized) politics, of
course, also involves conflict, domination, and relations between unequals. Even if equality is a
normative ideal toward which we should strive, equality should not be built into the very definition
of politics itself. Moore seems to be equivocating between the norms we want to guide our political
relations and the description of political relations themselves (an incarnation of the obfuscation
between the rights-holder and rights-justification question). Just as we need an account of the
people even in cases of failed, unjust, and illegitimate states, we also need a conception of the
people that can fulfill the function of serving as the holder of territorial rights in both ideal and
non-ideal contexts.39
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As mentioned above, Stilz (2016, 102; 2019, 126) also assumes an idealized context in her endogenous account of
peoplehood since for her a people just is a group that realizes the value of self-determination. But since her account
self-consciously blurs the rights-holder and the rights-condition question, I will address her account of the value of
self-determination (and consequently her moralized and idealized account of the people) in Chapter 2.
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The social ontology of the people that I defend as a group of individuals engaged in placebased common activities aimed at the overarching end of independent governance is able to play
this role of serving as the holder of territorial rights for both well-ordered and ill-ordered societies.
Here, it will be useful to consider some of the various ways in which a people might come to have
the shared end of independent governance. Recall that having a shared end is an externalist matter
concerning how common activities and the roles of members within those activities are
functionally integrated. So, having the shared end of independent governance does not require that
all members of a people each individually adopt this end or that they jointly intend to pursue this
end, even if meeting these conditions could help this shared end to obtain.
A people could come to have the shared end of independently governing itself due to
bottom-up processes whereby its members mutually adjusted their common activities to be
directed toward that end, perhaps even because they politically identify with one other as being a
part of the same project of self-determination as Moore suggests. However, a people’s common
activities could also be organized toward the end of independent governance as a result of topdown imposition, for instance, by a dictator that oppressively structured the activities and
institutions within a geographical domain in such a way so that he could rule over its members by
himself. Here it would still be the case that the common activities of the people were aimed at
independent governance—just governance by the dictator independent of anyone else—even if its
members were coerced into participating in those common activities.40
The property of being engaged in common activities aimed at independent governance is
thus multiply realizable. It may result from a people, in ideal cases, involved in well-ordered,

The end of a common activity, as Gould (1988) notes “may be a shared end in the sense that they [the individuals
participating in the common activity] have all freely chosen it together, or it may be shared only in the weaker sense
that they all cooperate to effect an end set for them by someone else or even imposed on them from without and which
they have not chosen” (78).
40
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reciprocal, and equal relationships, constituting the collective agency or joint intention to govern
itself, politically identifying with the same project of self-determination, or sharing a common
conception of justice. But importantly, it may not. Thus, the common activities of a people and the
minimal cooperative relations arising between its members are not meant to be “common” or
“cooperative” in any ideal sense that denotes a lack of coercion, unfairness, domination, or
hierarchy. Nonetheless, the nature of a people’s common activities may give rise to and generate
norms that govern how these common activities should be structured—in particular, norms of selfdetermination and ecological sustainability.41 I turn to these norms and principles in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3, which must be appealed to in order to justify the territorial rights of peoples.
One might still worry about the plausibility of providing a social ontology of the people
that does not, at least in some way, appeal to internalist properties of some sort, whether it is the
desire, joint intention, collective agency, or political identity of a people’s members to govern
themselves. Politics must be a matter, after all, of the intentions of individuals or what they want,
so this objection goes. Here, I note that the shared intention, desire, subjective identity, or whatever
other mental property with the content of aiming at self-governance that the internalist theorist
wishes to appeal to as holding between a group of individuals may indeed be morally valuable and
I do not deny this. However, as the philosophical literature on collective intentions and shared
agency illustrates, genuinely shared mental properties are difficult to achieve (and not simply
individual mental properties with the same content, which itself is hard to realize in large groups).
I agree with Stilz (2019) at least in the respect that often “the state attempts to create shared
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Unlike Moore (2015, 50) then, I do not characterize a people as engaging in or aspiring to engage in collective selfdetermination but rather as aiming at independent governance, since I take self-determination to be a norm that
regulates how a people should be structured and to include it within the conception of the people itself renders the
conception overly idealized and risks circularity.
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intentions by facilitating institutionalized joint activity among its constituents” (126). 42 Thus, the
value of some sort of shared mental property between a group of individuals is something we often
aim to realize (precisely because of its value) but it is not always already present in a group that
we should consider a candidate for holding territorial rights. Focusing on a normatively valuable
end, as it were, gets things backward in our theorizing. The notion of a people within a theory of
territorial rights is a technical term that needs to play certain normative and theoretical functions
within that larger theory. And so appeal to our intuitions about what the word “people” ordinarily
means (as if there is only one meaning)—for example, that it must somehow involve an internalist
property—can only take us so far and cannot be decisive or determinative. Nonetheless, an
externalist notion of the people, as I have conceived and defended it, does not preclude shared
internalist properties (which are more difficult to achieve) from being present in a people, from
explaining causally or even constitutively the existence of the relevant externalist property of
engaging in place-based common activities aimed at independent governance, or from even being
understood as morally valuable.

§1.8 CONCLUSION
Now that the social ontology of the people that I defend is fully in view, it will be useful
to compare it once again to the other candidate options for territorial rights-holders: states, nations,
and ethnogeographic communities. According to my account, a people is a group of individuals
engaged in common activities that are rooted in or attached to a place and that aim at various shared
ends, the overarching end of which is the exercise of some form of independent governance over
all the inhabitants of a geographical area.. A people is only contingently related to political

42

See also Stilz (2016, 108).
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institutions, such as a state, and so is not necessarily a collective agent since political institutions
are generally required for establishing a system of beliefs and desires on the basis of which a
people can act in at least minimally rational ways.
Both a nation and an ethnogeographic community are also defined not in terms of political
or state institutions, but rather pre-politically43 or non-politically as a group marked by certain
shared cultural features, as in the case of a nation, or shared land-use patterns and ontologies of
land, as in the case of an ethnogeographic community. However, unlike a nation or an
ethnogeographic community, a people is defined politically via common activities directed toward
independent governance (and not in thicker cultural or ecological terms), and if a people indeed
has political institutions such as a state then those institutions will then be a proper part of a
people’s common activities that may help to delimit and demarcate their scope and to stabilize and
perpetuate them. So, it is possible, as Stilz suggests, that a state and political institutions pre-exist
and create a people such that the people is not a pre-political entity, but contra Stilz, peoplehood
is not necessarily created by states or political institutions.
The common activities of a people are defined in externalist terms (which do not rely on
mental states or representations) via individuals playing interdependent roles in their place-based
common activities that are functionally integrated to achieve shared ends, the overarching end of
which is independent governance. In this sense, the common activities of a people are understood
in a similar fashion to how Kolers conceives of a shared ontology of land as material rather than
intentional, ideological, or subjective. According to Kolers (2009), “The ontology is manifest in
the material organization of the community; whether it is also in the heads of the individual

Abizadeh (2012) glosses pre-political as “prior, both causally and constitutively, to the exercise of political power”
(868-69). Sometimes pre-political is meant more narrowly as prior to or independent of the state.
43
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members is not directly relevant” (92).44 The property of engaging in common activities that aim
at independent governance is multiply realizable and may but need not result from various
internalist or idealized conditions such as collective intentions, joint commitments, subjective
political identity, or common conceptions of justice. Importantly too, a people may result from
oppressive conditions and top-down imposition by a dictator (just as a people may be created by a
state or political institutions). Thus, a people is not an idealized notion but can exist in both wellordered and ill-ordered societies even if the political relations and common activities structuring a
people are unequal, conflictual, and coercive. This enables the concept of the people to play the
necessary normative function of serving as the holder of territorial rights even in cases of failed or
unjust states and as the legitimizer of political institutions. Of course, offering a social ontology of
the people to answer the rights-holder question does not yet tell us which peoples should be
accorded territorial rights and what normative conditions a people must satisfy to justify having
territorial rights. I turn to the answer to this rights-justification question in the next chapter.

Kolers (2009) furthers: “it is logically possible that a particular ethnogeography be shared and dominant in a
community even if every single person within the ethnogeographic community intellectually rejects it.” It is sufficient
for ontologies to take “an as-if form”: namely, “the shared ontology may amount to nothing more than a story that
could be told that would make sense of the patterns of land use within some society” (86-87).
44
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CHAPTER 2: DEMOCRATIC SELF-DETERMINATION
Once we have worked out the social ontology of the people in answer to the rights-holder
question as a group of individuals who are engaged in common activities that are rooted in or
attached to a place and that aim at independent governance, we can turn next to the rightsjustification question: what normative conditions must be satisfied to justify a people having or
being accorded territorial rights? In this chapter, I begin my argument that a principle of ecopolitical self-determination is the core principle that justifies a people’s territorial rights. 45 I focus
in this chapter, however, solely on the political dimensions of self-determination and argue that it
is a democratic norm. The next chapter completes the ecological dimensions of my argument and
demonstrates how a people’s right to self-determination is inextricably and normatively bound up
with a duty of ecological sustainability and a right to ecological integrity. As such, the principle
grounding a people’s territorial rights must be understood in its totality as an eco-political one of
self-determination. Part of the motivation behind focusing on the political and democratic nature
of self-determination is the fact that most theorists of territorial rights do not think selfdetermination is a democratic principle or that it requires democracy.46
In §2.1, I draw from Gould (1988; 2004; 2006) to argue that a people has the right to selfdetermination, understood as a democratic norm, which provides one of the core justifications for
its territorial rights to jurisdictional authority and to resource and border control. In §2.2, I clarify
that justifying territorial rights for peoples based primarily on their right to self-determination does
not deny the variety of other common activities that also give rise to self-determination rights,
which may or may not take on territorial forms. These include, among other examples,

I say, “with qualifications,” because the entire account of what conditions must be satisfied to justify territorial
rights will be fully worked out and completed in Chapter 3.
46
But see Gould (2004; 2006) and Christiano (2006) for exceptions.
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corporations, transnational groups, dispersed minorities within a people, international bodies, and
functionally distributed shared governance between peoples.
In the next two sections, I argue against two prominent alternative conceptions of selfdetermination in the literature. In §2.3, I criticize Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman’s
(2009, chap. 2) view of self-determination as an irreducibly collective moral right that grounds the
intrinsic value of democracy but nonetheless allows a people to exercise its self-determination to
forgo democracy. Next in §2.4, I discuss Anna Stilz’s (2019) account of self-determination and
argue that the very value of political autonomy to which she appeals as the basis for selfdetermination would justify much more than what her thin conception of self-determination
consists in (which simply requires that (a) a state reflect the shared intention of a majority of
cooperators to associate together politically and to support the state’s institutions and (b) a
constitutional channel to revoke the authorization of the government under authentic deliberative
conditions).
In §2.5, I contend along with Gould (1988, 84–85; 2004, 175–76; 2006, 48–49) that selfdetermination does in fact require democracy understood in broad normative terms (and not via
any specific set of procedures or institutions) as the equal right of all those engaged in common
activities to participate in the decision-making concerning those activities. I demonstrate how
arguments for why self-determination does not require democracy appeal to reasons that
themselves justify the requirement of democracy. I also show that these arguments cannot
adequately explain how a people as a whole can be said as having say in its collective decisionmaking within a constitutional monarchy.
In §2.6, I consider the implications of requiring a people to be democratic in order to have
territorial rights. Requiring democracy does not necessarily entail Western models of
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representative electoral democracy and does not imply democracy can be coercively imposed upon
others (Gould 2004, 35–36; 2006, 52–53; 2013, 292). I show that there is a practical and theoretical
difference between saying that a democratically authorized rights-protecting non-democracy (call
this an “adequate state”) is justified in having territorial rights (Stilz and Altman and Wellman’s
view) versus saying that an adequate state is not justified in having territorial rights but that
nonetheless outsiders are not permitted to coercively intervene in such a state (my view). Adequate
states only have a temporary enforcement permission to govern a territory but not a claim-right
held against all other competitors to be the permanent ruler of that territory. So outsiders are
permitted to non-coercively support competitor groups within an adequate state especially if these
rivals have the capability and aspiration to peacefully change the existing regime into a democracy.
I conclude in §2.7.

§2.1 SELF-DETERMINATION AS A DEMOCRATIC NORM
One of the core values that helps to ground a people’s territorial rights is self-determination
understood (in part) as a democratic norm. As Gould (1988, 84–85; 2004, 175–76; 2006, 48–49)
has argued, the very existence of common activities serves as a context for democratic decisionmaking and generates a group right to self-determination (which is derived from the individual
rights to self-determination of the group’s members). To see why this is so, note first that every
individual has the equal right to determine their own actions and the equal right to the conditions
necessary for the exercise of their freedom, which Gould (1988, 35–71) grounds in the values of
freedom as self-development and equal positive agency. Since individuals are social creatures,
common activities are themselves conditions for the self-development of individuals insofar as
they provide a context for reciprocity and enable the achievement of ends that could not otherwise
be realized by individuals alone. It follows, then, that since no one has any more right than any
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other participant to determine their common activities, each individual engaged in a common
activity has the equal right to participate in the decision-making concerning that activity, which
can be understood here as a principle of democracy. If one were not able to participate in the
decision-making regarding one’s common activity and if the nature and course of the common
activity were determined by others instead, then one would be dominated and this would not be an
activity of self-development.
Since common activities are not simply reducible to an aggregate of individual activities,
the nature of the decision-making concerning common activities must differ from that of
individuals deciding their own actions independently of others. Rather, the determination of
common activities necessitates participation in decisions that bind all members of the group and
must take the form of codetermination by the group or collective decision-making among equals—
in other words, self-determination understood as a group right. The right of a group to selfdetermine its own common activities, then, should not be understood as taking any specific
procedural and institutional form, but rather as grounded more broadly and normatively in the
principle of democracy (Gould 1988, 84–85; 2004, 175–76; 2006, 48–49).
A people, then, in virtue of its common activities, has the right to self-determination—to
decide for itself the nature and course of its common activities. Self-determination as a group right
has both an internal and external dimension. Internally, a group has the right to set the terms of its
common activities and externally, a group has the right to be free from external interference (given
certain constraints of justice, democracy, and ecological sustainability, to be developed in this
chapter and Chapter 3) (Cassese 1995, 5–12). The two aspects of self-determination are ultimately
two sides of the same coin in which the external side can be understood as parasitic on the internal
one. Outsiders have a duty not to interfere with a group’s own governance precisely because it is
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the group itself that should decide the direction and shape of its common activities. As Iris Marion
Young (2002, 32–33, 258–59; 2005; 2007) has argued, the external dimension of selfdetermination should be understood in terms of non-domination, which entails the absence of
structures of relations that make others able to arbitrarily interfere with the actions of others.47
Additionally, a necessary condition of a people’s group right to self-determination is the
protection of the equal right of its individual members to participate in the group’s decisionmaking since, as we have seen, the former group right is premised on the latter individual rights.
The imperative of self-determination is generated by the presence of common activities regardless
of whether they are organized in ill-ordered, coercive, or oppressive ways. Peoples in ill-ordered
societies must transition toward democratically legitimate political institutions that protect the
equal rights to self-determination of its individual members if they are to exercise their group right
to self-determination. (I discuss more thoroughly what I will refer to as the concept of “transitional
legitimacy” and the concrete measures needed to realize this value in Chapter 5.) This cashes in
on my earlier point in Chapter 1 that we can and should have a capacious social ontology of the
people that encompasses both peoples in well-ordered and ill-ordered societies but that this does
not preclude us from identifying the norms that peoples of all sorts must meet.
Moreover, there will be certain constraints of basic justice that set limits on a people’s right
to self-determination, which are grounded in the very values (whether one appeals to freedom or
public equality) that justify self-determination as a democratic norm (Gould 2004, 31–39;
Christiano 2008, chap. 7). These constraints will include basic human rights to life, security,
subsistence, and equal protection under the law as well as political rights such as freedom of

Young (2002, 33) draws on Philip Pettit’s (1997) work but adds that self-determination also involves participating
in the making of collective regulations designed to prevent domination and so entails democracy (though the value of
self-determination is not reducible to democratic participation).
47
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conscience, expression, and association that are necessary to the democratic process (Shue 1996;
Stilz 2019, 113–14). Since such basic justice constraints represent internal limits to a people’s right
to self-determination, they are a necessary condition for the justification of a people’s territorial
rights, which is grounded primarily in its right to self-determination as I show next.
Another necessary condition for a people to have the right to self-determination over its
common activities attached to a place is that its members have the right to occupy that place. Many
theorists have noted how occupancy rights protect individual well-being and autonomy in various
ways (Walzer 1983, 43; Waldron 1992, 17–18; Stilz 2013; 2019, chap 2; Moore 2015, 36–45).
Many of the relationships, goals, and projects that individuals have which are important for their
flourishing are developed against the background and expectation of having continued use, access
to, and stable residency in a particular place. By enabling one to pursue one’s life plans located in
a particular place and to have the ability to critically endorse or revise them, occupancy rights also
secure the preconditions for the capacities of individuals to live their lives autonomously.
Occupancy rights include a variety of component rights such as the right to reside permanently in
a particular place, the right to participate in the social, cultural, and economic practices occurring
there, the right to be allowed to return if one leaves temporarily, and the right to be immune from
removal (Moore 2015, 36; Stilz 2019, 35–36). While similar to property rights, occupancy rights
are not equivalent to them because they do not include the full incidents of property rights such as
the right to exclude (many individuals can have rights to occupy the same geographical space) or
the rights to derive income, give, sell, or bequeath. Occupancy rights are a precondition for the
right to self-determination since if the members of a people are occupying a place unjustly, then
even if they were engaged in common activities on that place, those common activities would not
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generate a right to self-determination, at least not without the supersession or rectification of past
unjust violations of occupancy
The difficulty, as I see it, lies not in grounding occupancy rights per se, but in explaining
how the members of a people can come to not unjustly occupy a place when many societies have
a history of past injustices including colonialism, slavery, and war that involved violating the
occupancy rights of previous inhabitants. Although I do not think that past injustices necessarily
preclude the possibility of current inhabitants (who may not be at fault for those injustices)
developing occupancy rights, I also do not think that all past injustices will be superseded because
of the passage of time or changes in circumstances (Meisels 2003; Roberts 2003; 2007; Song 2018,
63–65).48 To have the right to occupy a place in which past injustices have occurred (including
violations of occupancy and territorial rights) will require that members of a people fulfill certain
corrective justice duties so as to not occupy that place unjustly. As I point out in §4.6, duties to
correct for past injustices and their ongoing legacies will often be overdetermined since (a)
benefiting from past injustices may itself generate certain obligations to rectify them, (b) past
wrongdoings authorized by a state that continues to exist will entail duties of state redress in the
present, and (c) many so-called past injustices are ongoing and not simply relegated to a distant
past (Butt 2008; 2007; Winter 2014). While I do not offer a comprehensive theory of corrective
justice to explain all the responses that would be needed to address the different kinds of injustices
that may have taken place on a territory in order for members of a people to not unjustly occupy
that place, Chapter 4 considers how my eco-political theory could help to address colonialist (and
territorial) injustices against Indigenous peoples and Chapter 5 evaluates how to realize legitimate
political institutions from within ill-ordered societies structured by racial oppression, which also
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See Jeremy Waldron (1992) for the view and argument that sometimes historical injustices can be superseded.
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entail past violations of occupancy rights. Here I just note that a precondition for a people’s right
to self-determination over its common activities is that its members have occupancy rights over
that place, which will likely necessitate that the people fulfill various duties of corrective justice.
A people’s right to self-determination helps to justify its territorial rights because of the
nature of a people’s common activities, which are fundamentally rooted in and attached to a
particular geographical location and aim at the overarching end of its own independent
governance. So, while other groups engaged in common activities also have rights to selfdetermination, insofar as they are not peoples and their common activities are not place-based or
not aimed at independent governance, then their self-determination rights will not help to justify
territorial rights. In order for a people to determine its place-based common activities and to realize
its aim of independently governing itself, a people must have the right to make and enforce laws
within its territory, which bind its members and through which it can decide the course of its
common activities. So, a people’s right to self-determination provides a core justification for a
right to jurisdictional authority, the most fundamental territorial right. And the external dimension
of self-determination is reflected in the rights to non-interference that the right to jurisdictional
authority entails.
Additionally, a people’s right to self-determination helps to ground a right to control its
borders (which is constrained by, as I shall argue in Chapter 6, the requirement to respect the selfdetermination claims of those it constitutes as outsiders). Immigration rates and the demographic
balance of immigrants will affect the nature and course of many of a people’s common activities
concerning, for instance, the economy, education, healthcare, the environment, etc. Additionally,
self-determination involves deciding and exercising control over who should be a member of the
very “self” that constitutes a people. (Indeed, deciding the course of a people’s common activities
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is also part of deciding what the “self” is since a people’s common activities are a proper part of
what the people is. A people just is a set of persons engaged in common activities of a particular
sort and is not simply reducible to those persons individually.) Also, since a people cannot exclude
any of the residents of its territory who are already engaged in its common activities, including
undocumented and irregular immigrants, by virtue of their equal right to participate in the decisionmaking of their common activities, a people can only exercise its right to control its own
membership by excluding others from entering and subsequently settling within its territory in the
first place. The nature of a people’s common activities—of being rooted in a place and aiming at
independent governance over that place—shows why a people’s right to self-determination, unlike
the right to self-determination of other groups, helps to ground a territorial right to control the
movement of individuals across its borders. Other groups engaged in common activities (e.g. social
clubs, corporations, etc.) may also have a right to control their membership due to their right to
self-determination but, unlike peoples, their right to control their membership does not generate a
right to exclude outsiders from crossing into a territory, since they do not aim to independently
govern a place in which their common activities are fundamentally located.
Finally, a people’s right to self-determination helps to ground a right to control its
resources, which may be constrained by duties of global justice. An important element in a people’
right to determine the nature and course of its place-based common activities is its right to decide
the rules concerning the acquisition, transfer, and use of resources that are a part of the
geographical location that it inhabits (Moore 2015, 175–76). Setting these rules (for example,
about whether property, or which kinds of property, should be privately or collectively owned) is
part of determining the conditions of its place-based common activities. Nonetheless, a people’s
right to control its resources does not entail a right to exclusively benefit from those resources.

69

Instead, the right to control resources can be qualified by global justice duties to, for instance, meet
the basic subsistence rights of all individuals, which may require the redistribution of a people’s
wealth (Moore 2015, 181–84; Stilz 2019, 233–35).
However, a people’s relationship to resources should not be understood in merely
instrumental terms—for example, as a stock from which value is to be extracted and fairly
distributed to satisfy individual human needs across the world, as some global luck egalitarians
conceive it—since peoples often view the lands on which they live and their resources in noninstrumental terms as well (Moore 2015, 179–81). Indeed, the entire point behind recognizing the
link between self-determination and resource control is to acknowledge a people’s right to decide
for itself how it wants to relate (whether in instrumental terms or not) to the resources that form
part of the ecosystems it inhabits and the material conditions underlying its place-based common
activities, even if this right to control resources is constrained by duties of global justices and duties
of ecological sustainability (the latter of which I will argue for in Chapter 3).

§2.2 SELF-DETERMINATION IN CONTEXTS BEYOND THOSE OF PEOPLES
To clarify, saying that a people has the right to self-determination over its common
activities, which entails (with qualifications) a comprehensive set of territorial rights in virtue of
the character of those activities as attached to a place and aimed at independent governance (in
other words, the eco-political nature of those activities), is not to deny the diversity of other
common activities and contexts in which groups may have self-determination rights, some of
which may take on various territorial forms and some of which may not. Groups engaged in nonterritorial forms of common activities that thereby generate self-determination rights (but not
territorial rights) may include various social associations (e.g. clubs or non-profits), economic
organizations (e.g. corporations), and even transnational groups whose common activities cut
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across territorial domains (e.g. web-based communities) (Gould 2004; 2006). There may also be
dispersed minority cultural groups within a people engaged in various forms of common activities,
which are not rooted in a given place, that have certain rights to non-territorial self-determination
(e.g. rights over certain issues concerning language, education, or other cultural affairs and rights
to special representation) (de Schutter 2015; Stilz 2019, 116).
There are also groups engaged in common activities that are rooted in a place but do not
aim at independent governance, such as cities, towns, provinces, or other substate units. Such
groups do not count as peoples and will not have a comprehensive set of territorial rights, although
they may hold certain incidents of territorial rights in a more localized and circumscribed manner
(for example, the right to make and enforce laws in a local domain within a larger federated state,
but not necessarily rights to control borders or resources), which have been delegated to them from
above by the people of which they are a part.
Additionally, regional, international, or global bodies (e.g. the AU, the EU, and the UN)
may be engaged in certain place-based common activities in which there may be some domains
over which these bodies have a degree of independent governance and authority. In such cases
though, it is generally the case that whatever incidents of territorial rights these regional,
international, or global bodies have are delegated to them and authorized by their constituent
peoples through multilateral agreements or treaties. And their constituent peoples still hold onto a
robust and comprehensive set of territorial rights over their own respective jurisdictions.
There may also be certain issues, the nature of which will require shared governance and
cooperation between multiple peoples, either regionally or even globally. Examples of such issues
include the rules regulating international trade and international waters, the governance of certain
geographical features that cross borders such as rivers or forests, and the management of global
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commons and planetary climate-regulating functions over the atmosphere and global warming (M.
Miller 1998, 117; Ward 1998; Ankersen 1998; Nine 2014; Stilz 2019, 237–46). Here, sovereignty
and territorial rights can be disaggregated functionally such that the right to jurisdictional authority
over that specific issue or domain is shared across multiple territorial rights-holders. Additionally,
due to globalizing forces and increased cross-border interconnections (whether political, legal,
economic, cultural, or ecological) it may be the case, as Gould (2004, 174–80; 2006, 54–55) has
argued, that self-determination rights grounded in the existence of common activities need to be
supplemented by a principle of all importantly or relevantly affected interests, understood in terms
of impacts to basic human rights, in which individuals have rights to have a say or an input in the
decisions that affect their basic human rights (even if these rights do not rise to the level of equal
rights to participate as would be required for individuals engaged in common activities).
It is also not theoretically impossible that at some point in the future, there will be a global
people with all humans engaged in planet-based common activities aimed at independent global
governance, which would then generate territorial rights on a planetary scale. However, this has
yet to come to pass and one might be worried that a world state may especially be liable to suffer
from democratic and justice deficits, such as tyranny, inequities, persistent minorities, elite control,
corruption, and the like (Kant 1795, 113; Urbinati 2003, 81–82; Christiano 2006, 100–105; J. L.
Cohen 2012, 78; Song 2012, 60–62). And even with a world state, there would in all likelihood
still be peoples within the wider global people who were engaged in their own more delimited
place-based common activities aimed at independent governance, which would still generate
territorial rights.
A principle of subsidiarity may need to be appealed to in such a case in which territorial
rights and sovereignty powers are allocated to lower levels unless assigning them to higher-level
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central units ensures greater comparative efficiency (Føllesdal 1998; Jupille 1998). Or, whenever
there are multiple overlapping political jurisdictions (regardless of whether there is a world state),
a flexible sort of “constitutional pluralism” may be desirable, which consists of “a plurality of
constitutional sources of authority and competing claims to jurisdictional supremacy by
autonomous, interacting, and overlapping public (state and supranational) legal orders, whose
relationship must be also characterized as heterarchical and which creates a potential for
constitutional conflicts that have to be solved in a non-hierarchical manner” (J. L. Cohen 2012,
70). Nonetheless, while the territorially bounded and densely interconnecting place-based common
activities of a people may not exhaust the landscape of self-determination, they are still a
fundamental fixture within it. The forces of globalization do not obviate (though they may alter)
the normative and democratic significance of differentiated peoples seeking to govern their own
collective lives free from external interference within their own demarcated geographical domains.
If anything, it may continue to be important to protect the collective self-determination of
territorially bounded peoples from exploitative or unjust global forces, for instance, due to
inequitable neo-liberal market mechanisms and international power politics.

§2.3 AGAINST SELF-DETERMINATION AS AN IRREDUCIBLY COLLECTIVE RIGHT
Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman (Altman and Wellman 2009, chap. 2) argue that
the right to self-determination should be understood as an irreducibly collective moral right held
by legitimate states and groups who are willing and able to become legitimate states (where
legitimacy, for them, is a matter of adequately protecting the human rights of a states’ constituents
and respecting the rights of all others). 49 Altman and Wellman thus defend a version of the

I say more about Altman and Wellman’s conception of legitimacy in Chapter 5 on transitional legitimacy. Here, I
focus on their conception of self-determination.
49
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legitimate state theory mentioned in Chapter 1. Moreover, they contend that the intrinsic (or
noninstrumental) value of democracy can only be grounded in the irreducibly collective moral
right to self-determination and that all other attempts to explain the intrinsic value of democracy
in terms of individual rights fail. It also follows from their account that a people has the right to
exercise its self-determination to forgo democracy. Insofar as democracy has no necessary
connection to individual autonomy or individual equality, no individual is wronged if she is a
member of a people that freely decides as a group to waive democratic governance (25–31). I
discuss this implication of their theory and the view that self-determination does not require
democracy in §2.5. Altman and Wellman’s account of self-determination represents a challenge,
then, to my defense of a people’s territorial rights based on Gould’s conception of selfdetermination since Gould does in fact take a group’s right to self-determination to be derived
from the individual rights to self-determination of its members.
Altman and Wellman’s (2009) argument (or at least part of it) that democracy is grounded
in an irreducibly collective moral right to self-determination can be understood as an inference to
the best explanation for our considered judgments on forcible annexation, colonialism, and
democracy’s value. They defend their claim that the right of self-determination should be held by
legitimate states and groups that are willing and able to become legitimate states based on the
observation that this position coheres well with and helps explain our reasonable convictions that
forcible annexation and colonial conquest are morally impermissible (the former violates the selfdetermination of legitimate states and the latter violates the self-determination of groups willing
and able to become legitimate states) (14–16). And by denying that the intrinsic value of
democracy can be successfully explained by other theories based on individual rights, Altman and
Wellman purport to have shown that we are left only with the explanation of the intrinsic value of
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democracy in terms of the irreducibly collective moral right to self-determination.50 Democracy is
the explanandum, of which collective self-determination is the explanans. In sum, as they put it,
“popular sovereignty is normatively prior to democracy” (42).
However, it seems to me that any account of the value of collective self-determination,
regardless of whether the account in question understands self-determination as an irreducibly
collective moral right, will help explain our considered moral judgments that forcible annexation
and colonialism are morally impermissible. Put another way, our convictions that forcible
annexation and colonialism are wrong can help show us that self-determination is valuable but
they cannot settle for us whether or not self-determination should be understood as an irreducibly
collective right.
Additionally, much of the force behind Altman and Wellman’s argument that the intrinsic
value of democracy is grounded in the irreducibly collective moral right of self-determination
(since it is an inference to the best explanation) lies in their rejection of alternative explanations of
democracy’s intrinsic value in terms of individual rights, which they separate into two categories:
those based on individual autonomy and those based on equality. Though I will not canvas here
the details of all the arguments they make against these varying theories, I note here that they do
not specifically address Gould’s own defense of democracy’s value, which is based on both
individual freedom understood as self-development and equal agency, and does not necessitate
conceiving of a group’s right to self-determination in irreducibly collective terms. So, it is not clear
that Altman and Wellman’s criticism of theories of democracy based on autonomy, on the one

50

In support of my reading of their argument (or at least part of its justificatory force) as an inference to the best
explanation, Altman and Wellman (2009, 18) note that one might be hesitant to accept their explanation for why a
monarchical coup of a democracy is wrong based on the collective moral right to self-determination for two reasons:
first, one might presume that the deontological reasons to respect democracy stem from individual and not collective
rights; and second, one might worry about the implication of their argument that non-democratic regimes can be
legitimate under certain circumstances.
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hand, and equality, on the other, will apply to Gould’s theory that is based on her conceptions of
both these values.
So, for instance, one of Altman and Wellman’s (2009, 20–21) objections to grounding the
intrinsic value of democracy in equality points out (as do many others) that an impartial
dictatorship could also give equal consideration to the interests of all members without giving any
of them a say in any political or government decisions. But if one has resources in one’s theory to
appeal to freedom and equal positive agency in conjunction with the value of equality as Gould
does, then one will not fall prey to this objection because a dictatorship still violates the freedom
of its members to determine their own activities (including their common activities) by denying
them any positive say in political decision-making. Thus, if there is a live and independently
plausible explanation for democracy’s intrinsic value still left on the table, then Altman and
Wellman cannot rely on an inference to the best explanation to prefer their grounding of
democracy’s intrinsic value in the irreducibly collective moral right to self-determination.
Do Altman and Wellman have any independent reason for thinking that democracy’s
intrinsic value should be grounded in an irreducibly collective moral right to self-determination
that does not rely on the justificatory force of an inference to the best explanation? They do but I
think it fails. A key move that Altman and Wellman (2009, 17–20) make (drawn from Allen
Buchanan, Henry Richardson, and others) is to argue that in a democracy, it is the group that is
self-determining and not individuals. Altman and Wellman approvingly quote Buchanan twice
here: “it is simply false to say that an individual who participates in a democratic decision-making
process is self-governing; he or she is governed by the majority” (17, 19). They add: “More
generally, with respect to any decision, either the individual’s will or the group’s will occupies the
relevant position of dominion. If the individual has dominion, then he or she determines the
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decision, notwithstanding the group’s preferences. If the group has dominion, then it determines
the decision, notwithstanding the individual’s preferences” (19). Altman and Wellman also
leverage this consideration in their argument against grounding democracy’s value in individual
autonomy.
But this presents a false dichotomy between group self-determination and individual selfdetermination and sets the bar too high for a decision to count as respecting an individual’s right
to self-determination. Clearly, a group can make a decision in virtue of individuals participating
in the group’s decision-making processes. It is misleading then to say, as Altman and Wellman do,
that for any decision, either the group determines the decision or the individual does precisely
because individual decisions may be part of what makes up a group decision. Altman and
Wellman’s strict dichotomy between group self-determination and individual self-determination
implies that there is no relevant difference between a group deciding in virtue of all its members
having an equal right to participate in that group’s decision-making procedure (democracy) versus
a group deciding in virtue of only members of a proper subset of that group having such a right
(oligarchy). After all, in either case according to their account, it is the group that is selfdetermining and not the individuals. Altman and Wellman seem to countenance the overlap
between individual self-determination and group self-determination only when an individual’s
vote is decisive or when an individual’s decision itself constitutes the group’s decision as in the
case of a dictator.
The key reason why Altman and Wellman (2009, 17, 19) so strictly dichotomize group
self-determination and individual self-determination is because they interpret self-determination
as requiring control or dominion. Though they do not themselves explicitly spell out what
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constitutes control or dominion, they seem to have in mind a conception that includes both Niko
Kolodny’s (2014a) notion of decisiveness and control:
One is decisive when, had one’s choice or judgment been different, the decision would
have been different. For example, under majority rule, one is decisive just when there is a
tie or when one is a member of a majority that wins by a single vote. One has control over
the decision if one’s judgment or choice would be decisive over a wide range of changes
in relevant conditions, including, especially the choices and judgments of others.… An
effective dictator, for example, has control over decisions. (199–200)
Altman and Wellman (2009, 17, 19) are clear, for instance, that an individual’s decisive vote to
break the tie in a group decision would be sufficient to constitute control for them (though not for
Kolodny). And dominion for them entails determining a decision notwithstanding the preferences
of others (which would properly be control for Kolodny).
However, interpreting self-determination as requiring control or dominion is too strong and
sets the bar too high for a decision to count as respecting an individual’s right to self-determination.
We should take the very fact that an individual has control only in cases where one’s vote is
decisive or when one is a dictator to be a reductio of the claim that self-determination requires
control rather than concluding, as Altman and Wellman do, that an individual is (generally) not
self-determining in a group decision. Altman and Wellman seem to be assuming, at least implicitly,
a flawed ontology of individuals in which their self-determination necessitates a sort of control,
independence, or dominion not generally had by human beings (e.g. dictatorship or in rare
circumstances where one’s decision is decisive). However, individuals are social creatures whose
very freedom and self-determination is often realized through their social relations and common
activities with others and not independent of these relations, as Altman and Wellman imply (Gould
1988, chap. 1 esp. 49-50).
Additionally, there are alternative conceptions of individual influence in collective
decision-making that can make sense of individual self-determination without resorting to control
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or dominion, such as Kolodny’s (2014a) “contributory influence, which might be understood on a
model of applying a vector of force, which combines with other vectors to determine a result. The
result is sensitive to this vector of force, and the vector remains the same in its ‘magnitude’ and
‘direction,’ no matter what other vectors are supplied” (200). Thus, it is perfectly intelligible to
conceptualize a group’s right to self-determination as derived from, rather than juxtaposed against,
the individual rights to self-determination of its members—that is, their equal right to participate
in the decision-making about the nature and course of their common activities. And this is so even
if it is the group as a whole that controls the decision and not (generally) not any single individual
who have instead the right to participate in the group’s decision-making processes—i.e., the equal
opportunity to have contributory influence. For this is just to say, as it were, that the individuals
made the decision together as a group.

§2.4 AGAINST STILZ’S POLITICAL AUTONOMY
ACCOUNT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Stilz (2019) develops an account of the value of self-determination based in political
autonomy. For Stilz, self-determination, as a condition for state legitimacy, is a matter of a state
reflecting the shared will of a significant majority of cooperators on its territory. A shared will
does not require a group to share a commitment to enact certain first-order policies or to share
certain substantive values, since this is unlikely in a modern pluralist state. Instead, a shared will
can take on a second-order form as involving a shared intention to associate with one’s fellow
citizens in a political community and to support certain institutions, including a commitment to
certain higher-order values and procedures that structure those institutions (94, 108–9). Later, Stilz
describes the shared will of a people in terms of the willing participation of its members, which is
constituted by members, upon reflection, endorsing their intention to “play their part” in a political
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institution. For a state to represent its population and to reflect their priorities and judgments, the
state must receive “uptake” from its people in terms of their willing participation so that the
collective agency of the state is connected to the agency of its individual members (125–26).51
Cooperators are “individuals who are willing to acknowledge the basic natural duty of
justice, respecting one another as bearers of a claim to freedom as independence (Natural Duty),
and who adhere to the requirement of political coordination under law that flows from this
commitment (State)” (98). Stilz thinks that dissent can be discounted in cases where dissenters are
unwilling to cooperate in a legitimate state that protects essential private rights (because the
judgments of these dissenters are not worthy of respect) and where too few dissenters exist for it
to be institutionally feasible to reflect their priorities in practice even if their priorities are
compatible in principle with the rights of others (because coercing these dissenters, while a pro
tanto wrong, is outweighed by the fact that there is no other feasible way to secure the essentials
of justice, security, and public order) (115–16).
Why is Stilz’s account of self-determination, understood in terms of a state reflecting the
shared will of a significant majority of cooperators, grounded in the value of political autonomy?
Stilz defines autonomy as “a person’s ability to freely conduct her life on the basis of her own
judgments and values,” which she breaks down into two components: “(i) self-directed action that
reflects the agent’s evaluative and moral judgments, where those judgments are (ii) supported by
her authentic reasoning” (104-5, 106). Stilz emphasizes that state coercion, especially its
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In an earlier piece, Stilz (2016, 112) characterizes the idea of willing participation in terms of citizens reasonably
affirming their participation in a shared political venture. For a similar thought, Sarah Song (2018, 60–61) argues that
a people authorizes a state when its members support it. For Stilz (2016, 112; 2019, 125) and Song, willing
participation and support are both weaker than consent. Stilz emphasizes that willing participation must be reasonable
(the shared political venture cannot be thoroughly unjust such that participation is a result of domination or
manipulation). Though Song does not stipulate that support must be reasonably given, she says, similar to Stilz (2019,
128), that the institutional conditions of self-determination require the protection of basic rights and mechanisms to
express dissent and to initiate reforms.
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comprehensiveness in imposing a whole web of threats upon subjects and its general
inescapability, presumptively threatens autonomy and the ability of subjects to live their lives
according to their own judgments. “Alien political coercion” that “bears no relation to the
priorities, values, and beliefs of those subjected to it” is especially problematic. “When one is
pervasively subject to alien coercion, substantial aspects of one’s life can come to seem hostile
and threatening. In such a scenario, it can become difficult to maintain any sense of oneself as an
agent who charts her life in accordance with her own purposes” (107). When a state reflects the
shared will of a significant majority of cooperators, this mitigates the threat of alien political
coercion and represents the political analogue to personal autonomy. Stilz (2019, 107–8) contends
then that there is an autonomy interest in what Niko Kolodny (2014a, 199) has termed
“correspondence,” which is when someone’s political institutions matches one’s judgments in
some way. The willing participation of cooperators in a shared political will helps to guarantee
this correspondence for individuals (Stilz 2019, 126).
The problem with Stilz’s account of self-determination (aside from the fact that it depends
on an implausible ontology of a people’s collective intentions, as I argued in Chapter 1) is that
political autonomy would seem to require much more than Stilz’s thin account of what selfdetermination consists in.52 Note first that when Stilz discusses the importance of a state reflecting
the shared will of a significant majority of cooperators, she seems to be appealing at bottom not
necessarily to autonomy but rather to correspondence and the avoidance of alienation (even though
she frames these concerns as concerns of autonomy). Correspondence is insufficient for autonomy,
since as Kolodny (2014a, 199) notes, a dictator might impose a policy that just so happens to
correspond with one’s judgment and so correspondence can occur without influence of any sort.

See, for instance, Daniel Philpott’s (1995) argument that autonomy justifies democracy and consequently selfdetermination.
52
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And alienation (which is just the inverse of correspondence) is problematic not necessarily because
it undermines autonomy but because alienation may make aspects of one’s life feel hostile or
threatening or may mean one does not feel at home in one’s social and political world (Stilz 2019,
100, 107). Of course, too much alienation may undermine one’s sense of oneself as an agent and
so alienation may contingently undermine autonomy but it need not since it is possible that one
maintains one’s sense of agency even in the face of significant alienation.
Autonomy, as Stilz (2019) notes, involves “self-directed action that reflects the agent’s
evaluative and moral judgments” (106). Correspondence and the avoidance of alienation only
emphasize whether a political institution reflects the evaluative and moral judgments of its
members, but not whether a political institution and the collective decisions made through it can
be said to be a result of the self-directed action of its members. Stilz speaks of two dimensions of
legitimacy. The “taker” dimension is a matter of a state providing justice-related benefits to its
members and is concerned with the quality of state institutions. The “maker” dimension involves
the interests that members have in seeing themselves as authors of their political institutions (9394). But authoring and “making” one’s political institutions will require at least the opportunity to
have some degree of influence over the direction of those institutions (even if this influence is just
contributory and does not rise to the level of decisiveness, control, or dominion) and not simply
that one’s political institutions reflect one’s priorities and judgments, which could itself be seen
merely as part of the “taker” dimension of legitimacy since it is a matter of the quality of
institutions and whether they provide “correspondence” for their members.
Additionally, although Stilz (2019, 111) understands self-determination broadly in terms
of achieving a certain “fit” between the state and the people’s shared will, notice just how thin of
an account Stilz provides for what would constitute such a “fit.” All that is required for a people’s
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shared will is a shared intention of a significant majority of cooperators to associate politically
with one another and to support the state’s institutions (including its higher-order values and
procedures) (94, 108–9). A self-determining people will exist, according to Stilz, so long as these
higher-order conditions are met even if the state does not reflect any of its members’ substantive
values or first-order policy preferences. Even aside from the fact that correspondence and avoiding
alienation is insufficient for autonomy, a member will likely feel substantially alienated from her
political institutions if none of the policies and substantive values enacted by those institutions
correspond with her judgments. And she may suffer such alienation even if, in some higher-order
sense, she is committed to associating politically with her fellow citizens and to supporting her
state institutions. One can feel alienated as a result of the decisions being made through one’s
institutions even if one continues to feels in some way that they are one’s own institutions and to
be committed to them. It is not clear under Stilz’s account why the first-order sort of alienation is
any less normatively significant than the higher-order kind.
Stilz (2019, 109–10) is aware that one can enjoy correspondence without influence and
mentions the case of the benevolent absolutist who, because of his goodwill, just so happens to
rule the people according to judgments of its members. So, she stipulates that correspondence
between a people’s shared will and its political institutions must come about through some causal
process. A government must be constrained to reflect the people’s shared will so that
correspondence is temporally robust across changes in government or in its shared commitments.
This requires simply that there be some channel by which the people can revoke authorization of
its government. In premodern societies, popular rebellion might be adequate as such a channel and
in contemporary conditions, a mechanism to initiate a process of constitutional reform, such as an
amendment procedure, in a constitutional monarchy would also be sufficient (130).
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However, even with this stipulation of a causal relation of correspondence involving a
channel by which the people could revoke authorization of its government, political autonomy
would not necessarily be realized. In the ordinary course of political governance and legislation
even given such a stipulation (“ordinary” meaning not in the circumstances of a constitutional
crisis in which a people has invoked a procedure to revoke the authorization of its government),
no individual would necessarily have the opportunity to participate in the state’s decision-making
procedures or to influence their outcomes. And the people would not have control as a group over
such ordinary legislative decisions even if the people held in reserve a form of constitutional
control over the structure of its government as a whole. Additionally, so long as the state reflects
the people’s shared will, interpreted in a higher-order sense to mean that cooperators are still
willing to politically associate with one another and to support state institutions, then the people
will have no grounds upon which to appeal to some procedure of constitutional reform to revoke
authorization of its government even if the state did not reflect any of the first-order policy
preferences or substantive values of its members. By dint of the mere existence of a shared will
understood in this thin higher-order sense, the people will already have authorized its government
according to Stilz.
If autonomy requires self-directed action that reflects the agent’s evaluative and moral
judgments (under conditions of authentic reasoning), then Stilz’s account of what selfdetermination consists in fails to fully realize autonomy on two counts. First, state decisions need
not result from the people’s self-directed action (since the only control and influence the people
need to have over the state, according to Stilz, is a constitutional channel to revoke its authorization
over the government as a whole). And second, state decisions only need to reflect the people’s
judgments in a thin higher-order sense such that members are still willing to politically associate
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with one another and to support the state institutions, even if none of their first-order policy
priorities or more substantive values are enacted. Stilz leaves unanswered why the norm of political
autonomy would not justify much more than what her thin account of self-determination requires.

§2.5 DOES SELF-DETERMINATION REQUIRE DEMOCRACY?
One reason why Stilz’s (2019, 127–31) account of self-determination seems so thin is that
she, like a number of other theorists (J. Cohen 2006, 357–58; Altman and Wellman 2009, 25–31;
Moore 2015, 26–28; 2016, 154–55; 2018, 6–7; Song 2018, 55, 67), does not think that selfdetermination requires democracy. According to these theorists, a people can exercise its selfdetermination to choose a non-democratic form of government, such as a constitutional monarchy.
So long as certain institutional conditions that fall short of democracy are met such as (1) the
protection of basic human rights, (2) the protection of rights to free expression, free association,
and public dissent, and (3) a channel to revoke the authorization of the government, then it can
still be said that the people is self-determining and the government reflects the will of the people.53
Collective self-determination, according to this view, does not require the equal rights to
participate in collective decision-making that is constitutive of democracy.
This argument that collective self-determination does not require democracy, however, is
internally inconsistent. The very reasons why self-determination need not be democratic seem
themselves to justify democracy as a requirement of self-determination. First, consider the
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These conditions are how Stilz (2019, 128) characterizes what is required for collective self-determination. Altman
and Wellman (2009, 26–27) agree that (1) and (3) are required. Song thinks (1) and (2) are required, but falls short of
saying that there needs to be a constitutional channel to revoke the authorization of the government. Instead, Song
(2018, 55) simply requires institutional mechanisms of accountability including the right to dissent from and appeal
collective decisions (which seem legislative but not constitutional). Song (2018) also adds the requirement, along the
lines of Rawls’ (2001, 65–67, 71–72) notion that a decent people needs a common good idea of justice, that the
“government must provide public rationales for its decisions in terms of a conception of the common good of the
society” (55).
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requirement that there must be a channel through which the people can revoke its authorization of
the government such as a binding constitutional referendum, which for Altman and Wellman
(2009) “must be free and fair, with every adult citizen having a voice and a vote” (27). But this is
to require equal—and thus, democratic—rights to participate in the collective decision regarding
what sort of government to adopt. If democracy is required at the constitutional stage to determine
if the decision about what form of government to adopt truly reflects the will of the people, then
determining whether ordinary legislative decisions by the government truly reflect the will of the
people would also seem to require democracy. In fairness to Altman and Wellman, they are aware
of this “dialectical instability” of requiring democracy for constitutional choices but not legislative
choices, but they deny that this asymmetry is unprincipled by appealing to their position that
democracy is grounded in an irreducibly collective right to self-determination, which I have
already rejected in §2.3 (28-29).
Furthermore, the reason for which Altman and Wellman (2009, 28) require that a
constitutional referendum always be made available in reserve is because of the fact that a people
is composed of different individuals over time. So a people at time t1 cannot choose to permanently
forgo democracy because the people at the later time t2 may no longer agree to be ruled by a nondemocratic government. However, precisely because the composition of the people is constantly
changing and in flux due to the naturalization of immigrants and the birth and death of members
(specifically members reaching the age of maturity), then a constitutional referendum would
constantly need to be enacted (or at least enacted very regularly, even given certain reasonable
assumptions that the previous majority may not have changed despite population changes) to
determine if the existing form of government really did reflect the will of the people. But if a
constitutional referendum is constantly or regularly in need of enactment, then it is no longer
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constitutional but simply legislative. So the very reason for constitutional self-determination to be
democratic turns out to be a reason for ongoing self-determination to be democratic as well.54
Theorists who claim that collective self-determination does not require democracy think
that a people can still be seen as having some say in collective decision-making even if its members
do not have an equal say. But according to the democratic conception of self-determination that I
am defending, it is difficult to see how a people can be said to be collectively determining a decision
without each member having an equal right to participate in the collective decision-making
process. It is hard to see, for instance, how a people as a whole has a say in the making of a decision
(or how the people’s will is reflected in that decision or how the people is the author of that
decision) if it is ultimately a monarch who determines that decision (even given the institutional
guarantees of basic human rights; rights to freedom of expression, association, and dissent; and a
channel to revoke government authorization).
Stilz (2019) would object that “even in a democracy, it is the majority—not the whole
people—who make ordinary decisions” and so the people of a constitutional monarchy (with the
requisite institutional constraints) and the people of a democracy are on all fours with one another
in terms of being self-determining (129). This is the same move, as you recall, that Altman and
Wellman (2009, 17–20) make to argue that democracy’s intrinsic value must be grounded in an
irreducibly collective moral right to self-determination and to deny that individuals are selfgoverning in a democracy. However, while it is true that not every individual member of a
democracy has control or a decisive vote over any given decision, it does not follow that the people
of a constitutional monarchy (with the requisite institutional constraints) and the people of a
democracy are on par with each other in terms of being collectively self-determining. The people
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See James Anaya (2004, 104–5) who distinguishes between the constitutive and ongoing aspects of selfdetermination, which Buchanan (2007, 332–33) also mentions.
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of a democracy determine decisions as a whole precisely in virtue of each individual member
having the equal right to participate or the equal opportunity to exert contributory influence in their
collective decision-making process (which helps to cash out each individual members’ right to
self-determination even if it does not rise to the level of control or decisiveness). The majority can
only be said to be making the decision against this background of every member of the people,
including those who are a part of the majority and those who are not, having an equal right to
participate. In contrast, in a constitutional monarchy, it is the monarch who determines the decision
for the collective and not the people as a whole.
Perhaps there is some space on the continuum between constitutional monarchy and full
democracy in which a people can be said as having some say as a whole in the making of decisions
governing its common activities even in a non-democracy, but theorists who deny that selfdetermination requires democracy have not adequately specified what sorts of conditions would
need to be met for this to be the case. My objection here to these theorists is not simply normative
(though I do think, following Gould [1988, 84–85; 2004, 175–76; 2006, 48–49], that selfdetermination normatively necessitates democracy) but ontological. That is, these theorists have
not adequately worked out an account of the threshold below democracy at which it is even
possible to describe a people as self-determining in the sense that it is still the people as a whole
who is making its collective decisions.55
As we have seen, Stilz would want to say that a people in a constitutional monarchy (that
protects basic human rights; protects rights to free expression, free association, and public dissent;
Moore (2016), at least, is most honest here in admitting that she does not specify this threshold: “a people is selfdetermining if it has institutional mechanisms that allow it to make collective decisions over important areas of life,
and if these collective decisions are respected by outsiders and thus free of external interference or the threat of
interference. This is close to the international norm. On this view, collective agents are viewed ‘as opaque’ presumably
because we do not inquire how exactly those collective decisions are made (although the presence of active dissent
negates the presumption)” (154). But Moore owes us an account of why we have the right to make the presumption
that a people is self-determining in the first place for the people of a non-democracy.
55
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and has a channel for revoking authorization) can still be said to be self-determining so long as the
monarchy’s decisions are congruent with the shared judgments and priorities of the people (at a
minimum, the shared intention of a significant majority of cooperators to associate politically and
to support the monarchy’s institutions). Here, it will be valuable to contrast this thin account of
self-determination, which I have already given reasons for rejecting in §2.4, and a democratic
account of self-determination. While Stilz takes correspondence (with the stipulation of some sort
of causal relation—i.e. a channel to revoke authorization) to be constitutive of self-determination,
under a democratic account correspondence is not constitutive of, though it may be instrumentally
valuable for, self-determination.
In a democracy, correspondence between any single collective decision and one’s own
judgments, values, or priorities is never guaranteed. However, one has the opportunity to help
bring about such correspondence because one has the equal right to participate in the decisionmaking processes of one’s political institutions. And because every decision is made by the people
as a whole with each member having the equal right to participate, it is much more likely (though
not certain) that the members of the people will enjoy a significant degree of correspondence
between the collective decisions made and their own individual judgments. Correspondence will
then be instrumentally valuable for democracy, for much the same reasons that Stilz indicates,
because individuals will not be alienated from their political institutions or feel as though
substantial aspects of their social and political world are hostile or threatening. Consequently,
individuals will be more willing to actively participate in the collective decision-making processes
of political institutions at which they feel at home, which helps to enable the smooth functioning
of democratic institutions and to realize the democratic values those institutions are grounded on.
In the ideal case, this will generate a positive feedback loop in which civic political engagement
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helps to increase correspondence, which in turn helps to motivate engagement, and so on and so
forth.
Additionally, if democracy is valuable (whether instrumentally, intrinsically, or both), as I
believe it is, then individuals will have good reasons for associating with their fellow citizens in a
democracy and for supporting their democratic institutions, including the values and procedures
that structure those institutions. Individuals will not willingly participate in their political
institutions by mere dint of their whim or desire, as it were, but because there will be some good
(at least pro tanto) justifications for doing so. Even if one’s first-order policy judgments are not
currently reflected in the people’s collective decisions, one knows that this is not necessarily a
permanent situation since future opportunities will regularly be available to exercise one’s rights
to democratic participation, to convince others of one’s views, and to agitate for change. So one
has reason to support democratic institutions more generally (as part of a loyal opposition with
future opportunities to become a part of the majority) even if one does not currently enjoy
correspondence in regards to one’s first-order policy preferences. Thus, the correspondence of the
higher-order sort that Stilz values is both rationally justified (at least to some extent) and so more
likely to be generated in a democratic context.
In sum, Stilz gets things backwards when she takes correspondence of a certain sort
(involving the higher-order shared intention to politically associate with others plus the stipulation
of a channel to revoke authorization) to be constitutive of a people’s self-determination. In contrast,
a people is self-determining, according to a democratic account, when its members have the equal
right to participate in collective decision-making, which in turn helps to realize correspondence
(both of the first-order policy kind and the higher-order willingness-to-politically-associate kind)
even if correspondence is not guaranteed and not constitutive of self-determination itself.
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It will also be instructive here to compare Stilz and Altman and Wellman’s conception of
a self-determining people with Rawls’ account of a decent people. Stilz (2019, 131 note 20) rightly
notes that Rawls does not require a constitutional channel by which the people can revoke
authorization of its government. However, Rawls (2001) does emphasize that a decent people must
provide its members with “the right to be consulted or a substantial political role in making
decisions,” which Stilz and Altman and Wellman do not require (aside from a constitutional
referendum) (61). Moreover, Rawls emphasizes that the right of dissent requires that government
and judicial officials take any dissent seriously by providing a conscientious reply. If dissenters do
not accept the answer given by the government, they can renew their protest by explaining why
they are still dissatisfied, which in turn must be given a further and fuller reply by the government
(71–72). So in these regards, Rawls’ notion of a decent people provides in fact for more
institutionally entrenched mechanisms by which members can participate in collective decisionmaking processes than do Stilz and Altman and Wellman’s conception of a self-determining
people, even if these rights to participate need not be equal and are not fully realized in decent
peoples. Nonetheless, Rawls’ notion of a decent hierarchical society is thus more sensitive to
democratic norms in these respects (even if it does not fully realize them) than Stilz and Altman
and Wellman’s conception of a self-determining people, which indicates too Rawls’ understanding
that congruence itself is insufficient for self-determination.

§2.6 THE IMPLICATIONS OF REQUIRING DEMOCRACY
It will be valuable here to clarify the implications of requiring democracy for selfdetermination and thus as a necessary condition for the justification of a people’s territorial rights
to stave off some potential objections. First, democracy here is understood in broad normative
terms—namely, the equal rights of all individuals engaged in a common activity to participate in
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the decision-making concerning that activity—rather than narrowly tied to any specific sort of
decision-making procedure or institutional arrangement. As such, requiring democracy does not
mean a people must adopt Western models involving, for instance, majority rule or the periodic
election of representatives of either the winner-take-all or parliamentary variety, in order to justify
its territorial rights. Democracy is not parochially Western, according to this conception, but can
encompass a broad range of practices, procedures, and institutions including consensus or
consultative models of decision-making so long as the equal rights to participate of all members is
protected (Gould 2004, 35–36; 2006, 52–53; 2013, 292).56
Second, to say that democracy is required for the justification of a people’s territorial rights
does not imply that outsiders are permitted or justified in imposing democracy upon a people, or
in using any means whatsoever including coercive force to do so, if that people is undemocratic
(and thus lacks territorial rights). 57 Self-determination itself as a democratic norm provides
grounds as to why democracy cannot be imposed since it is up to the members of a people who
are engaged in common activities to establish democratic institutions and forms of decisionmaking by themselves (Gould 2006, 52). If the people of an authoritarian state desires to establish
democratic institutions but is prevented from doing so due to state oppression, outsiders will be
permitted and justified in aiding the people in various non-coercive ways to support its democratic
aspirations since this would not be a case of imposing democracy upon a people who did not desire
it. Measures to support democratic aspirations in non-democratic states, however, can range from
non-coercive means, such as naming and shaming or economic and organizational assistance for
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See Gould (2004, 35–36) for a discussion of various models of democracy within traditional African communities
and Indigenous peoples in the Americas that diverge from Western modes of representative democracy.
57
Rawls (2001, 59–60) has a similar worry that requiring all peoples to be liberal and not tolerating nonliberal but
decent peoples would mean that decent peoples would always be subject to sanction—political, economic, or even
military.
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groups engaging in civil disobedience to advocate for democratic change, to more coercive
policies, such as economic sanctions and military or humanitarian interventions.
It is a separate question whether outsiders are permitted to use coercive force to help
support a people’s democratic aspirations when the people’ state or political institutions are
undemocratic and not by the people’s own choosing. The degree to which coercive measures are
permitted in support of democracy within non-democratic states is roughly proportional with the
extent to which those non-democratic states are committing injustices. Coercive intervention is
difficult to justify in the case of a non-democratic state that nonetheless protects its citizens’ basic
human rights and political rights to free expression, free association, and public dissent. However,
coercive intervention is permitted and even obligatory when a state is committing genocide, crimes
against humanity, and other widespread basic human rights violations (“The Responsibility to
Protect” 2001). Coercive measures themselves often jeopardize basic human rights, such as the
rights to life and physical security, and may come with other substantial harms and costs (Gould
2006, 53). And so respecting basic rights to life and physical security and avoiding substantial
harm may decisively count against using coercion to promote democracy in a non-democratic but
otherwise rights-respecting state. Additionally, military interventions even in the pursuit of
democracy must be subject to the duties of just war theory, such as just cause and conditions of
proportionality and necessity. The decision itself as to whether to coercively intervene in another
state will also need to be authorized by a legitimately constituted international body.
Another type of case is a people who has democratically chosen a non-democratic form of
government. Here again, outsiders may be permitted to non-coercively encourage such peoples to
choose democracy but coercive intervention will generally not be allowed unless the requisite
conditions such as the ones outlined above are fulfilled (serious injustices are being committed,
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duties of just war theory are met, and authorization is given by a legitimate international body).
But of course, in cases where a non-democratic state is committing serious injustices, it cannot be
said that the people has freely chosen or authorized that state since those very injustices (involving
force, violence, threats, and basic human rights violations) undermine the conditions in which a
people can autonomously choose that state on the basis of its members’ own judgments that are
responsive to their own independent reasoning processes (Stilz 2019, 128). Nonetheless, a people
who has democratically chosen a non-democratic form of government, which is not committing
serious injustices, is still not fully justified in having territorial rights, according to my account.
What is the difference, though, between saying that a democratically authorized nondemocracy that protects basic human rights is justified in having territorial rights (roughly, Stilz
and Altman and Wellman’s view) versus saying that such a state is not justified in having territorial
rights but nonetheless outsiders are not permitted to coercively intervene in such a state (my view)?
One might object that, as a practical matter, these two positions amount to the same thing, but one
would be wrong.
Call a democratically authorized non-democracy that protects basic human rights an
“adequate state” to distinguish it from the similar Rawlsian notion of a decent people. Consider an
adequate state in which there is a group peacefully advocating to change the regime into a
democratic state that has gathered sufficient political support to rival the existing non-democratic
state. Assume too that this group is sufficiently organized and has developed well-designed plans
such that it would have the capacity to institute a new, effective, and stable democratic state should
it be able to take over the regime. Assume too that given the current sociopolitical conditions, a
regime change, should it happen, would be peaceful and would not involve any serious injustices
or violations of basic human rights.
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According to the view that adequate states are justified in having territorial rights, outsiders
would not be permitted to non-coercively support the group seeking to change the regime and
institute a democratic state since that would violate the existing adequate state’s right to rule, which
is a territorial right. A state’s right to rule is a claim-right, held against other competitors, to be the
preferred ruler of a territory and its population (Stilz 2019, 21, 93). When outsiders support a rival
ruler even if through non-coercive measures, they are violating this right to rule and the attendant
rights against non-interference. In contrast, according to my view in which adequate states are not
justified in having territorial rights, outsiders are permitted to non-coercively support a competitor
who seeks and has the capacity to peacefully change the regime to establish a democratic state,
even if coercively promoting democratic regime change may not be permitted. No one’s right to
rule would be violated in such a case. And for a group that is on the verge of peaceful democratic
regime change, such outside support may be precisely what is needed to tip the balance in favor of
that group to actually realize democracy rather than have the non-democratic state continue its
rule. An adequate state may only have, what Stilz (2019, 21, 93) describes as, a temporary
enforcement permission to govern a territory and its population if the adequate state is the only
political entity available at the time to protect basic human rights and if changing regimes,
especially in coercive ways, may itself jeopardize basic human rights or entail unreasonably
harmful costs. However, the permission to use force to govern on a temporary basis does not mean
that an adequate state is legitimate or has the fully-fledged right to rule (a right that would be held
derivatively on behalf of its people if it had such a right).

§2.7 CONCLUSION
A people’s territorial rights to jurisdictional authority and to control borders and resources
are grounded (with qualifications to be worked out in Chapter 3) in its right to self-determination,
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where this should be interpreted (in part) as a democratic norm. However, to justify a people’s
territorial rights based on its right to self-determination is not to deny the wide variety of other
sorts of common activities and contexts that generate self-determination rights, whether of a
territorial form or not. Democracy is a requirement for a people’s self-determination and for its
territorial rights to be justified. Arguments that self-determination does not require democracy are
internally inconsistent, appeal to reasons that in fact justify the requirement of democracy, and are
unable to adequately explain how a people under a constitutional monarchy can be said to have a
say as a whole in the collective decisions governing its common activities. Finally, requiring
democracy does not entail that Western models of representative electoral democracy must be
adopted to justify territorial rights or that it is permissible to coercively impose democracy upon
others. Adequate non-democratic states that were democratically authorized and that protect
human rights may at best have a temporary permission to use force to govern a territory and its
population. However, they do not have the legitimate claim-right held against all other competitors
to be the permanent ruler of a territory. Thus, outsiders are permitted to non-coercively support
groups within adequate states in their aspiration to change the regime into a democracy, especially
if they have the capacity and desire to do so peacefully.
This chapter thus defends the political and democratic nature of the principle of selfdetermination, which partly grounds a people’s territorial rights. However, according to my theory,
the principle of self-determination has not only political but ecological dimensions as well and can
thus be characterized as eco-political in nature. In the next chapter, I demonstrate how a people’s
right to self-determination is also inextricably and normatively bound up with a duty of ecological
sustainability and a right to ecological integrity, which will then help to complete my answer to
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the rights-justification question (what normative conditions must be satisfied to justify a people
having territorial rights) according to an eco-political theory of territory.
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CHAPTER 3: THE PRINCIPLE OF ECO-POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION
A people’s right to self-determination, because it involves determining common activities
that take place upon and are a very part of the ecosystems of a people’s territory, is not simply a
political and democratic right but is also inextricably and normatively bound up with a duty of
ecological sustainability and a right to ecological integrity. As I emphasized in the Introduction, a
territory does not merely denote a domain or locus of political control or jurisdictional authority
but rather is also constituted by ecosystems of interacting and interdependent organisms, abiotic
entities, landscapes, and other environmental features and processes.58 Unfortunately, as Dahbour
(2019) has pointed out, the literature on territorial rights in general has an “ecological blindspot”
that ignores the material and ecological elements of territory and predominantly emphasizes its
political dimensions (2). Lea Ypi (2013) concludes, for instance, that “territoriality should
therefore be understood in the first instance as the attempt of an individual or group to affect,
influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control
over a geographic area” (242). Moore (2015) likewise writes, “Territory, on the jurisdictional
authority view, is the geographical domain in which (ideally) the people express their will through
institutions” (27).
A people sustaining its ecosystems is both a material precondition for and constituted partly
by the people’s own self-determination. Since a people is composed of a group of individuals who
are engaged in common activities that take place upon that territory’s constituent ecosystems,
sustaining those ecosystems is a material prerequisite for human life, political society, and a

Veronica Ward (1998) defines ecosystem as “a spatially bounded environment and its biotic communities” and as
entailing three basic elements: “ecosystem components, which are the inhabiting species; ecosystem structure, which
refers to the physical patterns of the life-forms of which there may be multiple layers; and ecosystem functions, which
are the dynamics of matter and energy processing and transfer such as carbon or nutrient cycles, hydrological cycles,
and natural disturbances (i.e., fires, floods, etc.)” (85).
58
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people’s capacity to exercise its own self-determination. A people then has a duty to ecologically
sustain its own territories, which is an internal constraint on a people’s right to self-determination.
Moreover, because a people’s common activities are in fact a very part of its territory’s ecosystems,
a people’s perpetuation of those (sociopolitical-)ecosystems now and into the future is in fact
constituted partly by the people’s self-determination over its common activities. For a people to
sustain its own existence within the ecosystems of which it is a part will just involve the people
setting the terms of the common activities rooted in those ecosystems. Similarly, the external
dimension of self-determination, a people’s right to be free from outside interference (given certain
constraints of justice, democracy, and ecological sustainability), is constituted in part by a people’s
right to ecological integrity. If outsiders violate the ecological integrity of a people’s territory, then
they are violating a constituent part and an enabling condition of a people’s self-determination.
Because a people’s right to political self-determination is intertwined with its duty of ecological
sustainability and its right to ecological integrity, I characterize the principle at the basis of
justifying a people’s territorial rights as one of eco-political self-determination.
If it seems strange to say that rights to self-determination and duties of ecological
sustainability are bound up with one another (and not just Hohfeldian correlatives), consider
Kolers’ (2012) remarks regarding what it means to have a territorial right: “S has a territorial right
in a particular geographical place P when S is morally entitled to bear a territorial relation to P.
The content of the territorial relation is some bundle of rights and responsibilities regarding P
through which S attempts to shape its members’ common life” (102). Similarly, Patricia MontureAngus (1999, 36) in the context of Indigenous sovereignty argues that sovereignty should be
understood as the “right to be responsible” rooted in a people’s close relationship to its land and
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not necessarily in terms of control of that land.59 Additionally, it will not be so implausible to note
the close relationship between a people’s right to self-determination and its duty of ecological
sustainability if one recalls too that a people’s group right to self-determination also requires that
it fulfill duties of providing basic justice and democracy for its individual members.
In §3.1, I describe how the ecological sustainability of a people’s territory involves
maintaining the territories’ constituent ecosystems (which a people’s common activities take place
upon and are a part of) so that the material preconditions for human life and political society
continue to be available now and into the future. I follow Bryan Norton (2005) in understanding
ecological sustainability as a schema with general categories of values or variables to be specified
in more detail by peoples themselves (ideally through open, deliberative, and democratic
processes). I also compare the notion of ecological sustainability with the notions of sustainable
development and plenitude.
In §3.2, I argue that a people ecologically sustaining its territory is constituted partly by a
people’s own self-determination. For a people to ecologically sustain its territory (which will
include filling out the categories of value that constitute its conception of ecological sustainability)
just is, in part, for the people to set the terms of the common activities that make up part of its
territory’s ecosystems. In §3.3, I contend that ecological sustainability constitutes an internal
constraint on (and not simply a countervailing consideration against) a people’s self-determination
and territorial rights because ecological sustainability is a material prerequisite for human life and
political society. There will be some threshold of unsustainability for which a people is at fault
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As I will further explain in Chapter 4, my eco-political theory in fact draws from and builds upon the work that
many Indigenous scholars have done in charting out the connections between political self-determination and
ecological sustainability or stewardship.
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that will entail that it is no longer justified in having territorial rights even if it meets all other
requisite conditions justifying territorial rights.
In §3.4, I explain why specifying a threshold of sustainability under which territorial rights
would be lost, even though it presents real theoretical and practical difficulties, is not impossible
and may even be plausible given the norms and metrics of ecological sustainability that are
developing internationally. In §3.5, I argue that ecological integrity as the external dimension of
ecological sustainability is a constituent part of external self-determination. The right of territorial
integrity, which is well-entrenched in international law but generally only prohibits political acts
of aggression and force, should be re-interpreted to incorporate the right to ecological integrity.
After having completed my articulation and defense of a principle of eco-political selfdetermination, I conclude in §3.6 by stating in full my answer to the rights-justification question
and the conditions needed to justify a people having territorial rights.

§3.1 ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY AS A SCHEMA
How should ecological sustainability be understood? Rather than adopting any specific
concrete measure or criterion of ecological sustainability, I follow Bryan Norton (2005) in
understanding sustainability in broad terms as “a relationship between generations such that the
earlier generations fulfill their individual wants and needs so as not to destroy, or close off,
important and valued options for future generations” (363; emphasis in original).60 As Norton puts
it, “Individuals face their environment as a complex mix of opportunities and constraints as they
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For other glosses of environmental sustainability, see Robert Goodland (1995), Andrew Dobson (1998, 33–61),
Andrew Brennan and Yeuk-Sze Lo (2016, sec. 6), and Julian Agyeman (2016). Dobson, in particular, provides a
useful typology of three different conceptions of environmental sustainability that vary in their answers to the issues
of what to sustain, why, how, objects of concern (primary and secondary), and substitutability between human-made
and natural capital.
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adapt to their environment at any given time.” “Choices made by members of an earlier generation
can change the mix of opportunities and constraints faced by subsequent generations, limiting the
latter’s choices in their attempt to adapt” (97; emphasis in original). The ecological sustainability
of a people’s territory thus involves maintaining the territory’s constituent ecosystems (which a
people’s common activities take place upon and are a part of) so that valued opportunities—which
I take to constitute a baseline of the material preconditions for human life and political society—
continue to be available now and into the future.
Norton suggests that ecological sustainability is best understood in terms of a schematic
definition that provides some general categories of values or variables that are specified in more
detail by local communities (ideally through iterative, deliberative, and democratic processes) to
form a more concrete set of criteria and goals (96, 359). The four categories of values or variables
that Norton identifies include (1) community-procedural values, (2) weak-sustainability (economic)
values, (3) risk-avoidance values, and (4) community-identity values (365–72). These categories
are helpful but we need not adopt these exact ones to take on board the general idea of
understanding sustainability primarily as an overall schema to be filled in by particular
communities through their own democratic deliberations.
Norton (2005, 362–64, 389–99) points out that because members of any community are
likely to be committed to a plurality of values, a good way to systematize these values when filling
out a community’s own understanding of sustainability will in fact be to focus public deliberations
over concrete questions about what indicators to use and what goals to set. Discussions over
concrete actions and particular indicators will enable values to emerge, crystallize, and potentially
converge in the public as individuals employ them to support the indicators they favor. A forum
could of course also be created in which individuals could deliberate over how different values
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should be weighed or prioritized against one another. But when the object of discussion is kept at
a lower-order level, indicators can be chosen to effectively guide collective action without
resolving all the value disagreements between members of a diverse population. The goal then will
be to adopt what Norton calls a “synoptic indicator,” which is “some measurable feature of an area
that reflects many of the deeply held, if inchoate, values and aspirations that residents feel for their
area and region” (2005, 390). Examples of such indicators might include “percentage of land cover
that is not paved over, built upon, or in other ways made impervious to the penetration of surface
waters into the ground” or “percentage of land cover that remains in native vegetative patterns,”
which could be supported by various stakeholders with a variety of perspectives and values and
where different indicators could form a system of spatially nested criteria at both local and regional
levels (391, 398).
It will be useful here to compare the concept of ecological sustainability to other two related
but distinct notions: sustainable development and plenitude. The notion of ecological sustainability,
according to my view, is not equivalent to the notion of sustainable development, which I take to
be narrower than and constitutive only of one particular conception of ecological sustainability
(Dobson 1998, 60). The concept of sustainable development, which just like ecological
sustainability is itself contested and admits of a plethora of more specific definitions, has been
charted out in various international documents such as the commonly cited 1987 Brundtland
Report (“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs”) or the 2011 Human Development Report (“the
expansion of the substantive freedoms of people today while making reasonable efforts to avoid
seriously compromising those of future generations”) (Our Common Future 1987, 43; Klugman
2011, 2).
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Some critics point out that the language of development imported from economics, along
with their attendant notions of “asset,” “capital” (employed albeit in the context of “natural capital”
or “ecological capital”), and even “resources,” tends to instrumentalize the non-human natural
world and environment as having value only for human purposes or needs (Plumwood 1993; Noss
and Cooperrider 1994, 72; Sagoff 2004; Brennan and Lo 2016, sec. 6). Conceptions of sustainable
development are often caught up in a “discourse of eco-efficiency” employed by corporate or state
actors to facilitate and justify the efficient exploitation of natural resources within a capitalist
framework (Smith 2003, 4). Leerom Medovoi (2010) points out that in addition to the connotations
of upholding something’s validity or rightfulness (e.g. sustain an argument) and of furnishing the
necessaries of life, sustainability takes on a darker underside in the context of sustainable
development meaning to endure, withstand, or tolerate injury and harm, which can serve to “gauge
the kind and amount of life that must not be killed now so that the process of surplus value
extraction can continue indefinitely into the future” (142).
Moreover, sustainable development seeks the continued improvement or expansion of
human well-being and so is a maximizing notion whereas ecological sustainability is a threshold
notion concerned with maintaining the viability of (socio-)ecological systems to support a baseline
of valued opportunities now and into the future (Goodland 1995, 5). Though one could interpret
the valued opportunities to be sustained in maximalist ways, that is not how ecological
sustainability is ordinarily conceptualized. The baseline of valued opportunities may need to be
more concretely specified by communities themselves through democratic processes but the
ecological sustainability of a people’s territory will include at the minimum basic needs and the
material conditions for political society. Finally, understandings of sustainable development are
often merely a form of “green washing” that ignores the ways in which issues of social justice and
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equity such as racism, sexism, and colonialism intersect with environmental harms (i.e.
environmental injustices), though increasingly the discourse of sustainable development is
evolving to include these sorts of sociopolitical (and not merely economic) considerations
(Agyeman 2008).
My main point here is not necessarily that these objections to the notion of sustainable
development are damning or that no conception of sustainable development could be developed
that avoided these criticisms. 61 Instead, my goal is to show that the concept of sustainable
development is narrower than that of ecological sustainability and amounts to one particular
conception, theory, or strategy of ecological sustainability, which already implies a particular way
of filling out the schema of ecological sustainability (Dobson 1998, 60).
Consider next Kolers’ (2011, 113–17) notion of plenitude or fullness, which he argues for
as a value-neutral criterion for deciding between competing territorial claims. Plenitude has both
an empirical and intentional dimension. The empirical dimension involves internal and external
diversity—that is, elements of a place being distinct from one another, and the place itself being
distinct from other places. Intentional plenitude is where an ethnogeographic community seeks to
enhance or maintain the empirical plenitude of its place in perpetuity. Kolers takes plenitude to
entail ecological sustainability and resilience, the latter which he defines as the capacity to resist
shocks to the system and return to an equilibrium state (74). According to Kolers, an
ethnogeographic communities has a legitimate claim over a particular territory when it
demonstrates plenitude on that given territory.
The problem with Kolers’ concept of plenitude, even if it implies ecological sustainability,
is that it is not clear why ever increasing abundance characterized in terms of internal and external
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For some accounts that seek to defend and rework the notion sustainable development, see Jeffrey Sachs (2015) and
Sneddon, Howarth, and Norgaard (2006).
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diversity is important for grounding territorial rights. While internal diversity might sometimes be
instrumentally valuable for grounding territorial rights since the internal complexity of a place (for
instance, its biodiversity) might facilitate its ecological sustainability over time, it is sustainability
and not fullness that is ultimately required as a condition for justifying an entity’s territorial rights.
Furthermore, the requirement to make a place distinct from other places in order to generate
territorial rights seems to be a groundless and superfluous call for uniqueness. Plenitude, as a
criterion for according territorial rights (similar to Kolers’ notion of ethnogeographic communities
as the holder of territorial rights, as I argued for in §1.1) is too thick ecologically.
Moreover, plenitude for Kolers is a maximizing notion since a place could always be fuller
(even if fullness would eventually tail off asymptotically). Kolers recognizes the need to set a
threshold for plenitude since otherwise we would not know when an entity would have satisfied
the conditions need to justify according it territorial rights. Kolers attempts to develop such a
threshold in terms of (1) feedback: when a people and the land are mutually formed, (2) knowledge:
when an ethnogeographic community can demonstrate an appropriate kind of knowledge about a
place, and (3) when a group’s plans for a place (intentional plenitude) are both reasonably wellspecified and subject to increasing complexity, understanding, or specificity over time (131–33).
The problem, of course, with such a threshold is its vagueness and the difficulty of
operationalizing it, which Kolers (2009) admits as much but simply “plead[s] innocence by
association” with other political theories (133). However, the problem is especially sharp for the
notion of plenitude (in a way that is not for ecological sustainability) since plenitude is maximalist
theoretically as a concept and the threshold of plenitude is set pragmatically. If the threshold
cannot be clearly specified in practice, then there will always be theoretical pressure from the
concept itself to ratchet that threshold higher and higher. Moreover, the theoretically maximalist
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nature of plenitude raises a special sort of annexation problem (similar to the one that legitimate
state theories suffer from as discussed in Chapter §1.1)—a kind of ecological colonialism, as it
were—since a group that is able to better enhance plenitude on another group’s territory may have
some grounds to take over that territory.62 The sharpness of this problem is not felt by the concept
of ecological sustainability because as we have seen, sustainability is a threshold concept in theory.
Of course, whether the notion of ecological sustainability can be sufficiently specified in practice
so as to be operationalized remains an important question, which I will address in §3.5.

§3.2 ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY AS PARTLY
CONSTITUTED BY SELF-DETERMINATION
The primary reason to adopt a schematic definition of ecological sustainability, from the
perspective of an eco-political theory of territory, is not simply the fact that employing any more
specific measure of ecological sustainability raises additional substantive (and controversial)
issues and risks taking on board a parochial metric suitable only for some contexts and not others.
As Norton (2005) points out, “Many of the key details of a sustainable lifestyle will be
idiosyncratic to a particular community located in a particular place with a distinctive ecology and
will be intelligible only as a part of the history of that place, which we have interpreted as including
both the landscape and the peoples who have lived there” (358–59). Instead, the whole point
behind developing a principle of eco-political self-determination is to demonstrate that for a people
to ecologically sustain its territory (including how to fill out the categories of value that make up
the schema of ecological sustainability) just is in part for the people to exercise its selfdetermination over the common activities that are a component of those ecosystems. So, there is a
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normative (and not just a pragmatic) reason, grounded in the value of self-determination, as to why
the notion of ecological sustainability should be conceptualized at this higher-order (and flexible)
level that enables peoples to determine and work out its details for themselves.
In the process of deciding how exactly to ecologically sustain a territory, which includes
deciding how to understand ecological sustainability (how to fill out the values, priorities, and
indicators in its schema), a people will be working out how to realize various universal and
particular place-based shared ends through its common activities. Universal ends, as I discussed
in §1.3, meet basic needs (both biological and social) that nearly everyone has or represent
conditions required to live a decent life (where the standard of decency can be partly relative to
current socioeconomic and cultural conditions). Particular ends are ends that are valuable only
from within a specific world view or that represent a specific mode of realizing various universal
ends. For example, both nomadic and industrial sedentary ways of living realize distinct particular
ends with respect to a place, some ends of which can only be understood as valuable by one who
already has certain commitments associated with a specific way of life and some ends of which
are particular modes of realizing biological and social needs (Kolers 2009, 10; Miller 2012, 259–
60; Moore 2015, 6; Stilz 2019, 167–69).
By exercising its self-determination to ecologically sustain its (sociopolitical-)ecological
systems and to identify and realize various universal and particular ends rooted in a place, a people
may end up developing thicker values or conceptions of the good life that are fundamentally
attached to that place and by which the people come to self-identify. Such “community-identity
values,” “constitutive values,” or “sense-of-place values” as Norton (2005) describes them, “spring
up locally, as members of communities interact with their environment” and “are developed and
passed from generation to generation, creating cohesiveness within human communities but also
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binding individuals and communities to their natural habit” (371, 388, 395). 63 The notions of
ethnogeography (a shared ontology of land), (cultural) national identity, and even political identity
attached to place, which I discussed in Chapter 1, though distinct in various ways, can nonetheless
all be seen as part of this same family of ideas emphasizing thicker connections to place that
peoples can develop and by which they can come to understand themselves.
I do not seek to deny the value of these sorts of identity or ethical commitments (or even
necessarily to deny that they could generate certain associative obligations that would normatively
bind fellow members together). However, it is important to carefully note and reiterate the role
that these sorts of notions play in my eco-political theory of territory. Namely, they do not serve
as the ground upon which territorial rights are justified, even if should they come about (sometimes
through the very exercise of territorial rights), they may a) come to define and constitute some (but
not necessarily all) peoples and (b) be valuable pursuits for which territorial rights can be exercised.
The problem, as I see it, is when theorists take these facts that peoples can sometimes define
themselves in these ways and that territorial rights can be exercised to secure a people’s interests
in these identities and commitments, and then infer from them that these thicker values are the
very justification for according territorial rights to peoples. Another way to put the point is that
although a people’s self-determination may end up taking on a thicker shape or character, these
thicker values and commitments are not themselves the basis upon which a people’s selfdetermination rights are justified. As I have tried to emphasize, peoples may end up defining
themselves however they want (hence, the proliferation of conceptions within this family of ideas);
they may not identify themselves in such thicker ways at all; and there may be much internal
disagreement within peoples (sometimes due to injustices or systems of oppression) about how
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exactly to identify or even which dimensions of identity are most normatively significant. Again,
this is the whole point behind grounding territorial rights, instead, in a principle of eco-political
self-determination: to enable peoples to freely decide for themselves how to identify, to govern,
and to ecologically sustain their common activities rooted in a place even amidst such plurality
both across and within peoples.
Because it is up to peoples to fill out the shape and character of the values that make up the
schema of ecological sustainability, peoples may or may not come to value the environment (or
parts of it) intrinsically for its own sake.64 A people can decide for itself (within certain normative
constraints, of course) how to relate to its land, how to conceptualize and value it, and what mode
of valuing (instrumental, intrinsic, some combination of the two, or some other mode entirely) to
take toward the land. Of course, there is a sense that one of the functions played by the notion of
ecological sustainability within an eco-political theory is to value the maintenance and protection
of ecosystems instrumently for their importance toward enabling the material preconditions of
human life and political society. But such an instrumental function does not define the entirety of
the notion of ecological sustainability, which as I have shown, involves a people’s selfdetermination and is up to the people to concretely specify.
The notion of ecological sustainability in an eco-political theory leaves it open whether the
natural environment should be valued intrinsically for its own sake or anthropocentrically for the
sake of human well-being (or even in other ways), and does not necessarily mandate any one mode

Though perhaps Norton will prove right in his prediction: “I predict that as better linguistic tools are developed for
expressing values that communities place on nature, the term intrinsic value will have its role replaced by
commitments to more specific indicators and protectionist efforts. Intrinsic value will, I predict, give way to a rich
pluralism, some values of which will be expressed as commitments to save objects and places and as acceptance of
measurable indicators and precise criteria. …Intrinsic Value theory is based on an assumption that environmental
values can be divided neatly into instrumental uses and noninstrumental valuings. In fact, of course, a pluralist will
naturally recognize a range of values from consumptive to transformative to spiritual, and it is simply a philosophers’
artifact to draw a sharp dividing line between these varied ways that humans value nature.”
64
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of valuing over others (Norton 2005, 368–70). So, for instance, the concept of ecological
sustainability employed here does not by itself settle the debate between weak sustainability or
strong sustainability—that is, whether it is acceptable to substitute natural capital for human made
capital (strong sustainability denies substitutability)—which is in fact a multidimensional
continuum since different kinds of natural capital could be more or less substitutable in various
contexts.65 If it turns out that a standard of completely weak sustainability is in fact unable to
maintain the viability of socioecological systems to provide valued opportunities now and moving
into the future in certain contexts (as I think is true), then of course such a standard would not
count as working out a particular conception within the schema of ecological sustainability on my
view. However, the concept of ecological sustainability by itself does not entail that it is impossible
to flush out an adequate conception of sustainability via a suitable sort of weak standard. A people
in spelling out its conception of ecological sustainability may also in fact reject altogether the
debate between weak and strong sustainability, eschewing the very notion of natural capital and
substitutability (a position which could then be characterized, if one wanted to do so, as a sort of
“absurdly strong substitutability”) (Holland 1997, 28; see also Dobson 1998, 50–54). Or a people
may instead spell out an ecological standard different than or even thicker than ecological
sustainability (either strong, weak, or otherwise), such as resilience or plenitude, by which to
govern its own activities and to hold itself accountable toward. So long as this standard entailed
ecological sustainability, then this would still constitute a people flushing out for itself the values
within a schema of sustainability—just flushing out sustainability and then some, as it were.
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The hypothetical example often given is about whether plastic trees (human built capital) should be substitutable
for actual trees if they are able to perform the same functions within ecosystems of producing oxygen, absorbing
carbon dioxide, supporting the life of other organisms, etc. See also Dobson (1998, 33–61), Norton (2005, 310–16),
and Brennan and Lo (2016, sec. 6).
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Perhaps, it will turn out, as various theorists are wont to claim, that “introducing the idea
that other species have intrinsic value, that humans should be ‘fair’ to all other species, provides
no operationally recognizable constraints on human behavior that are not already implicit in the
generalized, cross-temporal obligations to protect a healthy, complex, and autonomously
functioning system for the benefit of future generations of humans” (Norton 1991, 226). But this
is of course a contingent claim and perhaps true in some (sociopolitical-)ecological contexts and
not others. And so it may itself be subject to debate and be a part of a people’s deliberations over
how to concretely understand and realize ecological sustainability.

§3.3 ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY AS AN INTERNAL CONSTRAINT
ON SELF-DETERMINATION AND TERRITORIAL RIGHTS
Ecological sustainability, as I have already noted, is a material precondition for selfdetermination insofar as deciding the nature and course of a people’s common activities
necessitates perpetuating the socioecological systems upon which those common activities take
place (and are a part of) and which make possible human life and political society. Since a people’s
right to self-determination is the primary ground for its territorial rights and since ecological
sustainability is a prerequisite for self-determination, a people must fulfill a duty to ecologically
sustain its territory as a necessary condition for having territorial rights (and in particular, its right
to control its resources, which will have a direct impact on the sustainability of its territory).
Ecological sustainability thus constitutes an internal constraint on a people’s self-determination
and territorial rights.
I take it for granted that there are obligations to future generations so as to bracket off
metaphysical questions such as the non-identity problem, which would lead us too far astray (Parfit
2017). Of course, if no obligations to future generations of any kind existed at all, then there would
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be no reason to care about ecological sustainability (or any other future-oriented reason for acting
that considered future generations, for that matter). But if our pre-reflective judgments have some
evidentiary value in moral and political theorizing (per, for instance, a method of reflective
equilibrium), then we have some prima facie reason for thinking that the negation of the
consequent of the previous statement is true, and then for conducting a modus tollens to infer that
obligations to future generations of some sort exist (see Meyer 2016).
I will further note here that peoples are transgenerational groups, which may provide some
ontological basis that lessens the sting of non-identity worries because a people’s duty to
ecologically sustain a territory into the future will be, at least in part, a self-regarding duty to a
group that exist across generations and is not reducible simply to the individuals who will end up
being members in that group. In any case, even if some more nuanced non-identity worry reoccurs
here for transgenerational groups (since individuals of future generations still remain a constituent
part of that group), my goal here is not to provide any knock-down argument to such skepticism
against obligations to future generations but simply to suggest some prima facie reasons beyond
mere stipulation for sidestepping such skepticism for now. If ultimately the reader thinks that we
are only justified in stipulating these problems away, then stipulate away we shall.
The fact that ecological sustainability is an internal constraint on a people’s selfdetermination and territorial rights means that unsustainable exercises of self-determination is not
simply a countervailing consideration to be weighed against self-determination and territorial
rights. 66 If unsustainable exercises of self-determination were a countervailing consideration
against self-determination and territorial rights, then this would mean that although sometimes
unsustainability would be weighty enough to count in favor of overriding a people’s self-
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determination and territorial rights, it may not always on balance so count. In contrast, when
ecological sustainability is seen as an internal constraint on self-determination and territorial rights,
then unsustainability always counts against the very justification for and would constitute a limit
on a people’s self-determination and territorial rights.
The fact that a people has a duty of ecological sustainability, which is a necessary
condition for its self-determination and territorial rights, implies that there will be some threshold
of unsustainability for which a people is at fault that will entail it is no longer justified in having
territorial rights even if it meets all other requisite conditions for justifying territorial rights. If a
people utterly decimates its ecosystems—strip-mining its natural resources, polluting its
waterways and air, clear-cutting its forests, and generally engaging in unsustainable patterns of
production and consumption, for example—then it will no longer be justified in having territorial
rights. And a people will lack territorial rights in this case even if it is democratic, protects the
basic rights and political rights of its current members (even if not those of the next generation),
and meets all the requisite external legitimacy constraints (imagine in particular that various ecogeographical features or processes such as mountains, water flows, or wind patterns make it the
case that the people’s ecological devastation is by and large contained within its own borders and
further that it has fairly compensated all outsiders who have been impacted by any ancillary
spillover effects). Though, of course, since ecological devastation usually accompanies injustices,
undermines the conditions for democracy, and has cross-border impacts, such a case is somewhat
artificial. Nonetheless, it helps to conceptually demonstrate how a people will lose its territorial
rights if it fails to sustain its territory’s ecologies and even if all other requisite conditions for
territorial rights are met.
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However, the lack of territorial rights does not by itself entail that any sort of intervention
by outsiders is permissible, as I emphasized in §2.6. It will not be permissible, for instance, to
militarily intervene in a people’s jurisdiction if they have lost their territorial rights due to their
own unsustainable governance. But the imposition of economic sanctions on such a people may
be allowed especially if the people produced goods and services by devastating the ecosystems of
its territory and unsustainably exploiting its resources. Such sanctions could incentive the people
to change its economic systems and practices to become more ecologically sustainable because the
people would not otherwise be able to exchange its goods and services internationally.
I conceptualize the internal constraint of ecological sustainability on self-determination in
much the same way as the internal constraint of justice on self-determination (Gould 2004, 31–39;
Christiano 2008, chap. 7). Both are internal constraints that undermine the justification of and set
limits on self-determination and territorial rights and are not simply countervailing considerations
to be balanced against such rights. Democratic self-determination should not be exercised to
violate basic human rights or political rights. Similarly, as Robyn Eckersley (1996) notes, “there
are certain basic ecological conditions essential to human survival that should not be bargained
away by political majorities because such conditions provide the very preconditions (in the form
of life support) for present and future generations of humans to practice democracy” (218). Just as
falling below a minimum threshold of justice causes a people to lose its territorial rights regardless
of whether the people fulfills the other conditions justifying territorial rights, so too would falling
below a minimum threshold of ecological sustainability.
Some modicum of injustice does not necessarily undercut a people’s self-determination
and territorial rights, which entail some right to do wrong. Sometimes outsiders can only try to
persuade a people to change their policies to govern more justly (see Stilz 2019, 149). Similarly,
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suppose that a people is doing the bare minimum to sustain the ecosystems of its territory such that
the material prerequisites for basic needs and political society will continue to exist in the future.
However, suppose that it would be better all-things-considered if the people governed in even more
ecologically sustainable ways since doing so would enable political institutions to better realize
both human well-being and the ends of justice. Nonetheless, a people has some right to do wrong
in this case and would not lose its self-determination and territorial rights if it did not govern in
extra-sustainable or ideally sustainable ways. Outsiders would only be able to try to persuade a
people to change its policies to govern more sustainably.

§3.4 SPECIFYING THE THRESHOLD OF ECOLOGICAL
SUSTAINABILITY NEEDED FOR TERRITORIAL RIGHTS
How might the threshold of ecological sustainability under which a people would lose its
territorial rights (even if it met other requisite conditions) be specified in practice? This issue may
seem especially intractable if one is working with, as I am, a concept of ecological sustainability
that is defined as a schema and so admits of some indeterminacy that must be filled in by various
communities. I contend that although the issue of specifying a threshold of sustainability under
which territorial rights would no longer be justified does present real theoretical and practical
difficulties, it is far from completely intractable.
First, recall that the issue of specifying a threshold of ecological sustainability is not a
problem with the concept of ecological sustainability unlike the notion of plenitude, which is a
maximizing concept. Second, conceptualizing ecological sustainability as a schema that must be
filled in and rounded out by peoples themselves also does not entail that a threshold of
sustainability cannot be specified under which a people would lose its territorial rights. To see why,
begin by noting that the primary reasons for understanding ecological sustainability as a schema
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are first to build in a degree of context-sensitivity such that those most knowledgeable and familiar
with a place can determine what ecological sustainability would more concretely entail in that
particular location, and second to open up the determination of ecological sustainability to
deliberative democratic processes.
Empowering communities with the requisite knowledge and background to more
concretely spell out the shape of sustainability, however, does not preclude the possibility of
settling upon a multi-dimensional threshold of sustainability that is adequately parameterized
according to different types of context that may exist across peoples. Ecological sustainability is
no more problematically context-sensitive than the standard of a decent human life, which is often
used to ground basic needs or basic human rights and whose specification depends in part on
prevailing socioeconomic and cultural conditions (Brock 2009). Ecological sustainability could be
understood in terms of maintaining ecosystems in order to enable the conditions for decent human
life within a political society now and into the future. Moreover, admitting that disagreements are
possible (even likely) and so open deliberative democratic processes are needed to determine an
issue is not to say agreements are impossible. The whole point of deliberative democratic processes
is to attempt to reach a convergence (even if of a thinner sort around indicators rather than of a
deeper sort around substantive values) in a fair, free, and (even) epistemically sound manner. Thus,
neither the concept of ecological sustainability itself nor the manner of conceptualizing it as a
schema necessarily entails that specifying a threshold of sustainability under which a people would
lose its territorial rights is impossible or unlikely to happen.
Nonetheless, I am not denying that specifying such a threshold of sustainability involves
some real theoretical and practical difficulties. There are plenty of theoretical challenges in the
domains of science, economics, and other social sciences raised by the problem of how to set a
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sustainability threshold, which I am not qualified to comprehensively explain or resolve. And of
course, even if open deliberative democratic processes help to achieve convergence, they do not
guarantee it. Another reason to conceptualize sustainability as a schema to be flushed out via open
democratic processes is that ecological sustainability is a normative as well as a descriptive notion
whose definition should not only be left up to “purely” empirical sciences (if there even is such a
thing). Additionally, note that convergence over a specific threshold of sustainability will be easier
to achieve (because it is thinner) than convergence over a completely comprehensive measure or
theory of sustainability that would explain exactly why that threshold should be set there rather
than elsewhere. Peoples can agree on a threshold for their own different reasons and from within
their own preferred comprehensive theory of sustainability.
In any case, there are empirical indications of a growing international consensus around
the need for ecological sustainability, which gives us some reason to think that a sustainability
threshold as a necessary condition for territorial rights could feasibly be specified in practice
sometime in the future. The reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
for instance, written by thousands of scientists and other experts and reviewed by governments,
constitute an authoritative international consensus on the science concerning climate change.
Additionally, international treaties and agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris
Agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC),
represent a growing consensus on the need for ecological sustainability (even if such agreements
are not binding, lack enforcement, and may be insufficient for preventing global temperature rise
even if their goals are met). And even though the discourse surrounding sustainable development
could pose various risks, as I mentioned above, nonetheless its general international acceptance
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suggests it represents a starting point from which a threshold of ecological sustainability could
evolve (which would not emphasize problematic forms of development).
Finally, widely cited metrics that estimate the quality of sustainable governance for
individual countries already exist such as the Global Green Economy Index (published by Dual
Citizen, a private consultancy based in the United States), the Environmental Performance Index
(preceded by the Environmental Sustainability Index and developed by Yale University, Columbia
University, the World Economic Forum, and the Joint Research Centre of the European
Commission), and the National Footprint Accounts (published by the Global Footprint Network,
an independent think tank originally based in the United States, Belgium, and Switzerland). I am
not mentioning these metrics to endorse any one of them in particular but simply to show that it is
not only possible to specify in practice a sustainability threshold for peoples that could garner wide
support but movement in this direction has already begun. However the threshold of sustainability
is specified in practice, the global deliberative processes by which this threshold would be
developed would need to be far more open and equitable than they currently are and must
substantively include all relevant stakeholders, especially historically more vulnerable or
marginalized ones such as ecological refugee peoples and Indigenous peoples.

§3.5 ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY AS CONSTITUENT
PART OF EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION
Ecological sustainability just like self-determination can be seen as having an internal and
an external dimension. Internally, ecological sustainability involves a people’s duty to maintain
the ecosystems of its territory, which its common activities take place upon and are a part of, so
that valued opportunities, including the very conditions for life and political society, continue to
be available now and into the future. Externally, outsiders have a duty not to interfere with a
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people’s own governance of its territory by violating the ecological integrity of a people’s territory.
I understand ecological integrity as the external aspect of ecological sustainability. So, outsiders
violate the ecological integrity of a people’s territory if they undermine the viability or health of a
people’s ecosystems and thus interfere with a people right to decide for themselves how to sustain
them. A people’s right to ecological integrity then is also a constituent part of external selfdetermination, a people’s right to be free from outside interference (given certain constraints).
Outsiders may violate a people’s external self-determination in non-ecological ways but
importantly, they may also do so by violating the ecological integrity of a people’s territory.
The right to territory integrity, well-entrenched in international law, is generally understood
as recognizing the illegitimacy of aggressive threats or uses of force, especially ones designed to
change borders or otherwise violate a group’s political independence. This conception of territorial
integrity thus presupposes a notion of territory premised on political or jurisdictional control over
a geographical area. But since a territory also includes its constituent ecologies, an eco-political
theory of territory would suggest that the right to territorial integrity be expanded to include a right
to ecological integrity (Eckersley 2004, 232). As Eckersley (2004) explains, “territorial
sovereignty—including self-determination and the associated principle of nonintervention—can
serve as a bulwark against anti-ecological practices that encroach upon the territory and policymaking powers of particular nation-states” (233). 67 Just like in the case of developing a
sustainability threshold as a necessary condition for territorial rights, we may hold out some hope
for “green evolutions in sovereignty” and think that there might be some movement toward reinterpreting territorial integrity to incorporate the notion of ecological integrity (Eckersley 2004,
chap. 8). Consider, for instance, the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of
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Hazardous Waste and the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, both of which involved developing
countries at the frontlines of negotiating international legal norms to protect their ecologies from
hazardous waste or genetically modified organisms produced mainly by multinational corporations
from developed countries (Eckersley 2004, 233; Vogler 2005, 238).
Of course, because ecosystems do not neatly line up with political boundaries and various
environmental problems are regional or global in scale (e.g. climate change), responses to certain
challenges to the ecological integrity of peoples’ territories will require shared governance and
cooperation at supranational levels (Penz 1996; Vogler 2005). I do not deny this is the case, as I
pointed out in §2.2. Sovereignty and territorial rights can be disaggregated functionally such that
the right to jurisdictional authority over some specific issue or domain (e.g. control of shared rivers
or regulation of global commons or planetary climate-regulating functions) is distributed across
multiple territorial rights-holders. Territorial rights do not necessarily entail exclusive territoriality
or sovereignty. Peoples may need to delegate some of their territorial rights to regionally or
internationally authorized bodies. When different levels and domains of jurisdiction are present, a
green principle of subsidiarity may be needed in which “decisions would be made at the level
which would ensure maximum environmental protection” (Jupille 1998, 243). Generally speaking,
one might expect centralization where transboundary physical or economic spillovers are present
or where economies of scale may be achieved, and devolution to occur where environmental or
regulatory costs are internal to a given locality. It still remains the case, however, that peoples,
engaged in common activities attached to a particular place and aimed at independent governance,
who fulfill the necessary normative conditions to justify territorial rights should have their
territorial rights respected. And an important element of respecting a people’s external selfdetermination will be respecting its right to ecological integrity. This right to ecological integrity,
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as we shall further see in Chapter 4, will be particularly important to protect for many Indigenous
peoples who have suffered from colonialist injustices, which often involve the imposition of
ecological harm upon them and their territories.

§3.6 CONCLUSION
Let us take stock now that the core elements of an eco-political theory of territory have
been covered. Figure 1 below shows the overlap (though not the character of the relationships)
between the notions of self-determination, ecological sustainability, and ecological integrity that
make up the principle of eco-political self-determination, which serves as the main basis for a
people’s territorial rights. The bullet points afterward explain the overlap between these concepts
and the character of the relationships between them.
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Figure 1
Self-Determination

Ecological Sustainability

1

3
2

Internal Self-Determination

5

4

Ecological Integrity

External Self-Determination



A people ecologically sustaining its territory is constituted partly by its own selfdetermination because for a people to sustain the ecosystems of its territory just is in part
for it to set the terms of its common activities that take place upon and are a part of those
ecosystems. (2, 5)



Ecological sustainability is a material precondition for self-determination because
sustaining a people’s ecosystems is a prerequisite for human life and political society. (2,
5)



A people can exercise its self-determination in unsustainable ways. (1)
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A geographical area can be ecologically sustainable even if no people is exercising its selfdetermination upon it. (3)



If outsiders violate a people’s ecological integrity, then they are ipso facto violating a
people’s external self-determination, because by undermining the health and viability of
the ecosystems of the people’s territory, they are interfering with the people’s governance
over its own common activities that take place upon and are a very part of those ecosystems.
(5)



A people’s external self-determination can be violated without its ecological integrity being
violated. (4)
The answer to the rights-justification question, according to my eco-political theory of

territory, can now be fully stated. A people is justified in having territorial rights (which are
primarily grounded in a principle of eco-political self-determination) if the people:
(a) occupies a geographical area not unjustly, which likely necessitates fulfilling various
corrective justice duties (Occupancy/Corrective Justice),
(b) protects the basic human rights (e.g. to life, security, subsistence, and equal protection
under the law) and political rights (e.g. to freedom of conscience, expression, and
association) of all its members (Basic Justice),
(c) respects the equal right of all its members to participate in the decision-making
governing their common activities (Democracy),
(d) sustains the ecosystems of its territory for human life and political society (Ecological
Sustainability), and
(e) meets any external legitimacy constraints on its territorial rights (External Legitimacy),
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i. which in general consists of the reciprocal claims of outsiders grounded in the
same values that justify (b), (c), and (d): namely, respecting the basic human
rights, political rights, rights to self-determination, and rights to ecological
integrity of outsiders,
ii. but also takes on more specific shapes for the right to control resources (namely,
fulfilling global justice duties, which I point out in Chapter 2) and the right to
control borders (where respecting the self-determination claims of outsiders
may, for instance, sometimes require that a people include those very outsiders
as members, which I substantiate more fully in Chapter 6).
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CHAPTER 4: THE TERRITORIAL RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
Now that I have laid out the core tenets of an eco-political theory of territory, I turn next to
considering how the theory fares when it comes to explaining and justifying the territorial rights
of Indigenous peoples. The self-determination and territorial rights of Indigenous peoples are an
especially crucial case to consider for any theory of territory not only because Indigenous territorial
claims pre-date the Westphalian modern nation-state formation but also because many of the most
egregious territorial injustices have been committed against Indigenous peoples as a result of
settler colonialism. Because the situation of Indigenous peoples is such a central case to consider,
a theory that succeeds in accounting for Indigenous territorial rights thus passes a crucial test of
adequacy that any theory seeking to serve as a theory of territory in general must meet.
The problem with many existing theories of territory is that their methodological
frameworks often implicitly assume modern nation-states as their primary context of application
or concern. Even if the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly mentioned in some of
the more sophisticated versions of prevailing theories, Indigenous peoples might still be seen as
an exceptional sort of case to be accommodated by a more general theory, or the colonialist
influences and ramifications of various frameworks continue to be adopted without critical
interrogation.
I begin by evaluating three types of existing theories—property theories, legitimate state
theories, and cultural nationalist theories—and show how each insufficiently explains or justifies
the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples. In §4.1, I argue that property theories of territory
inspired by John Locke risk re-inscribing the colonialist and anti-ecological underpinnings of
Locke’s own views. Even if a property theory of territory could be rehabilitated, the more such a
re-worked theory moved away from the colonialist, capitalist, and anti-ecological baggage bound
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up in Locke, the less clear it would be that the grammar of labor and property would be doing any
theoretically explanatory work.
In §4.2, I consider the problems facing legitimate state theories when it comes to
accounting for the claims of Indigenous peoples, including applying only to modern nation-states,
justifying benevolent colonialism, and ignoring backward-looking corrective justice measures
needed to rectify colonialism. I argue that even if suitably modified to respond to these problems
in some ways, legitimate state theories are still unable to account for the collective selfdetermination rights of Indigenous peoples.
Next in §4.3, I consider cultural nationalist theories that initially might seem promising for
explaining the cultural harms of colonialism and for justifying national self-determination for
Indigenous peoples. However, I contend that cultural nationalist accounts, by grounding selfdetermination and territorial rights in a determinate pre-political cultural target, risk collapsing into
ethnic or racial nationalism and re-inscribing a colonial logic of governmentality.
After criticizing the prevailing accounts, I lay out again the main elements of an ecopolitical theory of territory in §4.4 and note how the theory draws from and builds upon the work
of various Indigenous scholars who have charted the connections between political selfdetermination and ecological stewardship. I then demonstrate how grounding Indigenous
territorial rights in a principle of eco-political self-determination, when compared to other theories,
more comprehensively enables the right of Indigenous peoples to decide for themselves how to
protect their cultural integrity (§4.5) and justifies Indigenous territorial rights in the face of some
of the central eco-political injustices of colonialism (§4.6). I conclude in §4.7 with some
considerations about how Indigenous territorial rights and Indigenous claims to corrective justice
could be fulfilled and institutionalized in practice.
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§4.1 AGAINST PROPERTY THEORIES
The first sort of theory of territory that I will consider conceptualizes territory in terms of
property and has its origins in John Locke. Two versions of this type of theory exist: an
individualist and a collectivist one. On the individualist account, a state’s territorial rights derives
from the natural property rights of individuals who consent to the state’s authority (Steiner 1996;
Simmons 2001). Individuals acquire exclusive rights to private property according to the familiar
Lockean story by mixing their labor with land and external objects (Locke 1690, 2.27). To secure
their property holdings and natural rights, individuals contractually agree with one another to be
governed by the common political authority of a state, which entails having their property
incorporated into the state’s jurisdiction. A state’s territorial rights thus results from the natural
property rights of individuals and their contractual agreements.
In contrast, on the collectivist account, territorial rights are not derived from but analogous
to individual property rights (Nine 2012). Peoples, understood as collective agents, directly acquire
territorial rights by transforming land through their collective labor and creating morally valuable
relationships that realize the values of justice, desert, efficiency, and autonomy. Collectivist
accounts do not appeal to the consent of individual property holders to legitimize political authority
so as to avoid the familiar problems that consent-based individualist theories face, such as
explaining how states are able to establish legitimate continuous boundaries (what if certain
property holders withhold their consent?) and overcoming the fact that most individuals have
rarely if ever freely consented to their state’s jurisdiction.68
On the face of it, taking theoretical inspiration from Locke seems problematic for
constructing a theory of territorial rights for Indigenous peoples because Locke’s own views are
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rife with colonialist assumptions and implications (Tully 1993; Arneil 1996; Armitage 2004).
Locke characterized Native Americans as existing in a state of nature and failed to recognize the
sovereignty of their political societies or their territorial claims, which thus enabled the
justification of European appropriation of Native American lands without their consent. As Locke
put it, “Thus in the beginning all the world was America” (1690, 2.47). Additionally for Locke,
the labor needed to generate property rights was conceptualized in European (and specifically
English) modes of enclosing and cultivating the land, which he contrasted against the idleness and
wastefulness of Native Americans. “[F]or I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste
of America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage, or husbandry, a thousand acres yield
the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences of life as ten acres equally fertile land
do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated?” (2.37). Later, Locke revises the ratio of the
value extracted from land by the Native American versus the English from one-hundredth to onethousandth and claims that the profit a Native American receives in one year from an acre of land
is possibly not even worth a penny (2.43). The claims of Native Americans are limited to
“unassisted nature” or its “spontaneous products” that they have hunted or gathered since they do
not labor in the requisite agrarian manner to gain rights to the land itself (2.42, 2.37).
For Locke (1690, 2.27, 2.38), the acquisition of land is limited by two provisos: so long as
“enough and as good” is left for others and the products of one’s land does not spoil (2.27, 2.38).
For some commentators, these two provisos represent strains of ecological sustainability within
Locke’s thinking since they imply that the productivity of natural systems should be maintained
and that nothing should go to waste (Trachtenberg 2014, 107). However, both provisos for Locke
are in fact bound up with justifications for colonialism. Locke saw America as a vast (nearly
unlimited) and vacant land—terra nullius, vacuum domicilium. Thus, European colonists were
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justified in appropriating as much land as they desired since there would always be “enough and
as good” leftover for Native Americans (2.33, 2.36). Rather than injuring Native Americans,
colonists in fact benefitted them by enclosing and making the land far more productive through
their labor—so much so that Native Americans end up obliged to colonists as their beneficiaries.
“[T]he inhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by his industry on neglected, and
consequently waste land, has increased the stock of corn, which they wanted” (2.36). Some critics
contend that the “enough and as good” proviso is ultimately transcended as a restriction on
appropriation with the creation of private property since labor increases productivity so much so
that everyone will benefit and will have the opportunity to acquire the necessities for life (Buckle
1993; Macpherson 1962). In other words, there will always be “enough and as good” once private
property enters the picture. Thus, the “enough and as good” proviso is insufficient on its own, at
least without theoretical reconceptualization, to ground a duty of ecological sustainability in
Locke.69
Consider next the spoilage proviso where leaving one’s land to spoil allows others who can
make productive use of that land to appropriate it as their own property. The spoilage proviso too
is ultimately overcome since the invention of money enables one’s property to be stored in a nonperishable form (e.g. gold and silver coins) (Locke 1690, 2.47, 2.48). Since Native Americans did
not use money, according to Locke, any spoilage on their lands justified their appropriation by
European colonists who could avoid it. Additionally, without money for trading on the
international market and increasing their riches, Native Americans would have no desire to
appropriate land beyond what was needed for their own subsistence. Locke makes clear that those
with money (i.e. Europeans) have a right to greater possessions: “The invention of money, and the
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tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions, and a right
to them” (2.36). And by tacitly consenting to the use of money, “men have agreed to a
disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth” (2.50). C. B. Macpherson (1962) has even
concluded that Locke’s theory of property in fact serves to justify unlimited capitalist accumulation.
In sum, property for Locke was itself conceptualized through colonialist comparisons
between Europeans and Native Americans where the former was defined in terms of what the latter
lacked and vice versa. The form of labor necessary for acquiring property in land was specifically
agrarian and tied to participation in international markets and arguably capitalist modes of
production. Given the fact that Locke himself was personally involved in British colonialism and
invested in the African slave trade through the Royal African Company (17th century colonialism,
slavery, and capitalism were, of course, all intertwined as both Native Americans and Africans
were enslaved so that their labor could be exploited), his views should perhaps be unsurprising.
Additionally, as the secretary of the Carolina colony, Locke helped to draft its Fundamental
Constitutions that granted masters absolute power over their slaves, which David Armitage (2004)
suggests likely took place at the same time that Locke wrote Chapter V of the Second Treatise
regarding property.
Are the colonialist assumptions and implications underpinning Locke’s own theory also
present in contemporary property accounts of territory influenced by him? The first point to note
is that defenders of such property accounts of territory explicitly import Lockean ideas without
explicitly challenging their colonialist connections. Both A. John Simmons (2001, 316–17) and
Cara Nine (2012, 82), for instance, take on board the Lockean notion that labor is what ultimately
generates territorial rights. However, neither theorist considers whether and how the notion that
labor grounds territorial rights can be conceived without the colonialist baggage that Locke saddled
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it with—namely, labor for Locke was always bound up in agrarian and market-oriented (even
capitalist) modes that excluded the territorial claims of Native Americans. Nine follows Locke in
her examples of how collectives generate value on land through their labor by pointing to
“particular forms of agriculture” and market systems that “determine and create value in land and
all of the products coming from the land” (82). Simmons too speaks in market-oriented terms of
“intended products and windfalls” flowing from labor and “past productive use of land” (317, 319).
Additionally, both Simmons (2001) and Burke Hendrix (2008) employ Locke’s “enough
and as good” proviso to argue for the limitation of Indigenous territorial rights. For Simmons
(2001), “the compelling historical claims to control over territory made by the descendants of some
aboriginal peoples, though perfectly legitimate in Lockean terms, may not be precisely delineable
due to the requirement that claims to large amounts of land (such as those necessary to a
hunter/gatherer economy) may have to be ‘downsized’ in the face of the needs of other potential
users (in order to leave ‘enough and as good for others’)” (319). Note that Simmons, like Locke,
simplistically characterizes Indigenous peoples as primarily engaged in hunting and gathering
rather than agrarian market-oriented forms of labor and ignores the other forms of agriculture that
Native Americans practiced (Tully 1993, 156). As an example of both the structure of an
independent Indigenous political society and Indigenous stewardship of the land, Kyle Whyte
(2016b) points to how “Anishinaabe peoples (including Ojibwe, Ottawa, and Potawatomi societies)
practiced a season round system of self-governance, in which structures of political authority
changed throughout the year depending on what people believed to be the best way to steward
ecosystems for optimal harvesting of plants and animals, with multispecies forms of responsibility
connected to clan and family systems” (95).
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Agreeing with Simmons, Hendrix (2008) writes, “existing property claims are always
complicated by considerations of fairness toward newcomers, and… these limitations are
especially sharp for those whose wealth comes primarily from natural resources in their unaltered
condition. This suggests that those who claimed that indigenous peoples initially held more land
than they could claim ownership over probably have something in their favor, at least so long as
there were some in need, as seems to have been true” (57). Hendrix implies here, in Lockean
fashion, that the wealth of Indigenous peoples does not primarily originate from their labor but
from unassisted nature. Note that the newcomers to Indigenous territories whose moral claims
Simmons and Hendrix are so concerned with are in fact colonialist settlers. Whereas Locke saw
America as vast and vacant and so legitimately open for colonialist appropriation because enough
and as good would be left for Native Americans, contemporary theorists contend that Native
Americans must leave enough and as good for new settlers. So, though the treatment of the proviso
morphs in contemporary theories, nonetheless it is not used to ground or protect Indigenous
territorial rights but rather still serves to legitimize settler colonialism.
Of course, unlike Locke, contemporary theorists do not self-consciously see themselves as
justifying but rather as rejecting colonialism. The Lockean approach of grounding territorial rights
in natural property rights can seem to be a strategic way of defending the historical land claims of
Indigenous peoples since natural rights purport to have force regardless of social or political
circumstances (as opposed to conventional understandings of property rights) (Moore 2015, 19;
Hendrix 2008, 38). The territorial claims made by Indigenous peoples, as Simmons (2001) says,
“speak to us in a Lockean voice” (316). So perhaps a Lockean framework can be rehabilitated
from the colonialism of Locke’s own thinking to defend Indigenous territorial rights. James Tully
(1993, 153, 156) thought that this was possible. Had Locke appreciated the facts that Indigenous
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peoples (a) did indeed exist as self-governing political societies (rather than in a state of nature)
and (b) labored on land through generally ecologically sound practices of hunting, gathering,
trapping, fishing, and non-sedentary agriculture (if not the specific European form of agrarian
cultivation), then Locke should have recognized Indigenous claims to property and territory
according to his own criteria.
It is not altogether clear to me that this sort of rehabilitation of a Lockean approach can be
carried out so easily as if the problem lies simply in Locke’s appreciation of the relevant facts and
his application of his theory rather than the colonialist logics more deeply embedded within his
theoretical commitments. The fact that colonialist resonances continue to appear in contemporary
neo-Lockean theories suggest the problem may be more the latter than the former. Barbara Arneil
(1996) has gone so far as to say, “[s]ince its inception, the natural right to property has been defined
in such a way as necessarily to exclude non-Europeans from being able to exercise it” (209;
emphasis mine).
In addition to the colonialist logics operating in Locke’s views, conceptualizing territory
in terms of property is unable to adequately theorize, as I mentioned in the Introduction, the duties
of ecological sustainability and stewardship that territory seems to entail as something held in trust
for future generations (Kolers 2009, 27). The primary function of property rights is to enable the
rights-holder to have control over the use of and benefits that flow from her property.
Responsibilities to ecologically sustain one’s property cannot be ordinarily or easily generated
from within a property framework alone. In the limit case, for Locke (1690), “[man] may even
destroy the thing, that he has property in by his use of it, where need requires,” much less have an
obligation to sustain it (1.92). As we have seen, the Lockean provisos to avoid spoilage and to
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leave “enough and as good” for others are themselves inadequate for limiting appropriation or
countenancing sustainability and any restrictions are ultimately transcended in the end.
Additionally, by requiring human labor to transform land to create value (99% of the total
value in land is generated by labor according to Locke’s calculation) (2.40), Lockean property is
fundamentally anthropocentric in its conceptualization of value and purely instrumentalizes the
natural world as passive resources to be exploited (Trachtenberg 2014, 106). Of course, for a
people to sustain an ecologically responsible relationship to its territory will often require not
changing or transforming it but rather leaving it be. Ultimately, however, the entire dichotomy of
labor transformation versus leaving nature be is itself a product of Locke’s problematic form of
anthropocentrism (either we humans act or fail to act on nature) and ignores the complex web of
mutually interdependent relationships that living beings (human and otherwise) and abiotic entities
have to other co-inhabitants and members of their ecosystems.
This anti-ecological strain is also evident in contemporary neo-Lockean accounts.
According to Nine’s (2012) theory, “in order to acquire a right over a good, (i) an agent must be
capable of changing the land thereby creating a relationship with it, and (ii) this relationship must
be morally valuable—established through the fundamental liberal concern for basic individual
needs expressed in terms of principles of desert, efficiency, and autonomy” (82). Nine is not clear
about how the values of desert, efficiency, and autonomy are supposed to balance against one
another (especially if they come into conflict) or to fit together all in the same framework as various
expression of justice (which Nine cashes out in terms of individual basic needs and takes to be the
function of territorial rights). Moore (2015, 23) also points out that a concern for justice sits
uneasily within a Lockean framework since a people could establish institutions transforming and
creating value on its land, which would thereby ground territorial rights, while at the same time be
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violating human rights. Most importantly though, Nine’s theory makes no mention of any
ecological component of sustainability or stewardship as a value that a people must secure. Perhaps
Nine’s principle of efficiency could be interpreted as incorporating an element of ecological
sustainability because unsustainable uses of land might be inefficient in meeting basic human
needs. But of course, efficiency and sustainability are distinct values: one could both efficiently
and unsustainably use land to meet basic human needs in the present (perhaps, for instance, via
extractive industries within capitalism).
Regardless, Nine’s efficiency criterion proves incoherent. Nine (2012) claims that
efficiency is spelled out in both comparative terms (an agent has a better claim to land if they use
it more efficiently) and non-maximizing terms (so as to avoid the instability of constantly shifting
territorial rights to the agent that uses it most efficiently), even though efficiency comparisons
seem inherently to imply a maximum (88–90). According to Nine, one reason to prefer a nonmaximizing understanding of efficiency is that “a system of non-maximizing rights to land can be
described as the most efficient use of the land,” which paradoxically employs a maximizing
justification for a non-maximizing system (90). The structure of Nine’s argument is reminiscent
of justifications for rule-utilitarianism, but she does not deal with any of the familiar objections to
these sorts of arguments such as the criticism that rule-utilitarianism collapses into actutilitarianism: namely, rules to not maximize x (where x might be utility for the rule-utilitarian or
efficiency for Nine) justified on the basis that such rules do maximize x simply reduce to a reason
to maximize x. My diagnosis of Nine’s position is that she saw how the grammar of maximizing
efficient use of land was problematic (whether ecologically or for another reason) but nonetheless
was bound by her commitments to a Lockean framework to the value of efficiency. The
contradictory efficiency criterion that Nine ends up adopting, then, is the failed result of her
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attempt to square the Lockean circle. The notion of the efficient transformation of land still risks
following Locke in viewing territory in purely instrumental terms and participating (at least
implicitly) in capitalist or other exploitative and ecologically unsound economic frameworks. In
the end, efficiency is inadequate for comprehensively theorizing a people’s ecological relationship
to its territory.
Even if a Lockean approach toward territory could be rehabilitated from its colonialist and
anti-ecological baggage—by, for instance, expanding the notion of labor to include diverse ways
of relating to or generating value in land beyond just agrarian, market-oriented, and purely
instrumentalist modes—any such rehabilitated account would encounter the following sort of
dilemma. Namely, the more one moves away from Locke’s colonialist and ecologically suspect
frameworks, the less clear it is that the grammar of labor and property is doing any theoretical
work besides merely saying that territorial rights-holders have a morally valuable relationship to
their land. But of course, virtually all theories say something to this effect.70 The notion of mixing
labor with an object to generate value and property rights was already quite metaphorical in Locke
and was filled in with colonialist, capitalist, and anti-ecological content. If that content could be
removed, that would still leave one with an empty metaphor but not a theory. I think Nine’s
modification of the individualist Lockean picture illustrates this dilemma well in her very
straddling of it. She conceptualizes territorial rights as analogous but not equivalent to property
rights and thinks a people’s collective labor can generate different sorts of value in land (including
justice, desert, efficiency, and autonomy). But then it is not clear whether the notions of collective
labor and property, if stripped of Locke’s problematic baggage, would really be doing any work

As Moore (2015, 26) points out: “On the jurisdictional domain view, when we say that state S has territorial rights
in land L, what we mean is that the state (or state-like entity) has rights to jurisdiction over the land; that this
jurisdictional authority is justified by appeal to a particular moral value V; and that the land is the domain in which
the jurisdictional authority is exercised” (26).
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for her since she admits territory is not exactly like property and it is the values she appeals to that
matter and not labor per se.

§4.2 AGAINST LEGITIMATE STATE THEORIES
Consider next legitimate state theories according to which states should be granted
territorial rights so long as they meet certain standards of legitimacy, which differ from theory to
theory but generally include conditions such as the protection of basic rights, the rule of law, and
possibly even opportunities for political participation, which may or may not require democracy
(Buchanan 2007; Altman and Wellman 2009; Stilz 2011). Since legitimate state theories often take
modern nation-states to be the appropriate type of entity to hold territorial rights, one immediate
problem that these theories face when accounting for Indigenous territorial rights is that Indigenous
peoples generally do not (and did not) have modern nation-states. “Modern states,” notes Altman
and Wellman (2009), “are distinguished from other ways of organizing politics by their claim to
sovereignty over a demarcated territory, their unified system of law and governance within the
territory, and their extensive regulation of social life by means of legal institutions and an
administrative bureaucracy” (10n2).71
To avoid this problem, some legitimate state theories modify their conception of the state
to encompass a broader range of political institutions beyond that of simply the modern nationstate. Buchanan (2007, 237), for instance, defines a state as “a persisting structure of institutions
for wielding political power” (237). And Stilz ( 2019) in her later work conceives of a state as “a
public-law making authority with the power of enforcement” that features “(i) binding collective
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See also Morris (1998, 45–46) whom Altman and Wellman cite.
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rule setting and (ii) the ability to enforce its determinations in case of disputes” (14).72 But what if
the political institutions of a group are destroyed or its capacities to rule thoroughly undermined,
as has historically been the case for many Indigenous peoples due to colonialist injustices? Since
these groups may no longer have a state (or a single state that persisted through colonialist
injustices) even according to a broad understanding of a state, then there would be no candidate
entity to hold territorial rights in such cases. It seems then that it should be the people and not their
political institutions that should be seen as the primary holder of territorial rights. Perhaps a
legitimate state theory could help itself to a theory of corrective justice here according to which a
group that has lost its state due to injustices is owed the restoration of its statehood. But the
normative resources of corrective justice would be external to the legitimate state theory, as I point
out later, and in any case, a corrective justice theory would still need a social ontology according
to which it is the group and not its state that holds certain rights.
A second problem facing legitimate state theories (which I already mentioned in Chapter
1) is that they may license the benevolent colonization or annexation of illegitimate states (Stilz
2011, 590). Legitimate state theories seem to imply that failed or unjust states (even broadly
understood) can be annexed by other states so long as the conquering or colonizing states establish
the necessary levels of legitimate governance afterward. Again, perhaps a legitimate state theory
could help itself to a theory of just war according to which other conditions must be met to license
the invasion and occupation of another state (e.g. just cause, necessity, proportionality, etc.) and
so conquering an illegitimate state would not be automatically permitted just by dint of that state’s
illegitimacy (Stilz 2019, 131). But suppose, for the sake of argument, a legitimate state was even

See also Banai (2014) who defends a diversified account according to which “any system of law and government
that meet minimal conditions of stability and functionality may (i.e. subject to specified criteria of legitimacy) qualify
as a holder of territorial rights” (148).
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permitted to conquer an illegitimate state belonging to an Indigenous people. So long as the
legitimate state incorporated the members of that Indigenous peoples into its citizenry, protected
their basic rights, governed them by the rule of law, and provided them rights to political
participation, then the Indigenous people would have no grounds to complain, according to
legitimate state theories.
But it seems like the Indigenous people would have such grounds. Insofar as the Indigenous
people is engaged in its own common activities, then it would have a group right to selfdetermination, which would not be respected if members of the Indigenous people were simply
assimilated as individual citizens into a larger host colonialist state.73 As Stilz (2019, 131–32)
explains, the legitimate state may only have a temporary enforcement permission to rule the
Indigenous people in this case (where the Indigenous people had an illegitimate state and the
conditions of just war theory were satisfied) under the condition that it aims to facilitate the future
realization of the Indigenous people’s own self-determination. The legitimate state would not have
a claim-right held against other competitors (such as a future legitimate Indigenous state) to be the
preferred ruler of the territory and its population. Moreover, I will also note here that even if an
Indigenous people had a somewhat illegitimate state and so would not have the claim-right to rule
its territory, it may not only have (a) the permission to use force to govern (for the same reason as
Stilz’s above) but also (b) the liberty right to the opportunity to—or, in other words, the permission
to attempt to—fully satisfy the conditions needed to justify granting it territorial rights, especially
if (according to my eco-political theory) it meets the other conditions aside from the threshold of
legitimacy that serve to ground territorial rights.
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Legitimate state theories generally do not consider self-determination to be a condition for legitimacy (Buchanan
2007; Altman and Wellman 2009) and/or do not offer a plausible account of the value of self-determination. On the
latter count, see my criticisms of Altman and Wellman (2009) and Stilz (2019) in Chapter 2.
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A final problem with legitimate state theories is that, as functionalist and performancebased theories, they are focused on whether states meet certain conditions of legitimacy in the here
and now and so are not adequately backward-looking and ignore past colonialist injustices. Even
if a legitimate state theory were supplemented by backward-looking and corrective justice
concerns, they could not adequately explain on their own merits and internal to their theories why
the particular rectificatory measures needed would involve granting Indigenous peoples territorial
rights of their own, rather than subsuming them into legitimate host colonial state. Legitimacy,
while a necessary condition for political entities to hold territorial rights on behalf of their peoples,
is by itself insufficient for justifying territorial rights and so inadequate for grounding such rights
for Indigenous peoples.

§4.3 AGAINST CULTURAL NATIONALIST THEORIES
The third type of theory of territory that I will consider is the cultural nationalist account
that accords territorial rights to nations, understood as a distinctive kind of pre-political group
marked by certain shared cultural features (Margalit and Raz 1990; Tamir 1993; D. Miller 1995;
2000; 2012; Meisels 2009). Different theories characterize the relevant cultural features in
different ways, which may include among other things, political, historical, linguistic, or other
identity markers. To give one of the more prominent definitions as an example, David Miller (1995)
describes a nation as “a community (1) constituted by shared beliefs and a mutual commitment,
(2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5)
marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture” (27). Later, Miller also allows
language to count as an element of a common nationality (98). For cultural nationalists, nations
acquire territorial rights by transforming the land in ways that add both material and symbolic
value—the former through cultivation and the creation of buildings, roads, waterways, and so on,
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and the latter as a result of historical events taking place on a specific site or rituals and practices
marking out certain places as sacred or holding special significance (D. Miller 2012, 259).
As I mentioned in §1.1, cultural nationalists face the challenge of defining the slippery and
controversial notion of nationhood, particularly so that it does not collapse into problematic forms
of ethnic or racial nationalism (Dahbour 2003; Abizadeh 2012, 868–73). To appreciate the deep
nature of this challenge, recall again that cultural nationalist accounts aim to identify a pre-political
entity to ground territorial rights.74 Nations, for Miller (1995), are not supposed to simply be the
effect of “political imposition” but are instead meant to arise “more or less spontaneously” from
the “authentic” beliefs, commitments, histories, character, etc. shared by its members (40).
However, nations are, of course, both socially and politically constructed and, indeed, must be
according to the very reason given for granting them territorial rights. The whole point of according
nations rights to political jurisdiction and territorial authority is to ensure the political means by
which they can protect and shape their cultures.
As Arash Abizadeh (2012) argues, the dilemma of establishing a prepolitical ground for
territorial rights that cannot help but be a political project means that “the cultural nation must go
casting about for an extracultural supplement to anchor its boundaries in space and time,” which
“is precisely what ethnicity, constituted by a myth of common descent, purports to supply” (873).
Cultural nationalism thus risk collapsing into ethnic nationalism where nationhood is defined in
terms of ascriptive features of identity rather than socially acquired characteristics that can in
principle be changed. Liberal nationalists in moving from ethnicity to culture, however, were
precisely seeking to avoid grounding rights in such ascriptive and arbitrary identity markers. In
public discourses, the xenophobic and nationalist rhetoric of far-right populists who code racist

Abizadeh (2012) glosses prepolitical as “prior, both causally and constitutively, to the exercise of political power”
(868-69).
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agendas in calls for cultural purity (but increasingly do not even bother to obscure their racism in
coded terms), which of course liberal nationalists would themselves condemn, can be seen as
extreme instantiations of this very tendency of cultural nationalism to collapse into ethnic
nationalism. The specter of ethnic and racist xenophobia continues to haunt nationalist accounts
despite their culturalized rendering. Cultural nationalist accounts may thus serve to exacerbate
rather than resolve ethnic, cultural, and nationalist tensions.
The problems that cultural nationalists face in defining a stable cultural target to ground
territorial rights intersect with and parallel the problems of defining a stable conception of
Indigenous culture, which arise especially in the contexts of international and state legal systems.
Numerous elements for defining Indigeneity have been proposed including prior or original
occupancy of a place, traditional cultures or distinctiveness from the dominant culture, connections
to a land and its ecology, ethnic or racial components, self-identification as Indigenous, and
subjection to colonization, among other possible items (Cobo 1986; Holm, Pearson, and Chavis
2003; Corntassel 2003; Kenrick and Lewis 2004; Mende 2015; Whyte 2016a; 2016b). Both
defining Indigeneity and grounding Indigenous territorial rights primarily in terms of a determinate
cultural nation, however, raise various related problems. Attempts at isolating what counts as
Indigenous culture often entails adopting a static, essentialist, and past-bound conception of
Indigenous identity. However, most theorists emphasize the need to recognize the dynamic,
relational, flexible, constructed, and contemporary-lived nature of Indigeneity (Macklem 1995;
Young 2002; Corntassel 2003; Kenrick and Lewis 2004; Moore 2005; Mende 2015). Culture, after
all, does not belong to discrete and hermetically sealed entities but rather cuts across different
dimensions of identity and is entangled in numerous interlocking allegiances.
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The problems of defining Indigeneity primarily or solely in terms of culture are not simply
conceptual but rather play out through the policies of host states that re-inscribe colonialism in
various ways. Reducing Indigenous claims to distinctive or traditional cultural grounds often
works to distill Indigenous identity into pre-political and essentialized caricatures that then serve
to re-entrench a colonial logic of governmentality. Glen Coulthard (2014) has demonstrated how
framing Indigenous claims in terms of a politics of recognition, for instance through the
multicultural respect for difference and diversity, can actually reproduce asymmetrical and
nonreciprocal colonial power relations between states and Indigenous peoples. Melissa Williams
(2014) likewise points out that state recognition and accommodation tends to “culturalize”
Indigenous self-determination and to “see like a state”—that is, “to render subaltern groups legible
by delineating the boundaries of their membership and to render them governable.” She furthers,
“State recognition of the claims of the subaltern is made conditional on their conformity to the
norms and expectations that are most conducive to the state’s capacity to manage social conflict,
to maintain its moral authority to govern, and to secure the conditions of economic growth” (5, 7).
Consider too Duncan Ivison’s (2002, 42) observation that the definition of “national
cultures” “either privileges a certain kind of cultural identity conveniently amenable to liberal
norms, or if not, demonises them as ripe for legitimate liberal intervention” (42).75 Applied more
specifically to the context of mainstream liberal nationalist and liberal legitimacy theories of
territorial rights, I take the lesson of Ivison’s observation here to be an empirical point about how
liberal theories of these sorts tend to ignore, obscure, and even undermine the particular claims of
Indigenous peoples. More specifically, cultural nationalist theories and legitimate state theories
both tend to assume, at least implicitly, modern nation-states as their primary context of application.
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Ivison is drawing off Homi Bhabha’s (1994, 175) work here.
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Even though cultural nationalist accounts claim to be including Indigenous cultural nations and
not merely states, their conceptions of nationhood implicitly privilege the sorts of cultures
belonging to modern liberal states. This consequently threatens to characterize Indigenous claims
in ways so as to make them governable by certain (albeit, inadequately reworked) liberal norms—
a sort of liberal colonial governmentality. Or, on the other hand, culture is taken to be problematic
for liberalism, perhaps because it generates particularist claims and threatens liberalism’s
universalism, and so liberal legitimate state theories end up permitting or perpetuating
encroachments on the claims of Indigenous peoples seen as problematic cultural groups (an
incarnation of the annexation objection).76
To be sure, Ivison’s observation here (and my application of it) is not a conceptual
objection to an abstract and ideal type of cultural nationalism or liberal state theory, interpreted in
maximally charitable ways. The most sophisticated theories of liberal nationalism,
multiculturalism, and liberal legitimacy do make good faith attempts to avoid falling into either a
sort of liberal governmentality, on the one hand, or a legitimate interventionism, on the other. And
like Ivison (who defends what he calls postcolonial liberalism), I think that the problem is not
inherently with liberalism per se and that the solution is not to jettison liberalism wholesale but to
critically re-conceptualize and rehabilitate it. But nevertheless, Ivison’s remark (and my extension
thereof) shows us what is at stake when it comes to justifying and accounting for Indigenous
territorial claims. Although not engaged in argumentation against “pure” (others might say
“sanitized”) theories, such a “hermeneutics of suspicion,” as it were, is valuable in serving to

Take, for instance, John A. Macdonald’s (the first prime minister of Canada) following remark in 1887 in reference
to The Indian Act: “The great aim of our legislation has been to do away with the tribal system and assimilate the
Indian people in all respects with the inhabitants of the Dominion, as speedily as they are fit for change” (Joseph 2016).
One way to understand (at least a part of) the ideology at work here, I think, is as an unapologetic defense of the
legitimacy of Western liberal norms in order to license a type of liberal colonialism and cultural assimilation.
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unmask and criticize the ideologies at work in actual (and so not ideal) but nonetheless frequently
circulated ideas or theories of cultural nationalism and liberal legitimacy.
The membership criteria of U.S. federally recognized Tribes (e.g. Citizen Potawatomi
Nation or Navajo Nation) or U.S. federal programs (which are not the same as belonging to an
Indigenous people) are a good example of such a politics of recognition based on defining
Indigenous culture in essentialized ways in order to re-entrench colonial governmentality. Many
federally recognized Tribes stem from U.S. policies (particularly in the 1930s) that were designed
to pressure Tribes to adopt certain government structures and membership criteria in order to
facilitate the leasing of their territories to various extractive industries such as oil (Whyte 2016b,
92). Additionally, the “Indian blood” quantum criterion that governs enrollment qualifications in
some U.S. federal programs and Tribes can be understood as an instantiation of a cultural category
collapsing into a racial category in the pursuit for a stable pre-political anchor for identity, which
measures of “blood” illusorily promise.
In contrast to the essentialized and ossified conceptions of Indigenous culture that state
policies generally employ, Indigenous peoples often adopt membership practices outside of the
state context, which recognize the relational and dynamic structure of Indigeneity. Drawing on
Kim TallBear’s (2007) work, Whyte (2016b) notes that “many of the indigenous peoples in North
America have rich systems of membership based on family, clan, or other kinship identities;
culturally specific processes for being recognized as a community member; and processes
appropriate for the ongoing reality that there has been constant intermingling across different
peoples and communities” (91). Kristy Gover (2014) likewise highlights how various Indigenous
peoples have constructed a “collateral” inter-Indigenous political-legal order that recognizes
“exogenous” Indigeneity for members of other Tribes and even individuals who self-identify as
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Indigenous but are not members of state-recognized Tribes or do not live on tribal territories. In
this way, Indigenous peoples operate outside of and subvert the colonial authority of states to
define who does and does not count as Indigenous. As Whyte (2016b) has argued, the very
difficulties, dilemmas, conflicts, and misuses that arise in conceptualizing Indigenous identity
should themselves be understood as an oppressive function and effect of settler colonialism’s
erasure of Indigenous peoples in their homelands. Oppression, after all, often works precisely
through the imposition of dilemmas and double binds on the oppressed. The problem that cultural
nationalist accounts are unable to provide a determinate target of culture to ground territorial rights
is thus exacerbated in the case of Indigenous peoples since the search for a pre-political,
essentialized, and culturalized understanding of Indigeneity is bound up in multifaceted ways with
the colonialist policies and structures of host states. Even if hypothetically a determinate
conception of culture could be provided (and we may still need a notion of culture in other contexts,
but one that can admit of relationality and flexibility and need not be so determinate so as to ground
territorial rights), there would still be serious practical difficulties in employing a cultural
nationalist account to defend Indigenous territorial rights due to the nature of existing colonialist
dynamics and practices of host states.
Another issue with cultural nationalist accounts is that they often import Lockean notions
of transforming the land through labor and mixing culture with land, which as we have seen is also
generally underpinned by colonialist and anti-ecological baggage. Tamar Meisels (2009), for
instance, writes, “When individual members of a nation settle a territory (i.e. when they form a
colony, build a town or city), they not only change the terrain in question but, rather, they reform
it and shape it in the light of their national culture” and even specifically mentions the colonialist
settlement of the New World as an example of the cultural transformation of territory (126-27).
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Miller (2007) likewise says, “the territory will in nearly every case be shaped over time according
to the cultural priorities of the people, as fields are marked out and cultivated; irrigation systems
are created; villages, towns, and cities are built; and so forth, so that eventually the face of the
landscape may be changed beyond recognition” (218). Miller also emphasizes the symbolic
significance with which a nation endows its particular piece of land in virtue of culturally
transforming it, establishing monuments on it, creating artworks about it, etc.
This theoretical framework of culturally shaping and transforming territory so totally that
it is “changed beyond recognition” is eerily reminiscent of the very processes by which settler
colonialism operates to erase Indigenous homelands and to create settler homelands in their stead.
Settler colonialism involves physically inscribing and carving out a homeland that reflects settler
cultures, values, ways of life, economic systems, and histories on a territory already occupied by
Indigenous populations (Whyte 2016b, 96; Tuck and Yang 2012). Moreover, as part of claiming a
place as their own and legitimating their right to live there, settlers create colonialist narratives,
myths, and ideologies (e.g. Manifest Destiny or “American the Beautiful”) that constructs
themselves as the “Indigenous” inhabitants of the land or symbolically frames their settler
homelands as natural or inevitable. While Miller might be right that groups endow their lands with
symbolic significance, not all symbols are equally valid or valuable. This is not to say that cultural
nationalist accounts necessarily justify the simultaneous homeland erasure and recreation of settler
colonialism (just as they may not necessarily collapse into ethnic nationalism), but it is also unclear
how they do not seriously risk these dangers. And we should hope for more out of our theories
than the fact that they do not necessarily justify injustices but that they proactively avoid and
counter these injustices. The tendency for cultural nationalist accounts to slip into justifications for
colonialism is in fact evidenced by Meisels herself who uses the colonization of the New World
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as an example of the sort of cultural transformation that would ground territorial rights. The
Lockean grammar of transforming land whether for productive use (of the agrarian and marketoriented kinds) or for cultural ends remains inadequate for a thoroughly decolonizing and
ecologically sound theory of territory.

§4.4 AN ECO-POLITICAL THEORY OF TERRITORY FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
How then does my eco-political theory fare when it comes to accounting for the territorial
rights of Indigenous peoples? To start, let me reiterate the fundamental elements of an eco-political
theory of territory. I take a people (and not a nation or a state), understood as a group of individuals
engaged in common activities that are rooted in or attached to a place and that aim at the
overarching end of independent governance, to be the appropriate type of entity that is eligible to
hold territorial rights. A principle of eco-political self-determination (and not labor, mere
legitimacy, or national self-determination) is the core ground upon which a people’s territorial
rights are justified. Because the self-determination of a people involves determining common
activities rooted in and attached to a place, a people’s right to self-determination is inextricably
and normatively bound up with a duty of ecological sustainability and a right to ecological integrity.
A people sustaining its ecosystems is both a material precondition for and constituted partly by the
people’s own self-determination. Perpetuating the ecosystems upon which a people’s common
activities are taking place is a prerequisite for human life, political society, and a people’s capacity
to exercise its self-determination over those activities. And for a people to sustain its territory’s
ecosystems just is in part for the people to set the terms of its common activities that make up a
component of those ecosystems. Additionally, a people’s right to ecological integrity is also a
constituent part of its external self-determination. If outsiders undermine the viability or health of
a people’s ecosystems, then they are ipso facto interfering with a people’s governance over their
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common activities that take place upon and are a very part of those ecosystems. This principle of
eco-political self-determination forms the core ground of my account as to what justifies a people’s
territorial rights.
The first point to note about my eco-political theory of territory is that it draws from and
builds upon the work of various Indigenous scholars who have charted the connections between
political self-determination and ecological sustainability and stewardship. Jeff Corntassel (2008),
for instance, develops the notion of “sustainable self-determination,” which “as a process is
premised on the notion that evolving indigenous livelihoods, food security, community governance,
relationships to homelands and the natural world, and ceremonial life can be practiced today
locally and regionally, thus enabling the transmission of these traditions and practices to future
generations” (119). Patricia Monture-Angus (1999, 36) also explains how Indigenous sovereignty
should be understood not necessarily in terms of the (political and jurisdictional) control of land
but rather as the “right to be responsible” rooted in a people’s close relationship to its land. She
thus helpfully shows how the right to self-determination and the duty of ecological sustainability
are fundamentally related to and bound up with one another, relationships which my eco-political
theory of territory explains and makes perspicuous.
Along similar lines, Whyte (2018b) develops a notion of “collective continuance,” which
stands at the convergence of the concepts of interdependence, systems of responsibilities, and
migration and “refers to a society’s capacity to self-determine how to adapt to change in ways that
avoid reasonably preventable harms” (131). The qualities of relationships and responsibilities that
support collective continuance include consent, diplomacy, trust, and redundancy. Collective
continuance for Whyte (2018a) itself describes an ecology, which refers to “both ecosystems but
also the calculated stewardship of them (hence the –logy)” (354). Ecology denotes systems or
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capacities not necessarily seeking to “bounce back toward some equilibrium” but rather as
“organized in ways that reflect more or less suitable adaptations to various metascale forces over
previous time (and what counts as suitable depends on perspective)” and so is constituted in part
by the sort of aforementioned qualities that facilitate a collective’s adaptive capacity (Whyte 2015,
147). Ecological sustainability for Indigenous peoples is thus understood not in terms of
development but rather in terms of resilience, resurgence, and “survivance” (Vizenor 1999) and as
already bound up with their political self-determination.

§4.5 INDIGENOUS RIGHTS TO SELF-DETERMINE THEIR OWN CULTURE
One advantage of justifying territorial rights primarily in a principle of eco-political (rather
than national) self-determination is that this enables Indigenous peoples to collective decide for
themselves how to understand, reclaim, restore, and renew their cultures without falling into the
dilemmas that cultural nationalist theories generate when grounding self-determination and
territorial rights in cultural nationhood. Since cultural imperialism, assimilation, appropriation, and
erasure have been and continue to be important ways in which colonialism threatens the interests
and rights of Indigenous peoples, one of the initial attractions of cultural nationalist theories, one
might think, is that they at least take seriously and even centralize cultural claims. However, as we
saw, the role that culture plays in cultural nationalist theories in fact risks collapsing into ethnic or
racial nationalism and perpetuating a colonial logic of governmentality. These problems are
generated when cultural nationalist theories make culture the very basis for self-determination and
territorial rights and shoehorn what is in fact dynamic and relational into something that ends up
being pre-political, static, and essentialized.
In contrast, since an eco-political theory takes self-determination and territorial rights to be
generated by the existence of place-based common activities and not grounded in cultural
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nationhood itself, the right to self-determination, conceptualized according to an eco-political
theory, enables Indigenous peoples to collectively decide for themselves how to understand,
restore, and defend their own cultural identities and claims (Bowen 2000, 15; Moore 2005, 283–
84). Rights to self-determine one’s own culture and identity can also help to explain the cultural
injustices of colonialism that undermined these rights. As Williams (2014) contends, “Just as
determining the rules by which individuals are recognized as indigenous is part of the selfconstituting power of indigenous peoples, indigenous communities are the only agents who should
be vested with the power to recognize the modes of expression and the forms of knowledge that
constitute their cultural identity” (12). Enabling Indigenous peoples to decide how to conceptualize
and protect their own cultures and identities respects their epistemic authority as the ones best
positioned to make such decisions (Moore 2005, 284). The epistemic injustices around Indigenous
identity that colonialism has inflicted and continues to inflict is one reason why Indigenous peoples
often defend an unlimited right to self-identification, especially in the context of international law
(despite the difficulties that such a right potentially raises in being abused to make illegitimate and
fraudulent claims of Indigeneity) (Corntassel and Primeau 1995, 348–49; Corntassel 2003). As I
noted above, Indigenous peoples have developed various nuanced systems and practices for
recognizing Indigeneity (including identities that are “exogenous” or at the interstices of
Indigenous/non-Indigenous), which adopt relational and dynamic conceptions of culture that
subvert the colonial authority of state-defined membership criteria.
An eco-political theory does not need to adopt any single substantive or thick conception
of Indigeneity. It is important to acknowledge that words such as “Indigenous,” “Aboriginal,”
“First Nations,” “Native Americans,” and “American Indian” are also terms of solidarity
developed in response to a common experience of colonialist oppression and encompass numerous
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diversities and specificities present among Indigenous peoples. No single monolithic Indigenous
culture or Indigenous identity exists. As Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel put it: “It is this
oppositional, place-based existence, along with the consciousness of being in struggle against the
dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign peoples that fundamentally
distinguishes Indigenous peoples from other peoples of the world” (Alfred and Corntassel 2005,
597). Even without a robust substantive conception of Indigeneity, the category of Indigenous
peoples, according to an eco-political theory, will still meaningfully refer to peoples who have
suffered from colonialist injustices.
Although an eco-political theory leaves it open for Indigenous peoples to define more
substantive conceptions of Indigeneity for themselves, I will point out that one important way of
conceptualizing Indigeneity is to highlight the very ecologies and place-based relationships of
Indigenous peoples (TallBear 2013). For Whyte (2016b), Indigeneity rarely entails merely
“coming before” or a prior original claim to place in a simple sense. Rather, according to the
understanding of Anishinaabe people, for exemplar, nativeness or Indigeneity often refers to “a
more complex intergenerational system of their place-based relationships connecting humans and
nonhuman beings (e.g., plants and animals), entities (e.g., spirits and sacred shrines), and systems
(e.g., seasonal cycles and forest landscapes) in the region” (144). Additionally, conceptions of
Indigeneity emerging from the Indigenous peoples’ movements (including such networks and
organizations as the Asian Indigenous Women’s Network and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues [UNPFII]) are at once political and ecological in terms of re-establishing Indigenous selfdetermination centered on protecting such intergenerational ecological systems. Although this
understanding of Indigeneity is not prescribed by an eco-political theory of territory, the two very
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much resonate with one another in their shared recognition of how politics and ecologies are bound
up with one another.
It is also important to note here that Indigenous self-determination should not be subsumed
under the broader category of the claims of national minorities (e.g. the Québécois) which are
defended by theories of multiculturalism. In general, multiculturalists, such as Will Kymlicka
(1995; 1998) or Alan Patten (2014), argue in favor of various sorts of special rights for minority
cultures (e.g. rights over certain issues concerning language, education, or other cultural affairs
and rights to special representation). One sort of argument for this view, which can be seen as a
modification of liberalism, is based on the fact that culture creates a context of choice and so is
needed for the protection of liberal values, such as autonomy, and the fact that minority cultures
suffer various sorts of disadvantages compared to the dominant culture. But Indigenous peoples
are not simply one cultural national minority among any other who suffers various forms of
disadvantage relative to the dominant culture by happenstance and is thus in need certain “special
rights.” Rather they were colonized; their lands were taken away; and their self-determination
violated; and so they need their territorial rights protected and corrective justice measure provided
(Maaka and Fleras 2000, 95, 108; Moore 2003, 92–93).
One reason to highlight this worry about reducing Indigenous self-determination claims to
the special rights of national minorities is because cultural nationalism, if it is unable to establish
a normative link between cultural nationhood and territorial rights, may end up collapsing into a
version of multiculturalism. To see this, recall that (as I mentioned in §1.1) one problem facing
cultural nationalist theories is that potential territorial rights-holders do not always share a common
culture and many political societies are multi-national, including both modern nation-states and
Indigenous peoples. It is unclear then why multi-national peoples should be broken up along
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nationalist lines with each nation having its own territorial rights, especially if these multi-national
groups are stable or have chosen to be a part of the same political society (Moore 2001, 57–58;
Nine 2012, 62–63). But then if cultural nationhood cannot justify granting territorial rights to
different nations, then the claims of culture seem just to reduce to those held by different nations
(including especially minority nations) all within a single territorial rights-holder, which is how
multiculturalist accounts conceptualize such claims. But again, Indigenous peoples are not simply
one minority nation among many within a multicultural “melting pot” society.

§4.5 EXPLAINING COLONIALIST INJUSTICES AND THE
ECO-POLITICAL NATURE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
To be sure, so long as a theory justifies a right to self-determination not grounded in cultural
nationhood, then it will be able to justify the right of Indigenous peoples to decide for themselves
how to understand and protect their cultures even if it is not identical with my eco-political theory
of territory. The key strength of an eco-political theory, however, cannot be captured by just any
theory that justifies the right to self-determination not grounded in culture. By showing the
connections between ecological sustainability, ecological integrity, and political selfdetermination, the principle of eco-political self-determination is able to explain many of the
central wrongs of settler colonialism and to comprehensively articulate and justify the claims of
Indigenous peoples especially in response to such wrongs. As I noted earlier in §4.3, settler
colonialism involves physically inscribing and carving out settler homelands, or as D. Ezra Miller
(2016) terms it “settlerscapes,” through erasing and replacing Indigenous homelands (Whyte
2016b, 96; Tuck and Yang 2012). Settler populations thus work to create their own ecologies out
of Indigenous ecologies (Whyte 2015; 2018b). Ultimately, settler campaigns seek to eliminate
themselves as settlers (Veracini 2010). The ongoing histories of settler colonialism are littered
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with examples where these processes of settler homeland inscription and Indigenous homeland
erasure violate, encroach upon, and destroy Indigenous self-determination, the ecological integrity
of Indigenous territories, and the capacities of Indigenous peoples to ecologically sustain them.
Consider, for instance, forced relocations of Indigenous peoples that, in addition to
inflicting violence and death, generally placed Indigenous peoples onto new and unfamiliar
ecosystems. Many Indigenous peoples had difficulty transforming the course of their common
activities to sustain their livelihoods and ways of life in completely new environments (Moore
2015, 41). Both the political and ecological relationships that rooted Indigenous self-determination
to their homelands were severed through such colonialist policies. Settler colonialism also
frequently involves industrial, capitalist, and other economic processes that exploit the ecosystems
of Indigenous territories to remake them into settler homelands and thus undermine Indigenous
rights to self-determination by undermining their rights to ecological integrity. Consider extractive
industries (uranium, coal, oil, gas, etc.), the dumping of toxic waste, large-scale industrial
agriculture, transportation systems, military expansions, deforestation, hydro-technologies such as
dams, just to name a few examples (Kamieniecki and Granzeier 1998, 263–65). Additionally, the
ecological damage brought about by anthropogenic climate change, though a risk to all,
disproportionately threatens the well-being and self-determination of Indigenous peoples and has
also displaced many (such as those in coastal areas of the U.S.), forcing them to relocate and thus
reproducing colonialist violences of the past (Maldonado et al. 2013). The ongoing histories of
settler colonialism and Indigenous resurgence make it exceedingly perspicuous how the political
self-determination of Indigenous peoples is always already bound up with their capacities for
ecological sustainability and the ecological integrity of their territories. Formal recognition of
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Indigenous sovereignty without substantive protections of the ecological enabling conditions and
constitutive components of Indigenous self-determination is empty and unjust.
Consider too the #NoDAPL movement. Settler support for the Dakota Access Pipeline
often claimed that no Indigenous rights to land would be violated by the pipeline’s construction.
In an opinion piece for the Wall Street Journal, North Dakota State congressperson Kevin Cramer
(2016) wrote, “The pipeline does not cross any land owned by the Standing Rock Sioux. The land
under discussion belongs to private owners and the federal government. To suggest that the
Standing Rock Tribe has the legal ability to block the pipeline is to turn America’s property rights
upside down.” This argument’s assertion of the legitimacy of individual settler property rights and
the U.S. government’s claims to land, however, effaces the histories of colonialist dispossession
of Indigenous territories along the pipeline’s route (Whyte 2017). The pipeline’s construction
crosses unceded and treaty-guaranteed territory of the Oceti Sakowin (The Great Sioux Nation)
and violates the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 and 1851 signed by the United States (NYC Stands
with Standing Rock Collective 2016).
Moreover, the violation of the Oceti Sakowin’s right to territorial integrity cannot be fully
understood merely in terms of border infringements (even though this did occur) but also needs to
be conceptualized as a violation of the right to ecological integrity. The pipeline’s construction
also raised the issue of who had the right to determine what is meant by and required of ecological
sustainability in a particular location. The violations of the Oceti Sakowin’s right to selfdetermination and their right to be consulted as a people (engaged in people-to-people relations
and not just internal-minority-group-to-federal-government relations) regarding the pipeline’s
construction involved imposing from the outside settler understandings of what was considered
ecologically sustainable. In the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers report approving the route of the
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Dakota Access Pipeline, Col. John Henderson (the Omaha district commander) wrote, “I have
evaluated the anticipated environmental, economic, cultural, and social effects, and any cumulative
effects” and found the pipeline’s crossing of the Missouri River at the Lake Oahe reservoir “not
injurious to the public interest.” Moreover, the report claimed of the public review process: “No
significant comments remain unresolved” (Hersher 2017).77 But, of course, it is the Oceti Sakowin
who have the right to decide for themselves what ecological sustainability should entail on their
territories and they thought that the pipeline’s transportation of fracked crude oil would, among
other harms, threaten the primary water source for their reservation and pose unacceptable
ecological risk. A people’s right to self-determination and its duty of ecologically sustainability,
as my eco-political theory emphasizes, are intertwined with one another. Ecological sustainability
involves peoples deciding for themselves how to fill out the variables, priorities, and values that
constitute the schema of sustainability.

§4.6 CONCLUSION: PROTECTING INDIGENOUS TERRITORIAL RIGHTS
AND CORRECTING COLONIALIST INJUSTICES IN PRACTICE
How should the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples be understood and justified?
Property theories of territory inspired by John Locke risk taking on the colonialist and antiecological baggage bound up with Locke’s own views. Legitimate state theories, even suitably
modified to include not simply modern nation-states and constrained by just war theory to prohibit
benevolent colonization, are still unable to account for the self-determination claims of Indigenous
peoples. Indigenous peoples themselves widely frame their own claims in terms of the right to
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The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe later sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, alleging that the Army Corps failed
to consult the Tribe and violated the National Historic Preservation Act. U.S. District Judge James Boasberg ultimately
denied the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s request to stop construction and wrote that the Army Corps “likely complied”
with its obligation to consult the tribe and that the Tribe “has not shown it will suffer injury that would be prevented
by any injunction the Court could issue” (Hersher 2017).
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self-determination, such as in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)
(Macklem 1995; Anaya 2004; Holder 2011). Although cultural nationalist theories justify a form
of national self-determination, grounding self-determination and territorial rights in a determinate
pre-political cultural target risks collapsing into ethnic or racial nationalism and re-inscribing a
colonial logic of governmentality.
Instead then, the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples should be primarily grounded in a
principle of eco-political self-determination, which draws from some Indigenous scholars’ own
conceptions linking self-determination with sustainability, enables Indigenous peoples to decide
for themselves how to understand and protect their cultural integrity, and justifies Indigenous
territorial rights especially in response to some of the central eco-political wrongs of colonialism.
Because the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples are a central case to consider for any theory—
their territorial rights pre-date those of modern nation-states and some of the most devastating
violations of territorial rights have been of those belonging to Indigenous peoples—the fact that
an eco-political theory is able to explain and justify the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples
more comprehensively than the prevailing theories counts in favor of it as a theory of territory in
general.
I end by considering some ways in which Indigenous territorial rights and Indigenous
claims to corrective justice could be fulfilled and institutionalized in practice. The first point to
note is that protecting Indigenous territorial rights is not equivalent to and need not entail the
secession of Indigenous peoples from existing host states and according them their own sovereign
states. Sovereignty powers and territorial rights, as I have pointed out, can be unbundled and can
entail various institutional forms of shared autonomy arrangements or consociation. There is good
reason why Indigenous people themselves are not seeking secession but rather greater
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(eco-)political and territorial autonomy (Corntassel and Primeau 1995; Maaka and Fleras 2000).
Insisting on complete sovereignty and independent statehood may actually preclude Indigenous
peoples from acquiring assistance, resources, and services from host colonialist states, which are
due to them as a matter of rectifying historical injustices and existing substantive inequalities. As
Moore (2005) explains, “What is needed is direct redistribution to indigenous people, while at the
same time conferring on indigenous governments the jurisdictional capacity to tax back what is
needed to provide services to their communities, and democratic control by indigenous peoples
themselves over the governance of their communities” (292). The jurisdictional authority of
Indigenous peoples over their territories can be maximized while their representation in the
government of their host states can be at the same time be increased in autonomy arrangements in
ways that combine “self-rule” with “shared-rule” (Moore 2003, 104–5; 2005, 288). The complex
interstices and tensions of this “third space of sovereignty,” as Kevin Bruyneel (2007)
characterizes it, must be carefully and creatively navigated as a site of Indigenous resurgence and
resistance against colonial authority. Granting Indigenous peoples full sovereignty may appear to
constitute recognition of their collective freedom but can in fact be a means by which host states
shirk their duties to rectify the past and ongoing colonialist injustices for which they are
responsible. This would represent yet another instance in which “shape-shifting colonial entities”
reproduce unjust power relations under the pretext of expanding freedom to “sever [Indigenous]
relationships to the natural world and define the terrain of struggle” (Corntassel 2012, 88).
An eco-political theory of territory can both ground corrective justice measures for
rectifying core colonialist injustices (because unlike legitimate state theories, it can explain the
core territorial wrongs of settler colonialism) and justify Indigenous territorial rights as a subset of
territorial rights in general and not simply “special” rights to be accommodated by a liberal
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multicultural state. Duties of corrective justice may provide certain pro tanto grounds for the
restitution of (and not simply the compensation for) historical Indigenous territories (Meisels
2003). Changing circumstances and the passage of time will not always by themselves entail that
past injustices have been superseded, at least not if this is taken to imply that the injustices
themselves have somehow been put right (Meisels 2003, 86; Roberts 2003; 2007).78 Of course,
individuals not responsible for past colonialist injustices, such as later settler generations, may be
currently residing in and have developed legitimate expectations on territories taken away from
Indigenous peoples.79 But even “if, after all, we arrive at the conclusion that certain historical
wrongs should not be reversed, this will be because other powerful and conflicting claims prevail,
rather than because we have necessarily concluded that the original claim no longer stands” (78).
If we add to this the considerations that (a) benefiting from past injustices may itself
generate certain obligations to rectify them, (b) past wrongdoings authorized by a state that
continues to exist will entail duties of state redress in the present, and (c) colonialist injustices are
ongoing and not simply relegated to a distant past, then the duty to correct for colonialist injustices
will be significantly overdetermined (Butt 2008; 2007; Winter 2014). Even if later settler
generations may now have certain claims to reside on historical Indigenous territories that should
be taken into account, rights to jurisdictional authority over a territory can still be restored to an
Indigenous people without the violation of individual residency claims or even property rights.
Individuals may be allowed to continue residing in a territory if they so choose even when
jurisdictional authority shifts; property may be bought using the resources of a host colonialist
state and handed over to Indigenous peoples to reconstitute their territories; and forms of eminent
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See Jeremy Waldron (1992) for arguments that sometimes historical injustices can be superseded.
Even if individuals are not causally responsible for past colonialist injustices, Daniel Butt (2006; 2013) argues that
they may still be connected and implicated in those past wrongdoings because the ongoing failure of overlapping
generations (and not just successive generations) to fulfill rectificatory duties is an ongoing act of injustice.
79
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domain with reasonable compensation may be on balance justified to fulfill corrective justice
duties. And as I have emphasized, various more complex institutions of shared territorial
governance between Indigenous peoples and their host states may be ultimately needed, such that
the rights of individual settlers residing on Indigenous territories will nonetheless be respected
even though they are not members of those Indigenous peoples. Enduring large-scale structural
injustices are messy, to say the least, and do not admit of easy solutions. The responses to correct
for colonialist injustices will be equally if not even more complicated. But the difficulty of
realizing justice is not an excuse for justice not to be done.
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CHAPTER 5: TRANSITIONAL LEGITIMACY
Legitimacy, as I understand it, is a property of political institutions and refers to a political
entity’s right to rule, and thus concerns one of the territorial rights when it is exercised by a political
entity on behalf of a people. As I mentioned in the Introduction, insofar as the other two territorial
rights, the right to control resources and the right to control borders, involve preventing outsiders
from controlling certain resources or moving into a territory—outsiders whom the territorial rightsholder is not claiming jurisdiction over—then these rights may be subject to additional external
legitimacy constraints, which the right to rule is not subject to because the right to rule concerns
primarily the relationship between a political entity and the individuals over which it rules (D.
Miller 2012, 253–54; Stilz 2011, 573–74). Nonetheless, even though the rights to control resources
and borders are beholden to additional external legitimacy constraints in ways that the right to
jurisdictional authority is not, insofar as those two territorial rights are exercised by a people
through its political institutions, then the legitimacy of the people’s political entity will be required
to justify those two territorial rights as well. This is why, as I mentioned in the Introduction, the
right to jurisdictional authority is the more fundamental right of the three territorial rights, upon
which the rights to control resources and borders are in some sense parasitic, even though the three
rights do not collapse into one and must still be disaggregated from each other.
The question that I focus on in this chapter is not that of what theory of legitimacy we
should hold. Since political institutions exercise territorial rights derivatively on behalf of their
peoples, on my account, the conditions needed for their legitimacy and their right to rule is also
derived from or patristic on the conditions needed to justify a people’s territorial rights. So while
I do present reasons in this chapter to favor a democratic theory of legitimacy (which is consistent
with my theory’s view that self-determination understood as a democratic norm is the core ground
justifying a people’s right to jurisdictional authority), the question that I am primarily concerned
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with answering in this chapter is how do we realize legitimate political institutions from within illordered societies? This is an especially important issue to address because the social ontology of
the people, as I have argued, should encompass both ill-ordered and well-ordered societies.
Additionally, existing theories of legitimacy do not adequately answer this question and primarily
take an ideal theory approach that ignores non-ideal circumstances of oppression and past
injustices.
Just as theorists concerned with the value of justice have developed the concept and
framework of transitional justice to address the situation of post-conflict and post-repressive
societies transitioning toward a stable and just political order, I argue in this chapter that the
advancement of a novel concept of transitional legitimacy is likewise in order for theorizing how
to realize legitimate political institutions from within ill-ordered societies more generally.
Transitional legitimacy is a necessary concept, which is additional to but does not dispense with
theories of legitimacy, just as transitional justice is necessary as separate from even if not a
replacement of theories of justice.
In §5.1, I begin by distinguishing between legitimacy, understood as a political entity’s
right to rule, and justice, which concerns the moral quality of political institutions, specifically the
scheme of rules about rights that a political entity ought to adopt and enforce. In §5.2, I criticize
existing theories of legitimacy (based on consent, public reason, human rights, and democracy) for
operating, at least implicitly, from within an ideal theory approach and, as such, inadequately
addressing in various ways non-ideal circumstances marked by oppression and domination.
In §5.3, I argue that in addition to a theory of legitimacy, which simply states the conditions
that constitute legitimacy, we need a concept of transitional legitimacy that tells us how to realize
legitimate political institutions from within ill-ordered (as opposed to well-ordered) societies. I
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specify the concept of transitional legitimacy by analogizing and distinguishing it from transitional
justice. In addition to focusing on distinct values (legitimacy versus justice), the circumstances of
transitional legitimacy are broader in scope than the paradigmatic circumstances of transitional
justice. The circumstances of transitional legitimacy concern ill-ordered societies marked by
oppression and domination in general, whereas the circumstances of transitional justice are
typically limited to post-conflict societies in the wake of large-scale human rights abuses, such as
Germany after World War II or South Africa post-apartheid. Thus, I take the concept of transitional
legitimacy as applying to and helpfully informing the situation of even stable democracies such as
the United States or Australia (which are ordinarily understood to be outside the purview of
transitional justice) insofar as these societies may still be structured in various ways by oppression
and the legacies of past injustices.
The notion of “transition” in transitional legitimacy, as I conceive it, has both descriptive
and normative senses. Descriptively, I defend an ecumenical account of transition that
encompasses ill-ordered ordered societies in varying processes of transformation ranging from
more radical to subtler changes, which can be adjusted accordingly depending on context.
Normatively, transition intertwines both backward- and forward-looking moral aims using a nonideal theory approach that links the rectification of past and enduring injustices with structural
transformation to realize legitimate political institutions.
After laying out the concept of transitional legitimacy, I substantiate its content in §5.4 by
focusing on the context of the United States and racial oppression against African Americans. I
argue that transitional legitimacy will generally require, at least, the public acknowledgment of
past injustices and the reaffirmation of equal political status of members of oppressed groups, the
rule of law to guard against racial discrimination (and hence the dismantling of the United States’
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system of racialized mass incarceration), effective de facto protection of democratic rights rather
than voter suppression laws, and reparations to correct for past and enduring injustices. I
demonstrate how, even under minimal assumptions, the United States is far from legitimate (rather
than not fully just but nonetheless legitimate) and can be understood as such across the liberal
spectrum from right libertarians to left egalitarians.

§5.1 LEGITIMACY AND JUSTICE
I begin by providing a preliminary characterization of the concept of legitimacy and by
showing how it is distinct from (even though related to) the concept of justice. Although legitimacy
and justice are both values used to evaluate political institutions, legitimacy refers to a political
entity’s right to rule, that is, to make and enforce laws, whereas justice concerns the scheme of
rules about rights that a political entity ought to adopt and enforce. 80 A just institution gives its
subjects what they are owed, in particular by exercising its rule consistently with its subjects’ rights
and entitlements (Valentini 2012b, 593–95). Generally, the ideal of justice is further substantiated,
in part, through theories of distributive justice that specify how benefits and burdens should be
distributed across society, such as John Rawls’ (1999) difference principle, Ronald Dworkin’s
(2002) equality of resources, and G. A. Cohen’s (1989) equality of access to advantage. Whereas
justice is about the moral quality of institutions, legitimacy is concerned with whether a political
entity has the proper standing to make and enforce laws. Legitimacy is also normally thought as
making a distinct and weaker demand than justice. A political entity can be legitimate but not fully
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On an alternate understanding, legitimacy refers to the justification of coercive political power (Rawls 1993;
Ripstein 2004). But this is a rather thin conception of legitimacy. A state that occupies another territory as a result of
a just war may be justified in coercing the inhabitants there. Additionally, justified coercion need not involve
commands or laws at all, but may simply be a matter of issuing threats or offers (Christiano 2008, 240–42). So, even
though coercion may be a primary means by which laws are enforced (but not the only means since positive incentives
and moral suasion may also be used to generate compliance), I shall take the right to rule to be the central notion of
legitimacy.

166

or perfectly just and, as such, may have the right to rule even though it does not exercise its rule
in complete accordance with its subjects’ rights and entitlements.
Another distinction between legitimacy and justice is that legitimacy, but not justice, is
generally thought to come with political obligations to obey the laws of a political institution or at
least to not interfere with its activities. (I leave it open here the exact relationship between
legitimacy and political obligation such as whether or not legitimacy entails political obligation.)
To be sure, individuals may have obligations to obey laws that are fully just but the existence of
those obligations would be dependent on the content of those laws—namely, their justness. In
contrast, political obligations are generally thought to be content independent and thus owed in
virtue of the nature of the source issuing some law—that it is a legitimate authority—even if that
entity and its laws are not perfectly just in content. Political obligations are also generally
understood as pro tanto rather than conclusive obligations. That is, under normal circumstances,
subjects may have political obligations to obey or not interfere with the laws of a legitimate though
not fully just political entity, but such political obligations can be overridden by countervailing
considerations in the case of clear and serious injustices.
A final difference between legitimacy and justice is that legitimacy concerns the special
moral relationship between a particular political entity and particular subjects—the entity’s right
to rule over those specific subjects and their political obligations to obey the rules issued by that
entity or to not interfere with its activities. Call this the “particularity requirement.” In contrast, a
political entity being just gives everyone a moral reason to refrain from undermining it or even to
positively support it. Even if you had perfectly general duties to promote justice, that would require
you to support all just political institutions but would not by itself provide reason as to why any
particular political institution would have the right to rule over you or the power to impose political
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obligations upon you (Simmons 1979, 32–34, 143–56). Even if it turns out (as I think it does) that
full or perfect justice requires legitimacy (i.e. in order for a political regime to be perfectly just, it
must also be legitimate), the two values are still conceptually distinct with legitimacy fulfilling a
more specific function of establishing a political entity’s right to rule over particular subjects and
the political obligations of those subjects to obey or not interfere with that particular political entity.

§5.2 LEGITIMACY WITHIN IDEAL THEORY
Existing theories of legitimacy often operate, at least implicitly, using an ideal theory
approach and, as such, are insufficiently attentive to non-ideal circumstances. Although the
ideal/non-ideal distinction has been understood in many different ways (Valentini 2012a), I shall
follows Charles Mills (2005) in his characterization. “What distinguishes ideal theory,” says Mills,
“is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization of the actual.… [I]deal
theory either tacitly represents the actual as a simple deviation from the ideal, not worth theorizing
in this own right, or claims that starting from the ideal is at least the best way of realizing it” (168).
More specifically, ideal theory uses some or all of the following assumptions as part of its basic
apparatus, according to Mills: an idealized social ontology, idealized human capacities, silence on
oppression, idealized social institutions, idealized social cognition, and strict compliance (168-69).
It is not particularly important to my argument whether Mills’ understanding of the
ideal/non-ideal distinction is the best one, or even whether the ideal/non-ideal debate is about a
single unitary issue (which I doubt). Instead, my main point is that existing theories of legitimacy,
in various ways, are insufficiently informed by circumstances of oppression, domination, and
conflict that mark actual societies. I will illustrate how specifically this is so with regard to four
sorts of theories: consent theories, Rawls’ public reason theory, minimalist human rights theories,
and democratic theories. Indeed, some objections presented in the intramural debates among
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theories of legitimacy can themselves be understood as objections that some theory or other takes
an overly idealized approach toward theorizing legitimacy. Ultimately, I conclude that democratic
theories of legitimacy should be preferred over others but that they too, taken on their own, fail to
tell us how to realize democratic conditions of legitimacy under non-ideal circumstances.
Consider first theories according to which political institutions are legitimate only when
they enjoy the consent of their members (Locke 1690; Simmons 1999; 2001). The often-cited
charge against consent theories is that no state or political institution has ever enjoyed the
unanimous consent of all its members; so, it cannot be the case that consent is required for
legitimacy.81 What I want to point out here is that this criticism can be interpreted as an objection
that consent theory operates using overly idealized assumptions and ignores the circumstances of
actual societies in which universal consent has never been (and will likely never be) realized.
One response to this objection by consent theorists, most notably John Locke (1690, 8.119),
is to appeal to tacit consent in which simply remaining within and deriving benefits from a state is
sufficient to qualify as consenting to its authority. The fallback to tacit rather than explicit consent,
however, runs into an interpretation problem—namely, it is unclear how any putatively noncommunicative behavior can be legitimately interpreted as consent (and in particular, with the
requisite content of consent to a particular political entity’s authority) (Buchanan 2002, 700–702).
David Hume’s (1998) objection that the costs of exiting the country of one’s birth are often so high
that remaining in place cannot possibly count as consent can itself be understood as a criticism
from non-ideal theory that appealing to tacit consent elides the nonconsensual reasons why people
in actual circumstances continue to reside within a given political jurisdiction.
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Though some philosophical anarchists such as Simmons (1999, 769, 2001, 315) are willing to bite this bullet and
say so much then for the legitimacy of states.

169

Finally, consent theory can be criticized more broadly for adopting an overly idealized
social ontology of political society as a purely voluntary scheme between undifferentiated
atomistic individuals when, in reality, politics is fundamentally about how to structure relations
between members of society already engaged in activities or institutions with one another even
when consent is lacking. One might worry, along with Carole Pateman (1988), Mills (1997), and
Pateman and Mills (2007), that the idealized abstractions marking consent theory, especially as it
has been worked out through the social contract tradition, not only obscures but also re-entrenches
structures of racial and gender domination.
In lieu of appealing to explicit or tacit consent, Rawls (1993) develops what he calls the
liberal principle of legitimacy, according to which “our exercise of political power is fully proper
only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as
free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals
acceptable to their common human reason” (137). Citizens are reasonable when they are prepared
to offer and abide by fair terms of cooperation, given the assurance that others will do so as well
(49). Rawls, of course, self-consciously takes himself to be working from within ideal theory. As
such, he assumes a well-ordered society in which (a) everyone accepts the same principles of
justice and knows everyone else does too, (b) the basic structure is publicly known to be just, and
(c) citizens have a normally effective sense of justice and generally comply with society’s basic
institutions (35). Additionally, Rawls presupposes the existence of certain shared fundamental
ideas implicit in a society’s public political culture (13–14).
But to make these assumptions in which there is already agreement on principles of justice
and shared fundamental ideas is to provide for reasonable consensus on the cheap, as it were. 82
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The situation, however, may be even worse for Rawls. David Reidy (2007, 254–65) has argued that even given
Rawls’ own assumptions, especially the fact of reasonable disagreement and the burdens of judgment, reasonable
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Actual societies are generally not well-ordered in Rawls’ sense and members may not have a
shared fund of public political ideas from which they can draw to arrive at a reasonable consensus
around the basic principles regulating society. It is not simply the fact that members may have
deep, even reasonable, disagreement about justice (Waldron 1999), but also that societies that are
not well-ordered but rather structured by systems of oppression will contain ideologies that distort
people’s very senses of justice. As such, people will diverge on what even counts as reasonable in
the first place since, for Rawls (1993, 52), the reasonable arises from people’s moral capacity for
a sense of justice. One might be tempted here to build additional substantive and normative content
into the notion of reasonableness so as to rule out the distorting effects of ideology, but this would
move away from a Rawlsian criterion of legitimacy since it would then be the substantive
normative content itself that was doing the work of legitimizing political power. The very notion
of reasonableness is thus a non-starter for determining legitimacy under non-ideal conditions.
Take minimalist human rights theories next. For Allen Buchanan (2007, 247), “a wielder
of political power (the supremacist making, application, and enforcement of laws in a territory) is
legitimate… if and only if it (1) does a credible job of protecting at least the most basic human
rights of all those over whom it wields power and (2) provides this protection through processes,
policies, and actions that themselves respect the most basic human rights” (247). Likewise, for
Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman (2009), “a state is legitimate if, and only if, it adequately
protects certain basic moral rights of its individual citizens and respects the basic moral rights of
all other agents” (7). Basic human rights are defined minimally here in terms of basic interests and
needs connected to leading a decent human life (Buchanan, 128; Altman and Wellman, 2–3).

consensus is wildly utopian since citizens will reasonable disagree over (1) the fact of reasonable pluralism itself, (2)
generic liberalism, and (3) a determinate democratic constitutional order.
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It is not clear, though, why the threshold of legitimacy stops short at the protection of basic
human rights. Buchanan argues that justice is the primary purpose for which an entity is endowed
with political power, which is supposed to explain why protecting basic human rights (through
means that themselves respect human rights), as a component of justice, is necessary and sufficient
for legitimacy (2007, 247–48). But although protecting basic rights is necessary for legitimacy, it
is insufficient. If justice is the purpose of political entities, why would legitimacy not require the
full realization of justice over and beyond the mere protection of basic human rights? This kind of
justice-based argument for legitimacy risks conflating the two values.83 To respond by saying that
protecting basic human rights must be sufficient for legitimacy precisely because legitimacy is a
weaker demand than justice is circular and simply assumes what is to be explained. Altman and
Wellman similarly claim that a state that protects and respects basic human rights has successfully
carried out the “requisite political functions” to be legitimate (2009, 3), but this begs the question
as to why the functions necessary for legitimacy stop short there and not at some higher bar.
A second problem with minimalist human rights accounts is that they do not meet the
particularity requirement of legitimacy. From a political entity’s protection of basic human rights
and achievement of a baseline degree of justice, it does not follow that that particular entity has a
right to rule over its particular subjects or that those subjects have reason to support or the
obligation to obey that particular entity, especially since there may be other entities equally or even
more capable of protecting the basic rights of those subjects.84
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Nonetheless, not all justice-based accounts of legitimacy risk conflating the two values. The democratic account of
legitimacy that I prefer makes a weaker demand than full or perfect justice even if justice is taken to require democracy
and so, in some sense, this account can be understood as based in justice.
84
Buchanan (2007, 254) indeed answers these particularity worries by adding democratic authorization as a
requirement of legitimacy when feasible. I address the democratic component of Buchanan’s theory next in the paper
as part of my evaluation of democratic theories of legitimacy more generally.
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Finally, human rights accounts are too thin and inadequate for theorizing legitimacy in
societies structured by systems of oppression and domination. Oppression undermines a political
entity’s right to rule (and by Buchanan’s (2007, 248) own lights since oppression obviously
violates the moral equality principle that ultimately justifies his account) even if, in some minimal
sense, an oppressive regime protects the conditions necessary for its subjects to lead a decent
human life. Additionally, minimalist human rights theories focus on how political entities function
or perform in the here and now (i.e. they are functionalist or performance-based) and as such are
insufficiently backward-looking in addressing past or enduring injustices that would undermine a
political entity’s legitimacy. A minimalist human rights account of legitimacy simply lacks the
theoretical tools needed to address non-ideal circumstances marked by oppression and domination.
Ultimately, I contend that legitimacy derives not from consent, reasonable consensus, or
minimal human rights, but democracy, which many theorists have argued by appeal to some sort
of principle of equality (Buchanan 2007; Christiano 2008; Kolodny 2014a; 2014b; Viehoff
2014).85 Democracy is understood here broadly and normatively as the equal right of all members
to participate in the decisions made by the political institutions that rule over them and not
necessarily in terms of any particular institutional instantiation and not limited solely to Western
forms of representative democracies.86 Democratic theories explain both how a political entity can
have a right to rule and members can have pro tanto obligations to obey the law. A democratic
political entity has the right to rule because it functions as an agent acting on behalf of its members
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Other democratic theories of legitimacy ground democracy not in equality but freedom as non-domination (Pettit
2013, chap. 3) or equal agency (Gould 1988, chap. 8). For my purposes here, it does not matter which exact
foundational principle is taken to ground democracy so long as any of these accounts explain (a) how a political entity
can have the right to rule and potentially (b) its members’ pro tanto obligation to obey, in ways that improve upon
alternative theories of legitimacy by taking seriously non-ideal circumstances of disagreement and meeting the
particularity requirement.
86
See Gould (2004, 35–36) for a discussion of various models of democracy within traditional African communities
and Indigenous peoples in the Americas that diverge from Western modes of representative democracy.
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that in effect pools their equal political rights through their participation in its decision-making.
Members have pro tanto obligations to obey democratically arrived at laws—obligations that they
owe ultimately to each other and not the government itself—because otherwise they would be
disrespecting the equality of their fellow members embodied by democratically constituted
institutions.
Democratic theories of legitimacy represent an improvement upon consent or reasonable
consensus theories in that they take seriously the non-ideal circumstances of deep disagreements
between members resulting from divergent interests, fallibility, cognitive bias, and the like
(Christiano 2008, chaps. 3 and 7). The only way to fairly resolve such disagreements that respects
the equality between members is to make decisions democratically. The pro tanto obligations that
members have to obey these decisions are thus content-independent since one must accept
democratically made decisions even if one disagrees with them. This does not mean, however, that
the obligation to obey is unconditional. Instead, the very principle of equality that grounds
democratic authority also sets limits on it and members have no obligation to obey laws that clearly
and seriously infringe on equality, such as violations of basic human rights, even if they were
arrived at democratically. Democratic theories of legitimacy also meet the particularity
requirement because it is in virtue of these particular members having the right to participate in
the decision making of this particular institution that gives it a right to rule and its members pro
tanto obligations to obey.
One remaining issue with existing democratic theories of legitimacy, though they represent
an improvement upon alternative theories, is that they do not tell us how to realize democracy
under non-ideal circumstances. So for instance, Buchanan (2007, 250, 254, 259) argues that
democracy is required for legitimacy when democratic institutions are feasible or possible or where
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institutional resources exist for democratic authorization. However, Buchanan leaves unspecified
what exactly constitutes feasibility or possibility here, which can be interpreted in stronger or
weaker ways. Moreover, such a theory on its own does not adequately guide action when such
institutional resources for democracy do not exist or are compromised by structures of oppression.
It also fails to explain why legitimacy would not simply require the creation of democratic
institutions when they do not yet exist. After all, Buchanan himself holds that there is a natural
duty of justice—a limited moral obligation to help create and build just institutions even when they
do not yet exist (86–87)—and that justice requires democracy (256–57), which taken together
seem to imply that legitimacy requires democracy even in circumstances in which democratic
institutions are not yet available. 87 Likewise, Christiano (2008, 232–34) admits that only a
reasonably just state can have legitimate authority, which assumes that certain idealized conditions
must already be in place before his theory of legitimacy can apply. But Christiano does not tell us
what conditions of reasonable justice would have to exist before a political entity could be
legitimate or what would be needed to bring those conditions about if circumstances were not so
ideal and structures of oppression were in place instead.
More generally, any theory of legitimacy tout court faces this problem of not explaining
how to realize legitimacy in non-ideal circumstances since these theories aim only to tell us what
conditions constitute legitimacy but not how to bring those conditions about. To answer this latter
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Buchanan (2007, 258–59) himself claims that although we have a duty to help create institutions that protect basic
rights and facilitate, or at least allow, for the development of democratic institutions, nonetheless legitimacy does not
require democracy where democratic authorization is not possible. I think Buchanan trades here on the ambiguity of
“possibility” or “feasibility” that I mention previously. If democracy is impossible in a strong sense such that there is
no democracy in any possible world and if ought implies can, then legitimacy cannot require democracy. On the other
hand, if democracy is impossible only in a weaker sense in that democratic institutions do not exist now but could be
brought into existence (if only after arduous political change), then legitimacy would nonetheless require democracy
even if we accept the dictum that ought implies can. It is not clear to me under what conditions democracy would be
impossible in the strong sense rather than just the weaker sense. It seems to me that even in non-ideal conditions of
severe oppression or domination, democracy is still feasible in some sense given the capacity of political revolutions
and social movements to create institutional change.
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question, we will need to appeal to concepts, theories, and resources beyond simply (even if also
including) theories of legitimacy and we will need to rely on non-ideal theory. But this is not to
say that non-ideal theory is not also needed when thinking through what our theory of legitimacy
itself should be, for it is. One might object that methodologically, ideal theory serves to specify
the end at which we should aim (e.g., consent, reasonable consensus, basic rights protection, or
democracy in the context of theories of legitimacy) and non-ideal theory concerns the means for
how to realize that end from within non-ideal circumstances.
But I think that such a clean division of labor between ideal and non-ideal theory is facile
since attention to non-ideal circumstances also helps to inform the norms and ideals themselves.
Mills (2005, 166, 168) points out that the difference between ideal theory and non-ideal theory lies
not simply in the use of ideals per se since both approaches, as approaches to normative theorizing,
will inevitably employ values, norms, and ideals. As I have shown, the debate among theories of
legitimacy includes objections that can be interpreted as operating from the perspective of nonideal theory but that nonetheless concern what the appropriate end is that we should aim at.
Roughly, we might say that attention to non-ideal circumstances helps to show that consent and
reasonable consensus are too high of a bar for legitimacy, whereas basic human rights is too low.
So, non-ideal theory in the context of legitimacy will serve two purposes: first, to inform what
theory of legitimacy we should prefer, namely a democratic account; and second, to tell us how to
bring about legitimacy in non-ideal circumstances. I turn to this second purpose next.

§5.3 THE CONCEPT OF TRANSITIONAL LEGITIMACY
What is needed (and what theories of legitimacy by themselves lack) is a concept of what
I shall call transitional legitimacy, which I will analogize to and distinguish from the notion of
transitional justice. Transitional justice raises the issue of what justice requires in the aftermath of,
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generally speaking, authoritarianism, conflict, war, and/or large-scale human rights abuses. In
particular, theorists and practitioners of transitional justice focus on the measures needed to
address past wrongdoing and their legacies and to move toward a peaceful, stable, and just political
order. Such measures commonly include trials, truth commissions, apologies, amnesty, reparations,
lustration (laws that remove or disqualify individuals involved in the abuses of the previous regime
from holding official positions), and other sorts of institutional reform such as writing a new
constitution. Transitional justice, then, is an exercise in non-ideal theory that generally concerns
the specific context of post-repressive or post-conflict societies. I contend that just as we need an
account of transitional justice in such non-ideal circumstances, so too will we need an account of
transitional legitimacy (though this does not mean we need to jettison our theories of legitimacy
just as transitional justice does not entail jettisoning our theories of justice).88
What distinguishes the concept of transitional legitimacy from the concept of legitimacy is
what we can refer to as the problem of transitional legitimacy. Whereas legitimacy concerns itself
with what conditions constitute legitimate political institutions, the problem of transitional
legitimacy is how to realize or bring about legitimate political institutions within an ill-ordered
society.89 Theorists of transitional justice likewise identify transitional justice with reference to its
distinctive problem. Michael Buckley (2013) in his distillation of the literature describes the
problem of transitional justice as follows: “how can society emerge from a history of repression
and large-scale abuse in a manner that improves the likelihood of [it] successfully transitioning to
a civil society, or a society characterized by peace, social unity, and the rule of law?” (335). Or in

88

Though some theorists such as Murphy (2017) contend that the unique problem and circumstances of transitional
justice actually mark it off as a sui generis species of justice.
89
I take the term ill-ordered society from Mills (2017, 207–8, 211) who contrasts it with Rawls’ well-ordered society.
“Ill-ordered societies are coercive rather than cooperative ventures, characterized by exploitation and systemic
disrespect for subordinated groups rather than mutual advantage and reciprocal respect” (208).

177

a different and more succinct vein, Colleen Murphy (2017) characterizes the problem of
transitional justice as “what constitutes the just pursuit of societal transformation?” (111-12).
Both the problems of transitional legitimacy and transitional justice are thus informed and
generated by non-ideal circumstances, but the circumstances of transitional legitimacy are broader
in scope than the circumstances of transitional justice, as they are generally understood. As
mentioned, transitional justice paradigmatically applies to societies emerging from conflict and
systematic human rights violations, such as Germany, South Africa, Argentina, and the former
Yugoslavian republics. Murphy (2017, 75) identifies four circumstances of transitional justice:
pervasive structural inequality, normalized collective and political wrongdoing, serious existential
uncertainty, and fundamental uncertainty about authority. She juxtaposes these circumstances
against those constitutive of stable democracies: limited structural inequality, individual and
personal wrongdoing, minor existential uncertainty, and narrow uncertainty about authority.
In contrast, I take the circumstances of transitional legitimacy to be ill-ordered societies
marked by oppression, domination, exploitation, and past/enduring injustices more generally,
which include but are not limited to the prototypical cases of post-conflict societies in the wake of
widespread human rights violations. Indeed, what are often seen as stable democracies, such as the
United States, may themselves be ill-ordered since the classification of democracy employed here
is descriptive and refers to certain democratic institutions such as the periodic election of
representatives but not necessarily the normative democratic requirements of legitimacy. The
differences between paradigmatically transitional societies and stable democracies exist along a
continuum and many societies will exhibit features that are a mix of the two archetypes. So, for
instance, an ill-ordered society structured by oppression may exhibit pervasive structural
inequality and normalized collective political wrongdoing to a substantial degree though perhaps
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less so serious existential uncertainty or only existential uncertainty for a specific subset of the
population—say a racial minority, but there may not be any fundamental uncertainty about
authority since the authority itself may be carrying out, perpetuating, or complicit in the oppression
to a large extent.90
Some theorists (Bonner and James 2011; Balint, Evans, and McMillan 2014; Winter 2014;
Henry 2015; Valls 2018) have begun to apply the framework of transitional justice beyond
paradigmatic post-conflict societies to address, for example, racial inequality, colonial injustices,
and other sorts of past wrongdoing within more consolidated democracies and settler states,
arguing that these cases also exhibit the features of transitional politics. There is precedent in
practice for this sort of expansion of the scope of transitional justice, such as the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of Canada for residential school survivors or the Maine-Wabanaki
State Child Welfare Truth and Reconciliation Commission responding to the adoption of
Wabanaki children into white homes. Other commentators, however, worry that allowing
transitional justice theory to “travel,” as Stephen Winter (2014, 43) puts it, risks losing what is
distinctive about transitional as opposed to non-transitional justice (Posner and Vermeule 2004;
Bell 2009). These debates raise the issue of what the notion of “transition” means and the role it

A note here will be useful regarding how to use the term “transitional legitimacy,” which I envision to be used in
similar ways to terms such as “transitional justice” and “corrective justice.” It would be strange, to say the least, to
assert that a state or political institution is transitionally legitimate, transitionally just, or correctively just. Instead, one
says that transitional legitimacy, transitional justice, and corrective justice applies in certain sorts of non-ideal
circumstances to deal with certain sorts of problems. When I say that transitional legitimacy requires x or that the
content of transitional legitimacy involves x, I mean that x is a measure needed to realize legitimate political
institutions in the non-ideal circumstances to which transitional legitimacy applies. Why not just say legitimacy
requires x in these sorts of circumstances? One could say this, just as one could say that justice requires y in non-ideal
circumstances φ of transitional justice, or justice requires z in non-ideal circumstances ψ of corrective justice. But
theories of justice just like theories of legitimacy generally operate from within ideal theory and cannot explain why,
in non-ideal circumstances ρ, w would be required. Theories of legitimacy, as I have stressed, simply tell you what
conditions constitute legitimacy but not how to bring those conditions about from within non-ideal conditions. To say
that legitimacy requires x in the non-ideal circumstances ω of transitional legitimacy, then, does not show that the
theoretical and explanatory work done by the notion of transitional legitimacy can be dispensed with.
90
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should play in our theories of transitional justice (and analogously our account of transitional
legitimacy).
Here, it will be useful to distinguish between the descriptive and the normative senses of
the term “transition.”91 Descriptively, there is the question of how exactly we want to characterize
the features of transitional societies. Regarding this issue, I am ecumenical, particularly regarding
the case of transitional legitimacy (if not also transitional justice). Depending on which sorts of
cases we want to focus on at any given time, we might define transitional societies in terms of
paradigmatic post-conflict societies in which there has been a radical or exceptional political
change or, alternatively, we may wish to hone in on a more “nuanced understanding of ‘transition’
as subtle, contested, gradual and above all, incomplete” (Henry 2015, 217). Other times, we may
want to adopt a broad understanding of transition that encompasses both, draw parallels and
differences between the two, or consider in-between cases (Hansen 2011). The notion of transition,
then, does not necessarily imply (as some critics suggest) an already predetermined trajectory or
simply a short-lived period between widespread conflict, authoritarianism, or human rights
violations and peaceful, stable democracy. One reason not to think of transition as exclusively
concerning a temporary phase (between radical injustice and stability) is that systems of oppression
generally endure for long periods of time and are themselves characterized by stabilizing dynamics
and forces that serve to re-entrench structures of domination.
Depending on how we expand or retract our descriptive account of transition, there may be
trade-offs between the account’s generality and its explanatory power in accounting for the more
densely textured details of any particular sort of case. Perhaps there are specific reasons in the case
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Murphy (2017) also distinguishes between the descriptive and normative sense of transition, but by the normative
sense of transition, she means something different from me—namely, “the fact that a community has a normative
aspiration transforming itself from a repressive or conflict-ridden from of government to a democratic one, but has
not yet achieved and is in fact not certain to achieve that aspiration matters morally” (36; emphasis in the original).

180

of transitional justice as an academic field for restricting the descriptive sense of “transition” to
paradigmatic post-conflict cases (see Bell 2009). However, this is not so much my concern since
my purpose here is to chart out a notion of transitional legitimacy and not primarily to interrogate
transitional justice, either as a concept or field. I employ the literature and notion of transitional
justice mainly as a foil to help specify the concept of transitional legitimacy that I hope to develop.
Nonetheless, the framework of transitional justice, descriptively speaking, usefully provides a slate
of measures for addressing past wrongdoing (reparations, apologies, truth commissions, etc.) that
we can consequently evaluate in terms of their applicability to transitional legitimacy.
In addition to its descriptive meaning, transition has normative connotations in terms of
transitioning or moving toward some ideal (of justice or legitimacy) from within non-ideal
circumstances, which serve various useful theoretical purposes. First, it introduces a temporal
dimension into our normative theorizing that calls us to address past wrongdoing even as we have
an eye toward the future realization of certain ideals and, as such, acts as a corrective to theories
that are either performative/functionalist or purely forward-looking (Valls 2018, 30, 33–34). By
keying us in on non-ideal circumstances and how they inform the realization of certain values,
transition-as-normative helps to shift our attention away from justice, where it has traditionally
and perhaps excessively been, toward injustice (as Amartya Sen (2009) and Naomi Zack (2016,
2017) have countenanced) and likewise away from legitimacy toward illegitimacy. In particular,
focusing on illegitimacy will help guard against the tendency to see established Western
democracies as having already achieved the “idealized endpoint” of transitional justice (Green
2012, 129) or as exemplars of legitimacy, which ignore the structures of oppression and histories
of past injustices within these countries that threaten to undermine their right to rule.
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Roughly, one might say that whereas the contrast case for transition-as-descriptive is nontransitional societies, the contrast case for transition-as-normative is legitimacy or justice as
theorized purely from within ideal theory. The notion of “transition” in transitional legitimacy, as
I conceive it, has both descriptive and normative senses: in the first instance, an ecumenical
account of ill-ordered societies in varying processes of transition that can be made thicker or
thinner depending on context; and in the second, an explicitly non-ideal theory oriented approach
toward realizing legitimacy, which supplements theories of legitimacy that concern solely the
conditions constitutive of legitimacy.92

§5.4 THE CONTENT OF TRANSITIONAL LEGITIMACY
Since I take the circumstances of transitional legitimacy to encompass ill-ordered societies
generally, the content of transitional legitimacy—what measures are required to realize legitimate
political institutions from within ill-ordered societies—will undoubtedly vary to some extent from
society to society. And this is as it should be. Attention to context, the specific histories and nature
of the systems of oppression in operation, and the relevant facts about a particular society will all
be important for determining the content of transitional legitimacy in a given case. Nonetheless,
this does not imply that no general characterization of the content of transitional legitimacy can be
made or that we must lapse into a radical contextualism in our normative theorizing of transitional
legitimacy. Since structures of oppression and domination share certain features—in particular,
features that undermine legitimacy—this means that a more general account of the content of
transitional legitimacy can be given. So, for example, transitional legitimacy will generally require

92

Distinguishing between the descriptive and normative senses of transition is not to deny that they interact in some
ways, since, of course, whatever descriptive non-ideal circumstances are at stake will thereby inform one’s normative
theorizing.
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(at least) the public reaffirmation of the equal political status of members of oppressed groups, the
rule of law to guard against group-based forms of discrimination, effective de facto protection of
rights to democratic participation especially for oppressed minorities, and reparations to correct
for past and enduring injustices. Or so I shall argue.
In any case, we should be no more skeptical of the possibility of providing a general theory
of transitional legitimacy for ill-ordered societies as we should be of the possibility of providing a
general theory of justice for well-ordered societies (à la Rawls). Should readers remain skeptical
of an overarching general theory for transitional legitimacy, then the concept of transitional
legitimacy can be alternatively understood as a framework under which different theories are
encompassed, each of which could address a more specific type of ill-ordered society and at
varying levels of generality and abstractness (e.g. post-war, slave-owning, patriarchal, settler
colonial, etc.). Together, these would constitute a family of theories, as it were, of transitional
legitimacy. Regardless, I take myself at least to have shown the importance of providing such a
framework of transitional legitimacy for ill-ordered societies.
In this chapter, I will focus primarily on the specific context of the United States and its
structures of racial oppression, especially directed against African Americans. Though I do not
take myself to be providing a fully-fledged general theory of transitional legitimacy (which I am
unable to accomplish in this space), I nonetheless think that certain general lessons as to what
transitional legitimacy will require can be gleaned from such an analysis of the United States
context. There is reason to focus on the United States even apart from the fact that it is the society
with which this theorist is most familiar. Namely, the United States, as an established democracy,
is often taken to be a clear instance of legitimacy. So, consideration of its ill-ordered nature, the
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various ways in which it falls short of legitimacy, and what transitional legitimacy demands in its
case serves as an important corrective to this general presumption.
Of course, there are other systems of oppression at work in the United States that also
undermine its legitimacy, including patriarchy, colonialism, racism against other groups besides
African Americans, etc., which I will bracket for now to better focus on the case of racial
oppression against African Americans. A fully comprehensive account of what transitional
legitimacy will require in the United States would need to consider these other systems of
oppression and how they intersect with one another. Below I consider the following four general
requirements of transitional legitimacy and analyze how the United States fails to meet them and
how it can begin to: the public reaffirmation of political equality for oppressed groups, the rule of
law to guard against group-based discrimination, effective de facto protections of democratic rights
especially for oppressed minorities, and reparations for past and ongoing injustices. What unifies
these four requirements of transitional legitimacy is that they all aim to undo and transform
structures of (racial) oppression and injustice and their ongoing legacies and effects so as to realize
legitimate political institutions.

§5.4.1 PUBLIC REAFFIRMATION OF POLITICAL
EQUALITY FOR OPPRESSED GROUPS
Just as publicity is a necessary condition of justice: justice must not only be done, but also
be seen to be done, so too is publicity necessary for legitimacy: for a political entity to be legitimate,
it must be seen to be legitimate. Publicity means that institutions that realize certain principles (of
justice or legitimacy) are transparently in accord with those principles (Christiano 2008, 51). If
justice must be public and legitimacy is a constitutive or necessary component of justice, then this
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seems to constitute a prima facie case as to why legitimacy must also be public. But there are also
more direct arguments, both formal and substantive, as to why legitimacy requires publicity.
First, the point of legitimacy as a value is to provide practical guidance to individuals in
regards to when a political entity has the right to make and enforce laws and when members should
obey or not interfere with those laws. But if a political entity could not be seen by individuals to
be legitimate, then this would defeat the action-guiding purpose behind legitimacy. So, it is not
simply the case that publicity is instrumentally valuable for facilitating legitimacy insofar as
members who see a political entity as legitimate will be more likely to respect its right to rule and
obey or not interfere with its laws—though this is true as well. Instead, there are reasons internally
connected to legitimacy as a value as to why for political entities to be legitimate, they must be
publicly so.
Second, insofar as legitimacy substantively requires democracy and democracy
necessitates publicity, then legitimacy must be public as well. Political institutions must not only
be democratic but be transparently in accord with democracy. Democratic procedures, for instance,
must be seen to be democratic. Voting mechanisms must be publicly known to be fair and to
institutionally realize the equal right of all members to participate in collective decision-making.
The deliberations and proceedings of legislation must be made publicly available to all. The reason
why democratic decision-making procedures must be public comes from their grounding in a
substantive principle of equality. Democracy itself is based on the notion that members are political
equals to one another and thus must be publicly treated as such (Christiano 2008, chaps. 2 and 3).
For the political entity of an ill-ordered society to be seen to be legitimate, transitional
legitimacy requires the public acknowledgment of past injustices and the reaffirmation of the status
of members of oppressed groups as political equals. Publicly affirming the political equality of all
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members, after all, just is a constitutive part of treating them as political equals, which is necessary
for legitimacy understood democratically. Public and officially sanctioned acknowledgment of
past injustices is important for marking a break between the current and past regime, especially
when ruling political institutions have themselves been complicit or responsible in perpetuating
these injustices. Failure to do otherwise risks condoning past injustices and their legacies.
Many concrete measures can be taken to acknowledge past injustices and affirm political
equality such as truth commissions, official records of past abuses, monuments, memorials,
museums, national holidays, educational curricula, changes in political symbols, etc. Though the
United States has implemented some of these measures to a degree in acknowledging slavery and
Jim Crow (e.g., erecting a National Museum of African American History and Culture as part of
the Smithsonian, establishing national holidays to commemorate Martin Luther King Jr. and Black
History Month, etc.), its affirmation of the political equality of African Americans is at best
incomplete. Rodney Roberts (2017, 522–23), for instance, has argued that the 2009 United States
Congressional apology to African Americans for slavery and Jim Crow fails as a legitimate
apology. Congress made it a point to pass the resolution with a disclaimer explicitly stating that
the resolution did not authorize, support, or serve as a settlement of any claim against the United
States. By denying that the resolution supports any claim whatsoever for the concrete rectification
of the injustices being apologized for, the disclaimer effectively negates any acknowledgment of
wrongdoing and renders the apology empty. Additionally, the resolution was not widely broadcast
or published, which undermines its ability to function as a public acknowledgment of past
injustices and a public affirmation of the equal political status of African Americans. Consider too
how monuments of Confederate war heroes and symbols of the Confederacy, such as the
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Confederate battle flag associated with slavery and resistance to the civil rights movement,
continue to be displayed, often in an official capacity particularly in southern states.93
A truth commission of the sort proposed in House Resolution 40—which would establish
one to study the history of slavery, racism, and its present-day effects and recommend appropriate
remedies including whether and how reparations should be provided—would go some way toward
acknowledging past and ongoing racial injustices and affirming the political equality of all.
However, since first being proposed by Representative John Conyers Jr. in 1989 (originally as H.R.
3745) and its subsequent introduction in some form each year since, such a bill has unfortunately
never been passed by Congress.
My aim here is not necessarily to advocate for any specific package of recommendations
for publicly acknowledging past racial injustices and affirming the status of African Americans as
political equals. Nonetheless, insofar as racism persists as an ongoing injustice not simply
relegated to the past (the notion of the United States as a post-racial society is, of course, illusory
and serves to ideologically perpetuate racial oppression), public reaffirmation of the political
equality of all, particularly African Americans, must be ongoing as well to meet the demands of
transitional legitimacy. Of course, a large reason why the public affirmation of the status of African
Americans as political equals remains incomplete is precisely because insufficient changes to the
basic political institutions of the United States have been made to address, dismantle, and rectify
existing structures of racial oppression.
Nonetheless, measures to acknowledge past injustices and affirm the political equality of
members of oppressed groups are not simply symbolic or expressive, as if this were an ancillary
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Of course, it is another question what should be done with such monuments or symbols—whether, among other
options, they should be destroyed or placed in a museum so as not to erase history. Regardless, the uncritical and
unabashed display of such monuments, memorials, and symbols serves to publicly denigrate the status of African
Americans as political equals.
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or trivial concern. Rather, it is their very symbolic and expressive functions that are necessary for
transitional legitimacy given a) the requirement of publicity and b) the need to publicly rectify the
open treatment of some members as political inferiors in the past within ill-ordered societies. The
normative significance of such symbolic or expressive measures thus are not primarily grounded
in their instrumental potential to promote healing, political trust, or reconciliation, as some
theorists of transitional justice emphasize. On the contrary, the goal and language of reconciliation,
rather than transitional legitimacy, can itself be problematic in endorsing assimilationist agendas,
assuming pre-existing harmonious relationships and the possibility of closure, and exculpating the
state of its authorization and participation in injustices by positioning it as the reconciling mediator
between conflicting groups (Schaap 2008).

§5.4.2 THE RULE OF LAW TO GUARD AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The rule of law is another necessary component to realizing legitimate political institutions
within an ill-ordered society. The rule of law refers to a set of formal, procedural, and (more
controversially) substantive requirements that laws must follow if they are to figure in the practical
reasoning of citizens and officials (Waldron 2016). Formal requirements are constituted by what
Lon Fuller (1964) calls the “inner morality of law”: generality, publicity, prospectivity,
intelligibility, consistency, practicability, stability, and congruence. Procedural requirements
include such things as hearings by an impartial and independent tribunal; a right to representation
by counsel; a right to be present, to confront and question witnesses, and to make legal arguments
in one’s defense; and a right to hear the reasoning behind a tribunal’s decision (Tashima 2008,
264). Finally, substantive requirements may include the protection of basic human rights (Bingham
2010, 67), although disagreement exists as to whether radically unjust laws can nonetheless adhere
to the rule of law in virtue of meeting certain formal and procedural requirements (Raz 2009).
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The rule of law is a necessary condition for legitimacy either because a) it is required for
individuals to form reliable expectations (about what the law demands and how it will be enforced)
on the basis of which they can guide their actions, which as I argued above is part of the point of
the value of legitimacy, or b) more strongly, the rule of law is analytically fundamental to the
concept of law such that for a legitimate political entity to have the right to rule through laws and
to generate political obligations for members to obey its laws as laws necessitates the rule of law
(at least its formal components) that is characteristic of legality itself (Waldron 2008; Simmonds
2008). It is difficult to see, for instance, how completely arbitrary or capricious demands, which
flagrantly flaunt the rule of law, can even count as laws in the first place.
Mass incarceration and racial discrimination throughout the United States criminal justice
system are clear cases in which the rule of law is violated. Despite the fact that the criminal justice
system is formally race-neutral and the United States has constitutionally entrenched protections
against racial discrimination, huge racial disparities nonetheless exist at every stage of the criminal
justice process including the initial stop, search, arrest, plea bargaining, and sentencing (Alexander
2012). According to the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the incarceration
rate of African Americans in 2017 was nearly six times that of whites (Gramlich 2019).
The system of racialized mass incarceration clearly violates various formal requirements
of the rule of law such as consistency (since it is differentially and discriminatorily applied based
on race) and congruence (since there is a wide gap between the declared rules, which are raceneutral, and their enforcement, which is not). Additionally, procedural requirements of the rule of
law are also violated because defendants are regularly denied meaningful legal representation and
pressured by the threat of lengthy sentences to accept unfavorable plea bargains. Prosecutors may
be arbitrary or racially discriminatory in who they decide to prosecute and for what crimes. Police
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also employ tactics of intimidation, coercion, and violence to pressure suspects to waive their
Miranda rights (to remain silent, to an attorney, etc.) or their right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure, which also infringe on the procedural elements of the rule of law. More
generally, police brutality against African Americans, particularly African American men, violate
not only the formal and procedural requirements of the rule of law, but also substantive
requirements including basic rights to life and physical security, which means that the United
States is illegitimate even according to an extremely minimalist human rights account of
legitimacy. Regardless of whether one thinks that prisons should be reformed (Shelby 2018) or
abolished entirely as inherently racist (Davis 2003; Gilmore 2017), it is clear that the system of
racialized mass incarceration in the United States undermines its legitimacy in many ways.
Of course, I do not deny that racialized mass incarceration is also unjust (in virtue of many
of the same features that make it illegitimate but also for other reasons as well). Consider the
following ways in which mass incarceration is unjust, which may be over and beyond its
contribution to illegitimacy. After their prison sentences, ex-offenders are often ineligible for
various sorts of education, housing, welfare, and other public benefits; they may have a difficult
time finding employment; and they may no longer be permitted to vote or to serve on juries. Insofar
as African Americans enter the criminal justice system at a higher rate than whites, then these sorts
of disadvantages faced by those exiting prisons (though not escaping the criminal justice system
as a whole) are unjust (even if completely legal) in their perpetuation of racial inequalities. These
disadvantages could also be seen as threatening the legitimacy (and not just the justness) of the
United States insofar as they contribute to the stigma of African Americans as criminals and
pariahs to be ousted from the social and political community. This violates the equal political status
of African Americans, which is a requirement of legitimacy. Additionally, by directly denying
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some the right to vote, felon disenfranchisement is illegitimate according to a democratic account
of legitimacy.
Nonetheless, there is room to push back against the claim that these sorts of disadvantages
that ex-offenders suffer contribute to the illegitimacy of the United States, even if they do
contribute to its unjustness (though, to be clear, I do not endorse these arguments). It could be
claimed, for instance, that ex-offenders deserve to incur various disadvantages, including the loss
of public benefits and even voting rights, in virtue of their crimes (perhaps because they violated
some sort of social contract and so now the benefits of that contract are justifiably withheld from
them). The problem, according to this view, is not the tying of disadvantages to ex-offenders, but
racial discrimination within the system itself. Moreover, the denial of various public benefits to
ex-offenders, it could be argued, is a matter of social and economic rights that are within the scope
of justice at large but not necessarily the more delimited concern of legitimacy. They do not
undermine the equal political status of ex-offenders, which is protected through other basic civil
rights. And in any case, stigmas are social cultural phenomena for which formal political
institutions cannot be responsible and so do not necessarily undermine the protection of the equal
political status of all.
Again, to be clear, I do not agree with these claims. So, I think that ex-offenders do not
deserve the loss of public benefits even under social-contract-type-assumptions since they have
already paid their debt to society (even under the assumption that they owed one) through their
prison sentence, and voting rights should be guaranteed rights and not privileges to be taken or
given away based on so-called “good behavior.” And I think that in the context of racialized mass
incarceration, these sorts of disadvantages do violate the equal political status of African
Americans, are not merely cultural stigmas inasmuch as they are legally entrenched, and thus
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undermine legitimacy and not simply justice. Regardless, I focus on the rule of law here and not
these other sorts of disadvantages imposed on ex-offenders because the rule of law is a rather
minimal or weak demand that is a precondition of legitimacy understood as the right to rule—no
matter how more substantively the content of legitimacy is filled out as requiring democracy or
not—and the normative significance of the rule of law is uncontroversial across the liberal
spectrum (from libertarians on right to social democrats and egalitarians on the left). So, even
under extremely minimal assumptions, it is patently obvious that the United States’ system of
racialized mass incarceration makes it illegitimate (and not merely unjust but still legitimate) by
violating the rule of law in myriad ways.

§5.4.3 EFFECTIVE DE FACTO PROTECTION OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
If one adopts a democratic account of legitimacy, then there must be effective de facto
protection of democratic rights in addition to their formal or de jure recognition so that the equal
rights of all to participate in the decision-making of their political institutions is genuinely
guaranteed. However, in the United States, a litany of voter suppression laws has been passed that
undermine the de facto protection of voting rights under the pretext of preventing voter fraud and
safeguarding election integrity despite little evidence that the risk of voter fraud (due to the causes
these laws seek to mitigate) is serious in any way. These sorts of laws include reductions in early
voting, voting registration restrictions, photo identification and proof of citizenship requirements,
absentee ballot voting restrictions, and gerrymandering. Such voter suppression laws
disproportionately affect African American, Latinx, Native American, and poor voters (as does
felon disenfranchisement) because these groups are more likely to take advantage of early voting
or absentee ballot voting (their job schedules tend to be less flexible), less likely to have photo
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identification or proof of their citizenship at hand, more likely to be locked out by stricter
registration restrictions, etc.
These laws can be understood as continuous with those during Jim Crow, such as literacy
tests, poll taxes, property-ownership requirements, or moral character tests, that likewise sought
to limit voting access for African Americans in practice even if not in name. As such, these laws
violate the Voting Rights Act whose purpose was precisely to eliminate the racial discrimination
of Jim-Crow-era-type de facto restrictions on voting rights (Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Hajnal,
Lajevardi, and Nielson 2017). Of course, there are other ways in which the effective de facto
protection of democratic rights is undermined in the United States including, for instance, the
outsized influenced of money in politics, corporate lobbying, Citizens United, etc. But again, one
could argue that these sorts of democratic deficits are due to wealth inequalities that are within the
purview of distributive justice but not legitimacy, whereas voter suppression laws clearly violate
legitimacy.

§5.4.4 REPARATIONS TO CORRECT FOR PAST AND ONGOING INJUSTICES
Transitional legitimacy also requires reparations for past injustices and their enduring
legacies. Here I focus on material reparations even though symbolic and expressive measures are
also needed to rectify past injustices since I have already discussed these latter mechanisms in
§5.4.1. A policy can be considered part of a reparations program for a particular group that has
suffered past injustices if at least part of its justification and rationale as a policy is to rectify these
wrongs and harms and if it achieves its intended effect (Valls 2018, 38–39). Purely forwardlooking distributive justice policies do not count as reparations even if they have the same material
outcomes since all actions are individuated in terms of the description under which they are carried
out, which include the relevant reasoning and beliefs according to which that action is taken (Mills
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2017, 172). Simply realizing a certain distribution of goods, in other words, is not equivalent to
rectifying past wrongs. Full distributive justice is thus neither necessary nor sufficient for
transitional legitimacy (it is not sufficient according to the reason above and it is not necessary
since a political entity can be legitimate even if not fully just). This is not to say that reparations
themselves are purely backward-looking. On the contrary, reparations when considered from the
perspective of transitional legitimacy intertwine both backward- and forward-looking aims
because they link the rectification of past and enduring injustices with structural transformation so
that legitimate political institutions can be realized (Valls 2018, 32; Murphy 2017, 112–13). More
concretely, reparations for African Americans need not take the form of monetary payments to
individuals but can be conceptualized instead as a domestic Marshall plan for Black communities
(an analogy that Martin Luther King Jr. (1963, 127) himself drew), which would entail broadbased social policies on, for instance, poverty, housing, employment, education, business loans,
etc. to rectify racial inequalities (Valls 2003, 68; 2018, 39–41).
Though reparations may be understood simply as a demand of corrective justice (Mills
2017) or even supported in some way by distributive justice (even if simply distributive policies
do not themselves constitute reparations) (Valls 2018, 33–34; Shelby 2004), they are also
importantly justified as a requirement of transitional legitimacy. One might worry that since
reparations entail the redistribution of money, opportunities, or other material goods of some sort,
they must fall within the ambit of justice but not legitimacy. To tie material distributional concerns
to legitimacy would set the bar too high for legitimacy and risk conflating it with justice, according
to this objection.
To see where this objection goes awry, note that racial injustice, as Mills (2017, 176–78)
points out, is fundamentally a violation of equal personhood. Racial oppression directly violates
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the negative rights of non-interference with life, liberty, and property and so can be condemned by
liberals of all variants, whether right-leaning libertarians or left-leaning egalitarians. Appeal to
positive rights, social rights, or economic rights (of the sort endorsed by left-liberals but not rightliberals) is not needed to explain the wrong of racial injustice. Compare racial injustice with class
injustice, which concerns the worst-off who lose out in a fair competition (fair at least according
to capitalist norms) and their children who are disadvantaged as a result. But “to be on the lower
rung of the social ladder because of bad luck in the social lottery is different from being on a lower
rung because of social oppression that denies equal personhood.” So, whereas “class injustice is
[only] anti-left-liberal,” “racial injustice is anti-liberal” more generally (178). Reparations for
racial injustice, although they take material form, are not merely violations of social, economic, or
welfare rights, which are within the domain of distributive justice but not legitimacy. Rather,
reparations seek to rectify violations to moral, legal, and political equality, which are properly a
matter of legitimacy (even if also justice). The mistake of the objection above lies in thinking that
reparations only rectify distributional wrongs and not wrongs to personhood. This shows again
how conceiving of reparations solely from the vantage point of distributive justice misses the mark.
Recall Christiano’s (2008, 232–34) assertion that only a reasonably just political entity can
be legitimate or Buchanan’s (2007, 250, 254, 259) qualification that democracy is necessary for
legitimacy only where feasible. Both gesture at certain preconditions that must be met before a
political entity can be legitimate but do not tell us how to realize those preconditions under nonideal circumstances. Transitional legitimacy, in contrast, does address this question. In particular,
reparations can be understood as necessary for bringing an ill-ordered society structured by
oppression and past injustices toward a reasonably just state so that the legitimacy of its political
institutions can be realized. Likewise, by implementing the material and institutional measures
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needed to rectify past violations of the equal political status of oppressed groups, reparations
remove a central obstacle to the feasibility of democratic institutions, which is fundamentally
based on the political equality of all. It might be said that whereas full or perfect justice requires
legitimacy, transitional legitimacy requires corrective justice (the directions of requirement are
opposite). Realizing legitimate political institutions from within ill-ordered societies requires, as a
precondition, the rectification of past systems of oppression and their ongoing legacies.
It will be important to note, though, that corrective justice here should not be understood
according to a tort-based, bi-lateral, and individual model where one individual wrongly harms
another, which entitles the victim to be restored to her status quo ante condition or compensated
so that she is as well-off as if the wrongdoing had not occurred (D. Miller 2017, sec. 2.2; Valls
2018, 23; Murphy 2017, 96–100).94 Understanding reparations according to this tort model of
corrective justice often raises theoretical complications such as collective and historical
responsibility across generations, counterfactual calculations, and nonidentity problems. However,
a tort framework of corrective justice is ill-equipped to address large-scale abuses and systematic
oppression for various reasons. In cases of large-scale and enduring structures of oppression, there
may be no coherent way to conceptualize a status quo ante condition (Walker 2006). There is no
point in United States history, for instance, in which African Americans have not had their rights
violated. Closure in the shape of settling a tort claim is also unlikely to be forthcoming in the case
of large-scale and deeply rooted injustices, which will require instead an ongoing commitment to
address.
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For a different understanding of corrective justice that is not simply modeled after tort law, see Shelby (2004, 12–
13) who includes as components of corrective justice both principles of reform and revolution that concern
transforming unjust institutional arrangements into just ones and principles of rectification that deal with remedying
injuries and losses resulting from ongoing or past injustices. Shelby’s interpretation of corrective justice, I would
argue, implicitly contains within it a notion of transition (particularly in its normative sense) rather than mere
correction and so could be in fact better characterized as transitional justice.
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Corrective justice, according to a tort model, is a purely backward-looking affair, whereas
transitional legitimacy, as I have emphasized, intertwines both backward- and forward-looking
concerns. Also, structural oppression does not simply consist of harms carried out by individual
private citizens to be mediated by the state but is instead also perpetuated and authorized by
political institutions (Valls 2018, 25–26). Reparations cannot be modeled off of assigning liability
based on individual transactions and interactions, but must instead involve overhauling the basic
terms by which social relations and political institutions are structured (Murphy 2017, 100–104).
Grounding reparations as a requirement of transitional legitimacy rather than a tort model of
corrective justice helps to sidestep or is additional to (depending on one’s view) issues of historical
responsibility for past injustices. Everyone has good reason to support or contribute to repairing
past injustices, regardless of their own responsibility or complicity in perpetuating those injustices,
because everyone has interests in living under legitimate political institutions (Winter 2014, 29;
Galoob 2016, 252). As Winter (2014) put it: “State redress claims do not assign rectificatory
liability to past agents. Rather, they concern the legitimacy of present political orders” (39).

§5.5 CONCLUSION
More often than not, the criticism of ideal theory occurs in the context of discussing the
value of justice. But theories of legitimacy are much less frequently subjected to the same scrutiny
from non-ideal theory. Perhaps this is because (to quote a self-avowed ideal theorist, irony
notwithstanding) “justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought,”
which cements its place as the center of attention for social and political theorizing (Rawls 1999,
3). Or perhaps it is because legitimacy is thought of as a weaker demand than justice and so
accounts of legitimacy are already engaged, to an extent, in thinking about non-ideal circumstances.
However, the inclination to operate from within ideal theory is strong for philosophers. And merely
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from the fact that the target of one’s theorizing is a value less stringent than full or perfect justice,
it does not follow that one is sufficiently attentive to non-ideal circumstances.
On the contrary, as I have argued, most theories of legitimacy are inadequately informed
by non-ideal circumstances even as the intramural debates among them can often be re-interpreted
as objections that take a non-ideal theory approach. Attention to non-ideal circumstances helps to
demonstrate that a democratic account of legitimacy should be preferred over others. But even
then, theories of legitimacy need to be supplemented by the concept that I call transitional
legitimacy. After all, theories of legitimacy only purport to tell us the conditions that constitute
legitimacy but are silent as to how to realize legitimate political institutions from within ill-ordered
societies, which is within the purview of transitional legitimacy.
By analogizing and comparing transitional legitimacy with transitional justice—in terms
of their respective circumstances and problems and via an evaluation of the descriptive and
normative senses of the term “transition”—we can hone in more clearly on the notion of
transitional legitimacy. The content of transitional legitimacy, as I argued by examining the case
of racial oppression against African Americans, generally requires the public reaffirmation of the
equal political status of oppressed members (through truth commissions, legitimate apologies,
changes in political symbols, educational curricula, and the like), the rule of law to guard against
racial discrimination (and thus the dismantling of the United States’ system of racialized mass
incarceration), effective de facto protection of rights to democratic participation rather than voter
suppression laws, and reparations to correct for past and enduring injustices. What ties these four
general requirements of transitional legitimacy (and their more specific attendant measures)
together is that they all aim to undo or transform structures of (racial) oppression and injustice,
including their ongoing legacies and effects, in order to realize legitimate political institutions. By
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considering the concept of transitional legitimacy, weaker though the demands of legitimacy may
be in comparison to justice, it turns out that there is still much that needs to be done to realize
legitimate political institutions even within a so-called established democracy such as the United
States. Let us make sure that we adequately think through how to transition toward legitimacy
within ill-ordered societies even as (and because) we set our sights on the loftier, more
comprehensive goal of justice.
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CHAPTER 6: SELF-DETERMINATION AS THE GROUND
AND CONSTRAINT FOR THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
Does a people have the territorial right to control its own borders and exclude potential
immigrants and if so, why? The most prominent answer given by political theorists and
philosophers argues that the right to exclude flows from a people’s right to self-determination.
After all, self-determination surely includes, if anything, determining and deciding who the “self”
is, which would entail exercising control over the entry of potential immigrants seeking to join that
very “self” (Wellman 2008, 115; Moore 2015, 197). This seemingly straightforward argument,
however, immediately raises the boundary problem within democratic theory—the problem of
deciding who should be included as a member of the people or demos. To say that a people has the
right to determine who is a part of its “self” risks begging the question against the boundary
problem: what justifies the membership of the people that is determining the “self” in the first
place?
The boundary problem raises the question of whether democratic theory itself can
adequately determine the scope of the people. Many theorists have observed that potential
solutions to the boundary problem must appeal to substantive rather than procedural principles of
democracy, such as majority rule, otherwise an infinite regress ensues, where a people decides
who should be a member of the people deciding, ad infinitum (Goodin 2007, 47; D. Miller 2009,
204; Song 2012, 42). Starting from candidate substantive principles such as an all affected interests
principle or an all subjected to coercion principle, some have argued that a people is in principle
unbounded since everyone is (possibly) affected or coerced by border controls (Goodin 2007;
Abizadeh 2008; 2012). These principles work to solve the boundary problem but by dissolving it.
However, theorists generally have yet to seriously consider how the principle of democratic self-
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determination could itself be employed in a solution to the boundary problem.95 This is surprising
given how self-determination is one of the most common grounds leveraged to justify the right to
exclude and how naturally self-determination can be interpreted democratically (though, as we
have seen in Chapter 2, not everyone does so). Proponents of the self-determination argument for
the right to exclude generally do not face the boundary problem head-on, and solutions to the
boundary problem generally do not appeal to the principle of democratic self-determination.96
In this chapter, I show how the self-determination argument can answer the boundary
problem by appealing to the very principle of democratic self-determination to both ground the
right to exclude and also constrain and determine the scope of that very same right. I will argue
that a people has the qualified right to exclude insofar as it respects the self-determination claims
of outsiders, which will have implications for the claims of both individuals and groups. (I am
assuming here and throughout this chapter that the conditions needed to justify a people having
territorial rights, which I argue for in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, must be satisfied for a people to
have a qualified right to exclude. I take this chapter to be justifying and specifying in greater detail
the external legitimacy constraint on the territorial right to control borders of respecting the selfdetermination claims of outsiders.) It will turn out that sometimes the only way for a people to
respect the self-determination claims of outsiders will be by including, rather than excluding, them
as members.
In §6.1, I lay out the connections between the issue of justifying the right to exclude and
the boundary problem within democratic theory. In §6.2, I briefly reiterate the democratic
interpretation of self-determination that I laid out in Chapter 2. In §6.3, I explain how a people’s
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For an exception to this, see Gould (2004, 174–80).
Song (2017) addresses the boundary problem in her version of the self-determination argument but does not appeal
to the principle of self-determination to answer the boundary problem.
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right to self-determination helps to grounds its right to exclude. In §6.4, I defend my solution to
the boundary problem in which a people has the qualified right to exclude insofar as it respects the
self-determination claims of outsiders. In §6.5, I analyze the concrete implications of the
requirement to respect the self-determination claims of outsiders in the cases of (a) long-term
residents, (b) refugees, and (c) brain drain. I conclude in §6.6 and show how defending a qualified
right to exclude is consistent with saying that affluent peoples should be opening up their borders
much more to meet their global justice duties.

§6.1 THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND THE BOUNDARY PROBLEM
The issue of whether and to what extent a people is justified in excluding potential
immigrants is closely connected to the boundary problem within democratic theory: namely, the
problem of deciding who should be included as a member of the people or demos. Both issues
concern centrally how to justify excluding some from membership in a political society. One
difference is that justifications for or against a people’s right to exclude need not presume a
democratic state, whereas the boundary problem concerns solely the people of a democracy
(although many theorists writing on immigration restrictions do in fact assume the context of a
liberal democratic state and as I have argued, a people must be a democracy if its territorial rights,
including the right to exclude, are to be justified).
The boundary problem raises the question of whether democratic theory itself can provide
any useful guidance in determining the scope of the people. Some theorists deny it can and contend
that the composition of the people is simply set by contingent historical circumstances
(Schumpeter 1976, 243–45; Näsström 2007, 631–33). According to this view, democratic theory
only enters the picture once the scope of the people has already been fixed independently of
democratic considerations. Frederick Whelan (1983), for example, notes, “Democracy, which is a
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method for group decision-making or self-governance, cannot be brought to bear on the logically
prior matter of the constitution of the group itself, the existence of which it presupposes” (40).
Whelan’s (1983, 19) point is that appealing to democratic decision-making procedures, such as
majority rule, cannot settle the boundary problem since it generates an infinite regress in which
there will always need to be a prior people deciding who should be a member of the people doing
the deciding, and so on and so forth.
However, to say that the scope of the people is an entirely contingent matter is intuitively
unsatisfactory from a democratic point of view. Exclusions of women and racial minorities from
membership within a people, far from being merely contingent, seem undemocratic in that they
violate some constitutive element of democracy, such as the idea of political equality (Dahl 1989,
121; D. Miller 2009, 203). Moreover, while Whelan is right that democratic decision-making
procedures generate an infinite regress when deciding the membership of the people, democracy
is not simply a set of procedures but also consists in the underlying values and principles that
justify those procedures (Goodin 2007, 47; D. Miller 2009, 204; Song 2012, 42).
Theorists have thus appealed to different substantive principles within democratic theory
such as an all affected interests principle (Goodin 2007; Owen 2012; Young 2002; Shapiro 2001)
or an all coerced principle (Abizadeh 2008; 2012) in order to address the boundary problem.
According to these principles, all those whose interests are affected by or who are coerced by a
state’s decision-making should have a voice in making those decisions. The upshot of at least some
versions of these principles is that since everyone is (possibly) affected by a state’s decisionmaking or coerced by border regimes, everyone should be included as a member of the people and
thus the demos is in principle unbounded (Goodin 2007; Abizadeh 2008; 2012). These principles
and their applications, though, face certain difficulties. For instance, it is unclear why simply being
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affected, however minimally, entitles one to participate equally as a member, rather than merely
to due consideration of one’s interests or to participate differentially such as by providing input
into the decision-making process (Gould 2006, 176; Owen 2012, 136–43). Likewise, it is unclear
why those outside a people’s borders are coerced by those borders in the same way and to the same
extent as those inside such that they should be included as full and equal members (Song 2016,
236). Evaluating these two principles in greater detail, though, is beyond the scope of this paper. I
point them out mainly to show that possible solutions to the boundary problem must appeal to
normative resources internal to democratic theory understood not merely procedurally but
substantively.97
In contrast, positions on the justifiability of immigration restrictions, ranging from those
that defend open borders to those that argue for a people’s right to exclude, appeal to a wide range
of values and principles beyond simply (though also including) democratic ones, such as
liberalism, justice, nationalism, security, social welfare, economic efficiency, etc. However,
insofar as justifications of the right to exclude potential immigrants do in fact appeal to substantive
democratic principles, then such justifications will require an answer to the boundary problem.
Otherwise, such positions will have to admit that democratic principles alone cannot fully justify
a people’s right to exclude or that the justificatory work is at least implicitly carried out by
principles outside of democratic theory. Additionally, if one assumes the context of a democratic
state when evaluating immigration restrictions (as many theorists do) or defends the position as I
do that the self-determination of a people requires democracy, then there is even more reason to
explicitly consider whether a democracy can justify its right to exclude by relying solely on the
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For a critical discussion of the all affected interests principle and a defense of an all importantly or relevantly
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democratic principles upon which it is based—that is, whether justifications of the right to exclude
can successfully address the challenge of the boundary problem.
It would be theoretically unsatisfying if democratic theory were unable to answer the
foundational question of how to determine the scope of the people and justify exclusions from
membership especially since the normative resources internal to democratic theory seem prima
facie to bear on this issue. This is, of course, not to deny that more comprehensive accounts of the
justifiability of immigration restrictions could be given that factored in values and principles in
addition to democratic ones, though such accounts would need to resolve questions regarding not
only what different values require but also how to appropriately balance between them. Indeed, I
will later show how my position defending a qualified right to exclude grounded in the principle
of democratic self-determination is consistent with justice-based reasons for more open borders.
However, to shore up any perceived limitations of democratic principles in answering the
boundary problem by appealing to non-democratic values amounts to giving up wholesale on the
boundary problem as a problem internal to democratic theory. It is worth exploring, then, whether
democratic justifications of the right to exclude can successfully address the challenge of the
boundary problem, taken on their own and without assuming any substantive account of other
values and what they entail for immigration controls, before resorting to normative resources
outside of democratic theory.

§6.2 A PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
One prominent argument for a people’s right to exclude appeals to the right to selfdetermination, which raises the boundary problem especially if self-determination is construed
along democratic lines (Walzer 1983; D. Miller 2005, 193–206; 2016; Wellman 2008; Pevnick
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2011; Song 2017; 2018). Before considering this argument in more detail, I will first reiterate the
value of self-determination and its democratic interpretation, which I laid out in Chapter 2.
The right to self-determination generally refers to a group’s right to decide for itself the
nature and course of its common affairs and is understood as having an internal and external
dimension. Internally, a group has the right to set the terms of its common activities. Externally, a
group has the right to be free from external interference (given certain justice, human rights, and
ecological sustainability constraints to the right to non-interference) (Cassese 1995, 5–12). The
two aspects of self-determination are ultimately two sides of the same coin in which the external
side can be understood as parasitic on the internal one. Outsiders have a duty not to interfere with
a group’s own governance precisely because it is the group itself that should decide the direction
and shape of its common affairs. The right of peoples to self-determination is recognized by
international law in, for instance, Article 1 of the UN Charter and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
Of course, many interpretations of the meaning of self-determination have been
promulgated especially since it became a fixture of international law applied to issues such as
decolonization, secession, and even the claims of Indigenous peoples (Cassese 1995; Anaya 2004).
Not all of these interpretations understand self-determination as a democratic principle. One
notable interpretation defends the value of national self-determination in which rights to selfdetermination should be accorded to nations understood as a distinctive sort of cultural group (with
the relevant features spelled out differently by different theories) (Walzer 1983; Margalit and Raz
1990; Tamir 1993; D. Miller 1995; 2000; 2012; Meisels 2009). These positions, as I pointed out
in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, will have to overcome problems such as defining the controversial
elements of nationhood and explaining why well-ordered multi-national political societies should
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(or should not) be broken apart. Additionally, by marking nations out pre-politically and grounding
their ethical value independently of democratic considerations, nationalist interpretations of selfdetermination circumvent rather than answer the boundary problem.
Out of the various possible understandings of self-determination, the democratic
interpretation is a rather intuitive one to make and is expressed, at least implicitly, in several UN
documents.98 Carol Gould (2006, 48) has argued that democracy, understood in broad normative
terms (rather than as simply a set of procedures or political institutions) as the equal right of all
individuals to participate in the decision making concerning their common activities, includes the
notion of self-determination at its very core. An activity is common when a group of individuals
joins together to realize certain shared ends where such activity is not simply reducible to a mere
aggregation of individual activities (Gould 1988, 78–79; 2004, 175). Since no one engaged in
common activities has any more of a right to determine them than any other, the right to determine
these activities necessarily takes the form of codetermination by the collective—that is, selfdetermination understood as a group right.99 “Group rights” as Gould (2001, 48) notes, “pertain to
groups as constituted entities and thus derive from the rights of constituent individuals who are
members of the group and who have these group rights insofar as they are members of the group
and not apart from these relations to each other” (48).
Gould (2006, 50) has argued that the very existence of common activities is normatively
significant as contexts relevant for democratic decision-making and can stop the circularity of
constituting the demos via democratic procedures, which the boundary problem raises. Wherever
common activities are underway, regardless of how they have arisen—democratically or not, all
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For other theorists that chart connections between self-determination and democracy, see Philpott (1995), Altman
and Wellman (2009, chap. 2), and Song (2017; 2018) .
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For an articulation of self-determination understood as a group right that builds upon Gould's theory, see Brian
Mello (2004).
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participants will have equal rights to co-determine those activities. I agree that common activities
have a role to play in addressing the boundary problem by determining the contexts relevant for
democratic governance. In the case of immigration restrictions, though, I will argue that additional
conditions must be fulfilled to further and fully legitimize the boundaries of a people, since there
remains the question as to what justifies excluding potential immigrations from participating in
the common activities of a people in the first place.100 Of course, were they already involved in
those common activities, then they should be afforded equal rights of participation. Additionally,
as I mentioned in the Introduction, because a people’s right to control borders involves preventing
outsiders from moving into its territory—outsiders whom the people is not claiming jurisdiction
over, the right to exclude is subject to certain external legitimacy constraints that the right to
jurisdictional authority is not (D. Miller 2012, 253–54; Stilz 2011, 573–74).
Besides saying that the common activities of a people identify a domain relevant for
democracy, other theorists have argued that there are reasons internal to democracy for why a
people should be bounded (sometimes specifically by a state).101 Sarah Song (2012, 58–60), for
instance, argues that a people should be bounded by a territorial state because such a state secures
both constitutive and instrumental conditions of democracy—namely, the substantive rights and
freedoms required for political equality in the first instance, and solidarity between members and
clear links of accountability between representatives and constituents in the second. The logic of
Song’s argument, however, need not solely apply to modern nation-states as currently configured,

100

To be fair to Gould (2004, 174–80; 2006, 54–55), she argues that when addressing the boundary problem, a
common activity principle can be supplemented by a principle of all importantly or relevantly affected interests
interpreted in terms of human rights.
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Joseph Lampert (2015)also argues that the all affected interest principle, which I do not fully evaluate in this paper,
requires recognizing the interest that people have in a viable democratic political order, which territorial states
contingently fulfill in contemporary circumstances. While citizens should authorize and control their immigration and
border control policies, they must do so via institutions that are accountable to potential immigrants on the basis of
their affected interests.
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but rather generalizes to any political institutions of the relevant kind that could secure the
conditions of democracy that she identifies. In other words, we can understand Song’s argument
as showing more broadly that peoples should be bounded territorially because this enables them
to establish and maintain political institutions (whether in the form of a state or not) that realize
the substantive conditions of democracy. Thomas Christiano (2006, 85–87, 97–99) likewise argues
that the domain of democracy should be bounded by what he terms a “common world” in which
individuals have roughly equal stakes and their fundamental interests are deeply intertwined,
because it is only in such a world that the principle of public equality, which he takes to justify
democracy, can be realized. 102 Such arguments are often accompanied by worries about the
democratic deficits that a world state or transnational institutions may especially suffer from such
as exacerbating or engendering tyranny, inequities, persistent minorities, elite control, corruption,
and the like (Song 2012, 60–62; Christiano 2006, 100–105).
Such arguments show that the historical contingency of a people’s territorially bounded
common activities—in that they must occupy some place, but they could have occupied any
number of other places—is not morally irrelevant from a democratic point of view. This contrasts
with thinkers like Frederick Whelan who take the historical contingency of the composition of the
people as a brute fact to be accepted prior to (and so irrelevant for) democratic theorizing. In
addition to being historically contingent, a people’s boundaries are also often the product of
morally arbitrary and even unjust forces such as wars, colonialism, etc. Such arbitrary and unjust
origins may necessitate corrective justice and indicate the need to organize common activities
democratically and equally, but they do not show that territorially bounded common activities are

Christiano’s (2006) characterization of a common world in which “the fulfillment of all or nearly all of the
fundamental interests of each person are connected with the fulfillment of all or nearly all of the fundamental interests
of every other person” is, however, too strong and public equality can still be realized in the context of territorially
bounded common activities that are not necessarily marked by such a deep and ubiquitous interdependence (85).
102
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necessarily democratically suspect (Blake 2003, 227–28; Christiano 2006, 87; Nine 2012, 68).
Stable democratic political institutions achieved, in the ideal case, through the collective efforts of
individual working together intergenerationally over a given territory secure substantive
conditions of democracy that are worth protecting.
I think Song and Christiano’s arguments, just like Gould’s, can go some but not all the way
in addressing the boundary problem. Song and Christiano show that there are democratic grounds
for why peoples should be bounded and why the boundary problem should not simply be dissolved
by conceiving of the people as unbounded in principle. However, these arguments focus on the
inside, as it were, and on how the boundedness of a people is important for securing substantive
values underlying democracy (whether the constitutive conditions of political equality or the
instrumental conditions of solidarity and accountability) but only for members within those
boundaries. This begs the question against the boundary problem since the issue raised is how to
decide the membership of the people in the first place, and specifically, in the case of immigration,
how to justify the exclusion of potential immigrants from membership. While these arguments
show that a people should have some (de dicto) boundaries, they do not adequately legitimize the
particular boundaries that are ultimately and contingently settled upon and the specific exclusions
these boundaries generate. Fully legitimizing such exclusions and answering the challenge of the
boundary problem will require, as I shall argue below, that a people consider the claims of outsiders
(by respecting their self-determination) and not simply secure the substantive conditions of
democracy for its own members, which would then constitute the external legitimacy constraints
on a people’s right to exclude. The legitimacy of the people, as Sofia Näsström ( 2007) calls it, is
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an ongoing task and must be continuously sustained by a people in terms of how it relates to those
it constitutes as outsiders.103

§6.3 SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
So, self-determination can very naturally be interpreted democratically and understood as
a right belonging to peoples. Not only does the very existence of a people’s common activities
generate rights to self-determination but there are also democratic reasons why a people should be
understood as bounded. Let us consider next how a right to exclude can be derived from (with
qualifications) the right to self-determination. There are at least two reasons for this. First,
immigration rates and the demographic balance of immigrants will affect the nature and course of
many of a people’s common activities concerning, for instance, the economy, education,
healthcare, the environment, etc. So, if peoples are to be able to determine the course of their
common activities, then an important element of this will involve some kind of control over
immigration. For historically marginalized and vulnerable peoples, such as many Indigenous
peoples, the right to exclude will be especially important for protecting their ways of life on their
land from outside, especially colonial, encroachment (Moore 2015, 200).
The second (and even more direct) reason for why a people’s right to self-determination
entails (with qualifications) a right to exclude is that part of self-determination involves deciding
and exercising control over what the “self” is (Wellman 2008, 115; Moore 2015, 197). After all,
this is exactly what members of a people are doing when they decide the course of their common
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Compare the legitimacy of the people with the legitimacy of the state or government, which must also be
continuously sustained in terms of how the state or government relates to its people by, according to different views,
being democratically accountable to them, fulfilling certain minimal conditions of justice such as the protection of
basic rights, or meeting some other standard. It is an interesting question, which I cannot tackle here, whether and how
the legitimacy of the people bears on legitimacy of its state or government.
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activities since it is precisely those activities that are a proper part of what the people is. A people
just is, in part, a set of persons engaged in common activities and is not simply reducible to those
persons individually. As Seyla Benhabib (2004)writes, “every act of self-legislation is also an act
of self-constitution. ‘We, the people,’ who agree to bind ourselves by these laws, are also defining
ourselves as a ‘we’ in the very act of self-legislation” (45). Is not determining who should be a
member of the people, then, on par with determining the course of a people’s common activities
in that both are ways of exercising control over what the “self” is?
However, this is precisely where the boundary problem raises its thorny head. To say that
a people has the right to exercise control over what its “self” is begs the question of what justifies
the membership of the people that is deciding who can be a part of the “self” in the first place.
Rather than saying, though, that this amounts to a damning objection against the self-determination
argument for the right to exclude, I want to hold onto the insight that an important part of selfdetermination is indeed exercising control over what the “self” is while at the same time seeing if
we can provide a satisfactory answer to the boundary problem. I, of course, cannot consider all the
objections that could be levied against the self-determination argument in this chapter even though
I take myself to have presented a prima facie case in favor of it. Nonetheless, there is reason to
consider the challenge of the boundary problem in particular since the self-determination argument
internally raises the boundary problem (as a problem within democratic theory) on its own grounds
insofar as self-determination is given a democratic interpretation. Additionally, the solution to the
boundary problem that I will defend ultimately will constrain and qualify the right to exclude,
which may consequently make it more palatable to some of its objectors.
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§6.4 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANSWERING THE BOUNDARY PROBLEM
How can justifications for the right to exclude based on the principle of self-determination
(interpreted democratically) answer the boundary problem that is inevitably raised? To address the
challenge of the boundary problem, I will argue that a people has the qualified right to exclude, as
grounded in its right to self-determination, insofar as it respects the self-determination claims of
those it constitutes as outsiders, which will include both individuals and groups. Respecting the
self-determination of outsiders, as I will show, is not simply a necessary condition for a people
having the right to exclude but also constrains and determines the scope of that very right. As we
have seen, potential solutions to the boundary problem must appeal to substantive rather than
procedural principles of democracy otherwise they risk generating an infinite regress (of a people
deciding who should be a member of the people deciding, ad infinitum). So, the argumentative
strategy employed here to answer the boundary problem appeals to the very principle of democratic
self-determination used to ground the right to exclude that raised the boundary problem in the first
place.
One might wonder how this argumentative strategy is viable rather than circular since it
seems suspicious that the very same principle of self-determination both generates and at the same
time resolves the puzzle of the boundary problem. However, to see the viability of this strategy,
note that the boundary problem is raised when the focus is on the self-determination of a people
and its right to exclude, understood without qualification. What generates the boundary problem
is the premise that an important part of self-determination is exercising control over what the “self”
is, which thereby grounds the right to exclude. The boundary problem is resolved, though, when
the focus is on the self-determination of outsiders, which in turn constrains a people’s right to
exclude, now no longer understood without qualification. The boundary problem is raised by the
principle of self-determination on the “inside,” as it were, and resolved by the same principle on
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the “outside,” as I shall argue. It is rather felicitous in fact that when it comes to immigration
restrictions, the very same substantive principle of democracy that raises the boundary problem
also resolves it, since the whole challenge of the boundary problem, as a problem within
democratic theory, is to see whether there are resources internal to democratic theory that can
address it.
What justifies the claim, then, that a people has the qualified right to exclude, as grounded
in its right to self-determination, insofar as it respects the self-determination claims of those it
constitutes as outsiders? First, in order for a people’s right to self-determination to be valid, it must
respect the self-determination claims held by others. To do otherwise would be to arbitrarily claim
for oneself what one denies to others (Banai 2013, 60–61). Additionally, because a people’s very
self-determination depends on the recognition by outsiders (hence the internal and external faces
of self-determination being two sides of the same coin), a people is bound by the commitments in
its own claim to self-determination to recognize and respect the self-determination claims of others
as well.104 Since a people’s right to exclude is itself grounded in its right to self-determination, a
people cannot exercise its right to exclude in a way that violates the self-determination of others.
The principle of democratic self-determination is sometimes characterized as particularist
in nature since it emphasizes the particular attachments and ties of belonging that members of a
people have to one another and not others.105 The particularism of democratic self-determination
and the exclusion it justifies is thus seen as standing in tension with the universalist commitments
of liberalism (whether to individual freedom, equality, or human rights) upon which open border
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Hinsley and Dahbour (2013, 173, 192) make similar points, though in the context of sovereignty as a recognitive
norm, which I take it that self-determination rights may but do not necessarily give rise to. According to Hinsley
(1986), “a state which claims to be free of limit and control within its community is bound in logic to concede the
same freedom to other states in theirs” (192).
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According to Miller (1995), ethical particularism is the view that “agents are already encumbered with a variety of
ties and commitments to particular other agents, or to groups or collectivities, and they begin their ethical reasoning
from these commitments” (50).
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proponents 106 often base their arguments. 107 However, the position I am staking out here
challenges this framing of the issue that pits particularist democracy against universalist liberalism
and does not interpret the principle of democratic self-determination in a particularist vein. Even
though the principle of democratic self-determination does take as morally significant the
particular attachments that members of a people have to one another and their territory due to their
common activities, it does not value these attachments at the expense of the legitimate claims of
outsiders. On the contrary, it is the very universalist form of the principle of self-determination
that requires a people to respect the self-determination claims of outsiders even in the exercise of
its right to exclude as grounded in its right to self-determination. Thus, while the content of the
principle of self-determination values claims that could be described as having a particularist
character (in that they are based in relationships that hold between specific agents, groups, and
places), the universalist form of the principle commits claimants to the equal validity of all other
claims that are also grounded in that very principle.
One might object that the requirement to respect the self-determination claims of outsiders
is rather vacuous and cannot set many constraints on a people’s right to exclude since all it amounts
to is the need for peoples to mutually respect each other’s group rights to self-determination. First,
as we shall see in the case of brain drain and ecological refugee peoples, respect for the group
rights to self-determination of other peoples by itself may already set some constraints on a
people’s right to exclude. Second, the requirement to respect the self-determination claims of
outsiders includes claims held not only by groups but by individuals as well. After all, the reason

106
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freedom and universal equality.
107

215

for this requirement is not based simply on the symmetry between a people’s group right to selfdetermination and the same such group right of other peoples. Rather, the requirement arises more
deeply from the normative source that grounds a people’s group right to self-determination in the
first place. The normative source is, of course, the principle of democratic self-determination—the
equal rights of all to participate in the decision making over their common activities—and this
principle may generate self-determination claims held by individuals as well as groups. Recall that
group rights are understood as belonging to groups as constituted entities and derived from the
rights of group members—that is, individuals—in their relations as group members (Gould 2001,
48). Under such an account, group rights and individual rights are not irreconcilable or mutually
exclusive, but rather can be coherently grounded in the same normative principle. Even if group
rights might come into conflict with individual rights, such conflicts need not arise any more so
between them than between individual rights themselves (Jones 2016, sec. 8). So, the requirement
to respect the self-determination claims of outsiders is the requirement to respect all such claims,
whether held by groups or individuals, that are grounded in the same normative source from which
a people’s group right to self-determination itself arises.
The system-wide justification for a people’s right to self-determination, especially given
its territorial nature, provides a second reason (in addition to the universalist form of the principle
of self-determination) as to why a people must respect the self-determination claims of all others
in the system. To see this, note that a people’s self-determination in this context means selfdetermination over (and, consequently, the right to exclude from) a bounded territory. The world’s
land is, of course, finite; so, any territory over which a people is accorded self-determination rights
generally means territory over which other peoples and their members have no self-determination
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rights (simplifying over any domains of shared governance). 108 In this sense, every people is
constitutively related to all those outside of it since the very moment that a people (and its territory)
is constituted, it constitutes all others, both individuals and groups, as outside itself. One
consequence of these facts is that the accordance of self-determination rights to peoples is best
seen as justified as a whole system in which the world is divided into various territorially bounded
peoples, rather than as merely justified for each individual people’s territorial claim taken one at a
time.109 Carving up the world into a “society of peoples,” to re-purpose John Rawls’ (2001) phrase,
can be justified as a means for groups of individuals engaged in common activities attached to
their respective territories to secure their self-determination consistent with the securement in kind
by all others of a territorial form of self-determination for themselves.110 It follows that a people
has the qualified right to exclude—a right that is grounded in its right to self-determination—
insofar as it respects the self-determination claims of all those that it constitutes as outsiders,
including both individuals and groups.
We thus have the beginning of an answer to the boundary problem—one that appeals to
the substantive principle of democratic self-determination and thus avoids the infinite regress
generated by appealing to procedural principles of democracy alone. The boundary problem raises
the challenge of how to justify the exclusion of some from membership within a people. The
answer that I am providing is roughly twofold: such exclusion is justifiable a) as grounded in a
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Kant (1991), of course, noted the fact that earth's geographical space was finite, from which he derived a right to
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the Law of Peoples.
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people’s right to self-determination and b) insofar as those constituted as outside the people have
their own self-determination claims respected. As I noted earlier, a people’s territorially bounded
common activities, while contingent, are not morally irrelevant from a democratic point of view
but rather generate contexts relevant for self-determination rights (which consequently ground
rights to exclude) and secure the substantive conditions of democracy. Here, we see how the
contingent boundaries of a people’s common activities and the specific exclusions those
boundaries generate are further and fully legitimized by a people respecting the self-determination
claims of outsiders. The very same ground (that is, the principle of self-determination) for valuing
a people’s right to exclude thus also constrains and determines the scope of that right.
Although the requirement to respect the self-determination claims of outsiders (held by
both groups and individuals) may serve to formally meet the challenge of the boundary problem,
it is still pitched at too high a level of generality and abstractness to provide practical normative
guidance. So, I move next to consider some concrete cases in which the self-determination claims
of outsiders should constrain a people’s right to exclude. For some of these cases, the selfdetermination claims of outsiders can only be respected if they are not excluded but are instead
included as members. My argument provides a substantive framework for thinking through what
constitutes permissible exclusion that not only addresses the core challenge of the boundary
problem within democratic theory but also unifies the judgments one should give in various cases
of exclusion. So, even if one disagrees with the details of the judgments that I give on the specific
cases below, one can still appeal to the same general framework (of determining what kinds of
exclusions violate the self-determination claims of outsiders) to justify a different package of
normative recommendations or to account for other cases of exclusion not considered here.
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§6.5 RESIDENTS, REFUGEES, AND BRAIN DRAIN
Let us begin with the case of long-term residents on a people’s territory, which many
theorists have argued should be included as members with full and equal status (Walzer 1983, 52–
61; Gould 2006, 49; Bosniak 2007; D. Miller 2008; Wellman 2008; Carens 2013, chap. 8; Espejo
2016). We can see this as following directly from the need for a people to respect the selfdetermination claims of others. Since residents are engaged in the common activities taking place
within a people’s territory and everyone engaged in the same common activities have equal rights
to co-determine the course of those activities, all long-term residents, including undocumented and
irregular immigrants, should be enfranchised as full and equal members (Gould 2006, 50). This
does not necessarily imply that long-term residents should be required to become citizens (since
they may reasonably not want citizenship within the people upon whose territory they reside in for
any number of personal, practical, or ideological considerations) but rather that access to
citizenship should be readily available to them.111 This argument is consonant with Joseph Carens’
(2013) theory of social membership in which an individual’s claim to become a member of a
people strengthens as she increasingly develops and becomes bound up in dense networks of
relationships, associations, and interests connected to the place where she lives. “Social
membership,” as he put it, “is normatively prior to citizenship” (161). Indeed, we can see the theory
of social membership as one way of specifying in greater detail what it means to be engaged in a
people’s common activities (so long as “social” is understood broadly to include involvement in
economic and political activities as well), with residence and length of stay being relevant,
objective, and easily measurable proxies for social membership (Carens 2013, 164–68).
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Insofar as engagement in the territorially bounded common activities of a people is scalar
and comes in degrees, the bundle of rights associated with membership could be disaggregated
and differentially distributed based on the degree of such engagement (Song 2016). For instance,
transients such as tourists, visiting students, or temporary workers could be granted civil rights and
liberties (e.g. freedom of religion, speech, and assembly; equal protection under the law; due
process) and access to basic public goods (e.g. public roads, emergency healthcare) since they are
still engaged with the common activities of a people at some level, even if the other rights attached
to full and equal status including access to extended public goods (e.g. non-emergency healthcare,
welfare benefits, basic education) and political rights (e.g. rights to vote and to hold political office)
should be reserved for long-term residents (Song 2016, 242–46). There may be multiple ways to
work out the specifics of such a scheme of differentially distributed rights, which can all be
reasonable and within the demands of democracy so long as a permanent caste of second-class
citizens lacking full and equal status either de facto or de jure (such as ancient Athenian metics,
blacks in apartheid South Africa, African Americans in the Jim Crow South, and Uighurs in China)
is definitively ruled out. Deciding upon the details of such a democratically legitimate scheme,
then, will be another way in which a people can exercise its right to self-determination and to
control its own membership.
The self-determination argument, as it is generally characterized, in fact relies on the very
constraint that long-term residents must be included in order to justify a right to exclude. To see
this, note that the right to exclude, as Sarah Fine (2010, 342–43) has pointed out, incorporates three
distinct elements: the right to exclude outsiders from crossing into a territory, the right to exclude
them from settling within the territory, and the right to exclude them from membership. Since most
proponents of the self-determination argument agree that all long-term residents who are already
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settled within a people’s territory must be enfranchised as equal members, the only way for a
people to exercise self-determination in controlling its membership is if it has the right to exclude
others from entering and subsequently settling within its territory in the first place (Walzer 1983;
Wellman 2008; D. Miller 2008). The right to exclude outsiders from membership does not
necessarily impinge on their freedom of movement as they may cross into a territory for a limited
time so long as they do not settle there (Wellman 2008, 136–37). So, the constraint that long-term
residents must be included as members is in fact built into the very self-determination argument in
the first place. Not only is this constraint a premise used to justify the right to exclude, but it is
also grounded in the same normative source justifying that very right—namely, the principle of
self-determination. My argument can be understood as exploiting this feature of the structure of
the self-determination argument that was there all along to show that it has more far-reaching
implications than is generally understood. I contend that there are additional constraints beyond
the constraint to include long-term residents that likewise a) are grounded in the same principle of
self-determination that justifies the right to exclude and b) should be relied upon as a premise
justifying that right since these constraints taken together serve to fully legitimize a people’s right
to exclude by answering the challenge of the boundary problem.
Consider refugees next. Proponents of the self-determination argument generally do not
take refugees to be a constraint on the right to exclude that arises internally from the principle of
self-determination itself. Christopher Wellman (2008) is perhaps most stark here when he notes,
“legitimate states are entitled to reject all potential immigrants, even those desperately seeking
asylum from corrupt governments” (141). The more representative position of self-determination
proponents sees peoples as in fact having duties to admit some refugees but takes these duties as
arising out of a principle of mutual aid (Walzer 1983, 48–51; Pevnick 2011, 12). According to
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such a view, it is possible that all peoples have fulfilled, at least to some extent, their duties of
mutual aid toward refugees, but some refugees still remain in dire straits in need of a place to go.
While this would be a tragic situation, it would not require, as a matter of duty, remedying on the
part of peoples.
In contrast, I suggest that a people’s duties toward refugees is a constraint on its right to
exclude that arises from the principle of self-determination itself. We can interpret the “right to
have rights” of refugees, as Hannah Arendt (1973, 296–97) put it, as the right to belong to some
people as an equal member engaged in the common activities taking place within its territory. This
is the legitimate self-determination claim that refugees hold against all peoples, which arises out
of the same principle that grounds a people’s right to exclude. As we have seen, the accordance of
self-determination rights to peoples is justified as a whole system in which the world’s land is
divided into various territorially bounded peoples for the purpose of realizing the selfdetermination of those within the system including both groups and individuals. Since refugees
will not have their self-determination claims (understood as the “right to have rights”) respected
within this system unless they are included as a member within some people, the duty to provide
refugees with membership thus acts as a constraint on a people’s right to exclude. Even if all
peoples admitted a significant number of refugees, so long as some refugees were still in need of
membership, then this situation would not simply be a tragedy but would require correction in
order for the accordance of self-determination rights to peoples to be justified in the first place.
Refugees, then, should not be understood narrowly as only those fleeing religious or political
persecution, but broadly as all individuals in need of a “durable solution” of membership within
some territorially bounded people, which would also include environmental refugees who are
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indefinitely displaced by environmental devastation or climate change and so cannot functionally
participate as members in the common activities of their place of origin (Lister 2014, 620–21).
The situation of ecological refugee peoples who have lost the entirety of their territories
due to ecological devastation, such as rising sea levels (which threatens island nations such as the
Maldives, Kiribati, or Tuvalu), constitutes another case of self-determination claims that would
constrain a people’s right to exclude. Since the self-determination rights of ecological refugee
peoples are group rights rather than individual rights, these rights would not be respected if each
individual member of an ecological refugee people were simply resettled and enfranchised within
other peoples (though this may be needed as a second-best compensatory measure). Additionally,
ecological refugee peoples have had the very conditions for their group right to ecological integrity
undermined by the losses of their territories. Since ecological integrity is a constituent part of
external self-determination as I argued in Chapter 3, ecological refugee peoples then are owed new
territories of their own that restores their collective self-determination (Nine 2010; Kolers 2012a;
Stilz 2019, 178–82). Such territories may need to come from uninhabited or sparsely populated
areas from large wealthy developed nation-states since they would likely be most responsible for
contributing to the plight of ecological refugee peoples through their greenhouse gas emissions
and most able to provide such territorial remedies. Perhaps under these sorts of territorial
reconstitutions, an ecological refugee people may only be granted partial sovereignty and may
need to share some sovereignty with the developed nation-state that ceded territory to it for a
variety of reasons. Members of that developed nation-state may still inhabit the territory ceded to
the ecological refugee people; existing socioeconomic ties and institutions across the two
territories may continue to necessitate shared governance; and certain sovereignty bargains
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between the two peoples may also be important for helping the ecological refugee people to
establish legitimate and functioning political institutions upon its new territory.
Of course, important questions remain that I do not have space to tackle here including
how the burden of accepting and assisting refugees among peoples should be fairly distributed,
especially in cases of partial compliance where not all peoples are doing their fair share to meet
the needs of refugees (Owen 2016). And there may be limits that need to be specified on the
amount of refugees that certain peoples can absorb given their population density and the capacities
of their sociopolitical institutions. However, to be clear, such practical limitations do not constitute
grounds for denying or shirking the duty to accept refugees and the capacities of some peoples to
accept refugees may themselves be expanded in many cases through financial or material
assistance from other peoples. Regardless, a people’s right to exclude will be constrained by its
duties to refugees, which can be seen as arising from the very principle of democratic selfdetermination that grounds the right to exclude in the first place. These duties to refugees may
require peoples to not only to accept their fair share of refugees but also to work toward significant
reforms to the international refugee regime as it currently exists and to cooperate with others to
prevent the rise of global temperatures so as to avoid creating ecological refugee peoples (or, when
the territorial losses of ecological refugee peoples can be reasonably expected to be inevitable, to
plan ahead for the institution of adaptation measures and territorial remedies).
Here, it is useful to clarify that an individual’s right to self-determination entitles her to
membership within some people (as in the “right to have rights” of refugees) but not membership
within any people of her own choosing. If the latter were the case, then the group right of peoples
to self-determination and their right to exclude would come into direct conflict with the individual
right to self-determination and to choose one’s own people. To settle this conflict in favor of the

224

right of individuals to choose their own peoples would then be an argument for completely open
borders. The right to self-determination, though, is the right to participate in the decision making
regarding one’s common activities but not the right to participate in any common activities of
one’s choosing. Of course, it will be important that an individual has some degree of choice over
which common activities to participate in and it may even be better the more such choice an
individual has. However, an adequate range of common activities from which to choose is
sufficient to protect an individual’s basic interests, and an individual cannot legitimately demand
as a right the choice to participate in whatever common activities she so desires.112 To assume such
a right otherwise would also potentially entail unfair and burdensome duties on the part of peoples
in accepting any and all newcomers, which would likely infringe on their group rights to selfdetermination. In a system composed of the territorially bounded common activities of peoples,
refugees have the “right to have rights” in part because membership within some (at least decent)
people, especially in current circumstances, is a precondition for accessing an adequate range of
common activities. Though long-term residents have the right to be members of not just some
people but the specific people whose common activities they are already participating within, they
still do not have the right to be members of any people of their choosing. Ordinarily, we do not
think of peoples as completely voluntary associations nor must we. Because there is no selfdetermination right to be a member of a people of one’s choosing, I do not see the individual right
to self-determination as conflicting with (and potentially undermining) so much as constraining
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This argument combines the insights of Miller (2005, 196) and Gould (1988, 71–80). Miller argues that the
international freedom of movement is a bare but not a basic freedom warranting the status of a right because the
domestic freedom of movement within decent states is sufficient for individuals to access an adequate range of
opportunities to secure their basic interests. Here, I focus on not the freedom of movement, but the freedom to choose
one’s common activities. Though common activities (like opportunities) are valuable since, as Gould notes, they are
among the conditions that individuals need for their freedom understood as self-development, the freedom to choose
one’s common activities (like the freedom of movement) should be given a sufficientarian interpretation.
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and determining the scope of a people’s group right to exclude as derived from its right to selfdetermination.
The final case that I will consider is that of brain drain or the emigration of skilled workers,
which may harm the economic or social development of sending countries. Although the empirical
data on brain drain, including its causes, effects, and possible solutions, is complex and difficult
to evaluate, suppose that a people’s immigration policies attract skilled workers from other
countries in ways that damage the economic and social development of those sending countries
(Sahay 2009, 19–56). Here, a people’s right to exclude is exercised in a way (perhaps by excluding
unskilled workers and providing incentives for skilled workers to immigrate) that violates the selfdetermination claims of other peoples. After all, emigration rates can affect a people’s
determination of its common activities just as much as immigration rates can. It is far from clear,
however, that modifying or restricting the immigration policies of receiving peoples is the best
solution taken on its own (even if it maybe should be one element within an overall approach) for
remedying the harms that might be caused by brain drain. Alex Sager has persuasively argued that
the issue of brain drain should be analyzed within a more holistic and institutional context, which
would consider not simply restricting emigration and immigration policies of sending and
receiving countries but also the reform of global institutions and the “migration-development
nexus” more generally (Sager 2004). Nonetheless, the possibility of brain drain presents a case in
which a people’s right to exclude could infringe on not the self-determination claims of individuals
(as in the case of long-term residents and refugees) but the group rights to self-determination of
other peoples. A people may thus have to, just as in the case of refugees, not merely modify their
immigration policies but also work toward reforming the global institutions in which they
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participate that structure the broader “migration-development nexus” and consequently engender
the harms of brain drain.

§6.6 CONCLUSION
Defending a people’s qualified right to exclude, as I have done, is far from equivalent to
justifying closed borders or endorsing the existing international border regime, which is unfair,
unjust, and undemocratic in various ways. Indeed, to say that a people has a qualified right to
exclude is consistent with saying that a people ought to exercise such a right by opening its borders
or at least making them fairly porous. Perhaps doing so would be an important means by which
peoples, especially affluent and advantaged ones, could fulfill their global justice duties (after due
consideration of the potential harmful consequences of brain drain). Regardless, it remains
important both theoretically and practically to defend a people’s qualified right to exclude as
grounded in and constrained by a principle of self-determination. For instance, defenders of
completely open borders based on a supposed right to the international freedom of movement will
be unable to directly argue that historically marginalized and vulnerable peoples (such as
Indigenous peoples) should have the right to exclude outsiders as a crucial condition for preserving
their own self-determination. 113 After all, the exclusion of outsiders by peoples whose selfdetermination is under threat still violates the presumed human right to free international
movement. As Moore (2015, 200) points out, when Manitoba, which was majority Indigenous
(Metis and First Nations), joined Canada in 1870, the combined migration of individuals—each of
whom may have had perfectly good and justifiable reasons for moving—in conjunction with
“numbered treaties” that pushed Indigenous peoples to increasingly smaller areas of land ended
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See the previous note for Miller’s argument for why there is no right to the international freedom of movement.
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up undermining Indigenous self-determination and further marginalizing them. Perhaps defenders
of a right to freedom of movement can retreat to considering the case of vulnerable peoples as an
exceptional one, perhaps of corrective or rectificatory justice, which would then justify restricting
the right to freedom of movement. While it is certainly true that historically disenfranchised
populations are owed corrective justice, treating their situation simply as a special case ignores the
fundamental thrust of their moral claims grounded in their rights to self-determination as a people.
It is better, then, to recognize a people’s qualified right to exclude as both grounded in and
constrained by a principle of democratic self-determination. Such a position accounts for the
particular attachments and claims of belonging often ignored by open border proponents,
attenuates the basically unrestricted right to exclude defended by many self-determination
proponents, and can still remain consonant with global justice duties that might arise. Proponents
of the self-determination argument should find the reasons I give for constraining the right to
exclude especially compelling because they are reasons that arise by their very own lights. Indeed,
built into the self-determination argument itself is the requirement to include long-term residents,
which is a constraint on the right to exclude that the argument relies on to justify that very right.
The additional constraints I suggest can be seen as extending this reason for inclusion. Finally, by
requiring that peoples respect the self-determination claims of outsiders, which may sometimes
entail including those very outsiders, my view addresses the core challenge of the boundary
problem and thus serves to legitimize the boundaries of peoples by making them more consistent,
internally and externally, with the very principle of democratic self-determination that they seek
to realize for themselves.
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